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Abstract
This thesis comprises three essays addressing questions related to pricing, competition, and con-
sumer welfare in imperfectly competitive industries characterised by the existence of demand and
supply side frictions.
Chapter 1 studies a dynamic pricing game amongst differentiated multiproduct oligopolists who
have incentives to temporarily lower prices to attract new consumers who are more likely to pur-
chase the same product again at a higher price due to inertia. The novel feature of the model, which
allows to explain persistence in the observed patterns of retail prices, is the possibility of costly
price adjustment. The magnitude of adjustment costs is estimated using scanner data on purchases
of a category of dairy products by UK households. The main results suggest that adjustment costs
can be substantial for manufacturers, but they are passed through to the consumers only on a very
limited scale.
Chapter 2 explores an alternative explanation for price dispersion by introducing a model with
search frictions and private information about marginal costs. Consumers decide how many sell-
ers to visit who in equilibrium set prices in a fashion similar to bidding in a reverse first-price
auction with an unknown number of competitors. The chapter shows how the distributions of
search costs and firm heterogeneity can be nonparametrically identified and analyses convergence
rates of the proposed estimators.
Chapter 3 uses an extension of the search model proposed earlier to study the value of information
provided by mortgage brokers in the UK. Prospective borrowers can either directly search and ap-
ply for mortgages with different lenders or use a broker who finds the best rate on their behalf. The
main finding suggests that, on average, the existence of brokers substantially fosters competition
between lenders, leads to lower monthly payments in equilibrium and reduces the deadweight loss
arising as a result of costly search.
Impact Statement
The research presented in the chapters of the thesis can broadly impact the academic and non-
academic discussion on competition, regulation, market power, and consumer welfare in imper-
fectly competitive markets. The main results highlight new channels through which oligopolists’
market power can be reduced, even if consumers themselves exhibit inertia (chapter 1) or infor-
mation acquisition is costly (chapter 3).
The empirical findings in chapter 1 are of particular interest for regulators who have been raising
concerns about the lack of transparency in the payments between manufacturers and retailers in
vertical chains. The framework presented there allows to estimate the magnitude of promotional
fees borne by manufacturers to influence pricing decisions by the downstream firm. These pay-
ments are typically hidden in the contracts and their existence has been a subject of a widespread
debate in the media. The chapter shows that removing such payments would indeed lead to a
redistribution of profits within the channel, but would not lead to a big improvement in terms of
consumer surplus. These findings can be used in the design of policies regulating contracts be-
tween manufacturers and retailers.
The conclusions in chapter 3 contribute to the important discussion on whether markets benefit
from intermediation. I show that in industries where direct contact between buyers and sellers
(here borrowers and lenders) can be difficult because of search frictions, the existence of brokers
positively affects competition and leads to lower prices. However, an important finding from this
chapter, which should be a pivotal argument in the public debate, is that the effects of intermedia-
tion are heterogeneous across different types of consumers and products they choose. Therefore,
no regulation should be uniformly affecting every party in the same way. In the context of the UK
mortgage market, certain types of borrowers could be encouraged to obtain advice from brokers
more often than others.
The models developed in the chapters of the thesis have novel features and can be used to study a
wider array of industries. The methodology proposed in chapter 1 can be readily extended to study
dynamic pricing problems with an arbitrary number of firms, products and consumer types. While
discussing the search model in chapter 2, I put particular emphasis on explaining the estimation
strategy and potential extensions, hoping that other researchers can benefit from the methodologi-
cal innovations introduced in these chapters.
Parts of the research in this thesis have already been disseminated to a wider audience through
presentations at international conferences and invited seminars. Finally, since the three chapters
can be treated as self-contained papers, my important goal for the future is to publish them in
leading academic journals.
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Preface
The last three decades have seen a steady increase in the number of empirical studies of imperfectly
competitive industries, which use the structure of game-theoretic economic models and modern
econometric tools to analyse market data and answer various questions related to competition,
market structure and industry dynamics (Ackerberg et al., 2007). However, the business environ-
ment in many industries changes so rapidly that even with an increased availability and improved
quality of data, IO researchers constantly need to broaden the set of tools and models they use, in
order to be able to answer questions which are up-to-date and relevant for academics and policy-
makers. Therefore, the majority of research presented in this thesis was motivated by the need to
fill some methodological gaps in the empirical IO literature and then applying the proposed meth-
ods to answer questions using detailed data from two important industries: retailing and banking.
In particular, I was interested in formulating models that: (i) would be able to detect and measure
the magnitude of different types of supply and demand frictions including price adjustment costs
faced by firms, consumer inertia, and search costs; (ii) could be used to counterfactually analyse
how such frictions affect pricing dynamics, competition and consumer welfare.
Chapter 1 is based on my joint paper with Fabio Sanches, Daniel Silva and Tang Srisuma and
was inspired by my earlier work on dynamic discrete games. While analysing data on dynamics
of retail prices of consumer packaged goods, it became clear that for most products, researchers
observe only a discrete set of prices which also exhibit a significant degree of persistence over
time.
To explain such patterns, the chapter introduces a new dynamic game-theoretic model in which
multiproduct firms simultaneously choose prices for all differentiated products they offer, which
can be structurally estimated using panel data on consumers’ choices and observed prices. While
the players involved in the game are forward-looking, consumers are myopic and exhibit brand
loyalty. This generates a dynamic pricing incentive for the firms, which face the well-documented
trade-off between building up a consumer base by charging low prices today and exploiting the
fact that some consumers are already locked in with the product and therefore they are willing to
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pay a higher price now. The source of frictions on the supply side are the costs of adjusting prices.
In other words, even when firms want to change the prices, they have to factor in the administrative
expenses they have to incur. Basing on the aforementioned observation that prices in our data take
only a limited number of values, we depart from the traditional treatment of prices as continuous
decision variables, in favour of a discrete choice approach. The additional merit of following this
path is that the model turns out to be a particular instance of the dynamic oligopoly framework
of Ericson and Pakes (1995) and therefore we can use the computationally feasible two-step es-
timation techniques developed for dynamic entry games. Moreover, after introducing firm-level
private information, we are guaranteed that an equilibrium in pure strategies exists, which has
been a problematic issue in papers studying optimal pricing with consumer inertia, such as Dube´,
Hitsch, and Rossi (2009) and Pavlidis and Ellickson (2017).
The features of the model are of particular importance for the empirical application to the UK
butter and margarine industry. This is a typical example of an oligopoly with three dominant firms
who sell multiple products under different brand names. The only dimension of price competi-
tion in this market is through temporary price promotions (sales), and more specifically switching
between regular and sale prices (Hosken and Reiffen, 2004). Industry reports reveal that 70%
of supermarket suppliers make payments toward marketing costs or price promotions. Moreover,
since promotional fees are usually not regulated by long-run contracts and instead negotiated on a
running basis, they have attracted interest from the UK competition authorities. Our research aims
to confront some of the anecdotal claims mentioned above with data. Firstly we seek to quantify
the magnitude of promotional costs to see whether they constitute an important part of manufac-
turers’ revenues. We then analyse how imposing regulation on the payments from manufacturers
to retailers would affect consumer welfare and firms’ profits.
The contribution of chapter 2, based on another joint paper with Fabio Sanches, Daniel Silva and
Tang Srisuma, is mostly methodological. The chapter introduces a new model of nonsequential
search with a continuum of consumers and a finite number of firms. Both consumers and firms are
heterogeneous. Consumers differ in search costs. Firms have private marginal costs of production.
This assumption is different from virtually all structural models of search, starting with Hong and
Shum (2006), which, following Burdett and Judd (1983) assumed that firms are ex ante identical
and play mixed strategy in equilibrium. We show that an equilibrium price dispersion can arise in
this model both as a result of search and ex ante heterogeneity amongst firms. However, hetero-
geneity in cost is not sufficient and some degree of search is still necessary for firms not to charge
monopoly price to all consumers in equilibrium. We provide conditions to identify the features
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of the model using prices and market shares. Our identification strategy is constructive and relies
on results from the literature on nonparametric auction estimation. We derive the uniform rate of
convergence of our estimator and show its properties in a series of Monte Carlo simulations.
The final chapter of the thesis, joint with May Rostom, is an empirical study of the impact of
search frictions and brokerage services on mortgage choices and competition in the UK credit in-
dustry. We extend the structural model of search with lender and borrower heterogeneity proposed
in chapter 2 to estimate the value of information provided by mortgage intermediaries (brokers)
in the UK. Using administrative data on loans originated in 2016 and 2017, we document the
existence of a substantial degree of unexplained price dispersion and observe that while mort-
gages obtained through brokers are on average cheaper, borrowers who use intermediaries end up
paying more once commissions are factored in. This fact underpins the assumption that brokers
are used by borrowers with higher search costs, which helps nonparametrically identify and es-
timate the distributions of search cost and banks’ cost of providing the loan. Our results show
that search costs vary by demographic groups and brokers’ presence exerts a negative pressure on
lenders’ market power. To estimate how intermediation affects consumer surplus, we consider a
counterfactual where broker advice is not available, finding that brokers’ presence reduces average
monthly costs by 33.7% and welfare losses caused by search frictions by 16.5%, though the results
differ by borrower and loan characteristics. Remarkably, average value of information provided
by brokers is positive only for borrowers who take up mortgages with 2-year fixed term deals. In
a second counterfactual we look at the effects of a hypothetical market centralization, finding that
such a regulation would halve lenders’ markups and lower monthly costs of an average mortgage
by 6.4%.
Last part of the thesis includes concluding remarks and outlines directions for future research,
both methodological and empirical. Additional materials for each of the chapters, including omit-
ted derivations, proofs, and additional results are included in the appendices.
3
.
Chapter 1
Implications of Consumer Loyalty for
Price Dynamics when Price Adjustment
is Costly
1.1 Introduction
A general consensus in the marketing and industrial organisation literature is that the existence of
consumer switching costs, due to brand loyalty (habit or other types of inertia), creates two coun-
tervailing effects for firms’ pricing decisions: investing and harvesting. See, for example, Beggs
and Klemperer (1992), Dube´, Hitsch, and Rossi (2009), Arie and Grieco (2014). The investment
motive acts as an incentive for firms to temporarily lower their prices in order to build up a larger
base of loyal consumers. Subsequently, after acquiring a number of loyal consumers, firms may
increase their prices and harvest the investments made in the previous periods. Existing theoretical
models of competition do not deliver unequivocal predictions about the effect of consumer loyalty
on equilibrium prices, concluding that they can be either higher (if the harvesting motive prevails)
or lower (if the opposite is true) (Farrell and Klemperer, 2007). To supplement theoretical find-
ings, recent empirical studies by Dube´ et al. (2009) and Pavlidis and Ellickson (2017) have shown
that the investing motive tends to generate a negative pressure on prices.
All models that study the effects of consumer loyalty on price dynamics assume that firms can
adjust their prices freely. This stands in contrast to a substantial body of empirical research in eco-
nomics that highlights the importance of price adjustment costs from the supply side in a variety
of settings. For example, see Slade (1998), Aguirregabiria (1999), Dutta, Bergen, Levy, and Ven-
able (1999), Levy, Bergen, Dutta, and Venable (1997), Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta, and Bergen
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(2004) and Ellison, Snyder, and Zhang (2015). If price adjustments are in fact costly, intuitively,
when firms reduce prices to invest in consumer loyalty they not only have to deal with temporary
profit losses but also with the cost of the price change itself. As a consequence, price adjustment
costs may alter firms incentives to invest in new consumers, with potential repercussions on the
correlation between loyalty and equilibrium prices.
In this chapter we present an empirical model of dynamic oligopoly pricing that explicitly
models both demand and supply side frictions. We use it to study the UK butter and margarine
industry using a rich scanner dataset. We are interested in knowing whether price adjustment costs
are present for the dairy producers who supply their products to supermarkets. If the answer is
yes, we would want to investigate: (i) how they can affect prices through promotions, and (ii) their
implications on firm profits and consumer welfare in the presence of consumer loyalty.
The focus on adjustment costs is of a significant interest in the context of our application. One
interpretation of the adjustment costs in our model is the promotional fees that suppliers pay to
the supermarkets; for example, for the purpose of prominently featuring their products on fliers or
designated store shelves. These payments are key components of the so-called supplier rebates
that, in the UK, are suspected to be substantial but hard to observe or quantify, even for financial
accounting purposes.1 Therefore counterfactual exercises that remove the adjustment costs can be
used to make predictions following a ban on promotional fees.
The supply side of our model is based on a class of dynamic discrete games that has seen
increasing number of applications in IO and other fields (e.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) or
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)). The dairy industry is an example of an oligopoly with
three dominant firms: Arla, Dairy Crest and Unilever, who sell multiple products under different
brand names. Their main sales channels are national retail chains. Therefore price competition can
occur through temporary price promotions (sales), and more specifically switching between reg-
ular and sale prices (Hosken and Reiffen, 2004). We therefore model price as a discrete variable.
On the demand side consumers maximise their household utilities with their purchase options.
We assume that consumers are myopic but exhibit some degree of brand loyalty. Our model is a
particular instance of the dynamic oligopoly framework of Ericson and Pakes (1995) that is known
to be computationally feasible and possess an equilibrium in pure strategies.
1Supplier rebates for big supermarkets in the UK received some attention recently for their lack of transparency in firms’
balance sheets. Unlike in the US, for example, UK retailers do not publish how much money they receive from commer-
cial income. A BBC article published in October 2014 says that, according to Fitch, the declared income on supplier re-
bates from a number of big American supermarkets “are the equivalent to 8% of the cost of goods sold for the retailers,
equal to virtually all their profit”, and a chartered accountant who specialises in working with UK supermarket balance sheets
“conservatively estimates supplier contributions to be worth around £5bn a year to the top four supermarkets”. More de-
tails and discussions on supplier rebates can also be found at: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-29629742 and
https://www.economist.com/business/2015/06/18/buying-up-the-shelves.
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Adjustment costs are generally not identified nonparametrically but can be identified under
a normalisation (Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014), Komarova, Sanches, Silva Jr., and Srisuma
(forthcoming)). Our normalisation choice is consistent with the motivation that suppliers bear the
fees to sponsor a price promotion.2 More specifically our application assumes a cost is incurred
to the supplier when a product goes on promotion but there is no cost when it returns to its regular
price. We otherwise allow the adjustment costs to be fully heterogenous across brands and super-
markets. We find that price adjustment costs are substantial in magnitude and constitute between
24% and 34% of firms’ variable profits. In absolute terms, these estimates are very similar across
players and given that the firms we considered are the market leaders, this result may indicate that
price adjustment costs constitute a much bigger fraction of the profits of smaller companies and
local dairies, effectively restricting the scope of their promotional activities. This is consistent
with what we observe in the data on smaller producers, who put their products on promotion much
less frequently. Our results also complements findings from the marketing literature that market
shares are positively correlated with the frequency of temporary price cuts.3
Our counterfactual studies compare equilibrium outcomes from models with and without ad-
justment costs. We first analyse the impacts of consumer switching costs on prices. We do this
by comparing equilibrium prices across different consumer loyalty levels. Our model predicts that
increases in consumer switching costs lead to increases in equilibrium prices. But this effect is
significantly more pronounced in the model with price adjustment costs than without. In particu-
lar, our estimates show that a three fold increase in consumer switching costs may lead to a price
increase that is up to 250% higher in the model with price adjustment costs vis-a`-vis the price in-
crease observed in the model without price adjustment costs. Therefore ignoring price adjustment
costs can substantially underpredict the effects of consumer loyalty on prices.
Next, we consider the implications of price adjustment costs for firm profits and consumer sur-
plus. One can interpret this investigation as a welfare analysis of a ban on promotional fees.4 We
find that when price adjustment costs are excluded from the model profits increase substantially,
between 50-70%, but consumer surplus goes up by only 0.4-3.3%. This happens because manu-
facturers pass only a small fraction of the cost reduction to the consumers. When we remove price
adjustment costs from our model the frequency of promotions increases and the average duration
2See the last paragaph of the concluding section in Aguirregabiria (1999), as well as Blattberg and Briesch (2010) for a more
detailed description of promotional mechanisms.
3For example, Agrawal (1996) noted that smaller brands should rather focus on advertising than price promotions. In the context
of slotting fees, Bloom et al. (2000) established that the existence of payments from manufacturers to retailers might be hindering
competition because these costs are higher for smaller brands in relative terms.
4This does not mean suppliers do not pay retailers for other costs. Operational costs, which include menu costs of printing new
labels and organising shelves, can still enter firm profit functions.
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of promotional spells decreases. In line with previous estimates (see Basker (2015) and Ellison
et al. (2015)), our results indicate that investments in technologies that seek to reduce the costs of
adjusting prices may generate considerable returns for firms. Alternatively, the results from this
counterfactual can be interpreted as the welfare estimates of a ban on promotional fees.
Our estimation strategy combines different methodologies. We use household level scanner
data to estimate a state-dependent logit demand model, and obtain a law of motion for aggregate
market shares. The other components of the firm payoff functions are separated into the adjust-
ment costs and everything else. We estimate the adjustment costs using the approach proposed in
Komarova et al. (forthcoming), who show that switching costs in dynamic games – for example,
entry costs in entry games, capacity adjustment costs in investment games, and promotional fees
in the context of our application – can be identified in closed form. Furthermore, the estimates of
adjustment costs are robust to different specification of profits and the discount factor. We also
estimate the discount factor, which, as shown by Komarova et al. (forthcoming), is identified when
period payoffs are linear in parameters, which is true in the case of the game analysed in this work.
The estimated discount factors are between 0.92 and 0.99 for different suppliers, which lie within
the range of values commonly assumed by other papers in this literature, suggesting that pricing
decisions have an important intertemporal component.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: the next section provides a brief literature re-
view, followed by several facts about the industry and description of the data. Section 1.4 presents
some preliminary reduced-form evidence of consumer switching costs and price adjustment costs
and their implications for pricing decisions. Section 1.5 introduces the theoretical model. Section
1.6 explains our identification strategy, steps of the estimation procedure, and shows our structural
estimates. We then discuss the fit of our model and our main counterfactual results in section 1.7.
Section 1.8 concludes the chapter. Appendix A contains derivations and additional details on the
identification strategy, description of the algorithms used to solve the model and robustness checks
to some of our assumptions.
1.2 Related literature
The model consists of three main building blocks: multiproduct nature of firms, consumer- and
firm-side switching costs. To the best of our knowledge, there exist no theoretical or empirical pa-
pers analysing these three aspects jointly. We also make use of some predictions stemming from
microeconomic models of sales and, in the empirical part of this work, of the recent developments
in the literature on identification and estimation of dynamic games.
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Models of sales. The existence of temporary sales is a not a new phenomenon and pricing prob-
lems of this kind have been extensively studied, both in the economics and marketing literature.5
Interestingly, explanations for transient downward price movements substantially differ from one
another, depending on the assumptions of the model and characteristics of industry or product of
interest. Even though in our model we assume that sales arise because firms are aware of consumer
inertia, it is still worth noting that there might be other explanations for the observed patterns of
prices, valid in other contexts.
Early theoretical contributions typically considered sellers of a homogenous good who offered
temporarily lower prices to discriminate between informed and uninformed (Varian, 1980) or high-
and low-valuation consumers (Conlisk et al., 1984). Sobel (1984) extended the model in the latter
paper to an oligopolistic setting to find that there are equilibria in which firms act as monopolists
to their loyal consumers and cut their prices only to compete for the price-sensitive consumers.
Some other equilibria characterised by long spells of regular prices might arise in the presence
of punishment strategies.6 Although we cannot account for history-dependence in the Markovian
framework and the author considers a durable good in a very stylised environment, some insights
from this study should also pertain to more complex situations, such as the the one described in
our work.
Aguirregabiria (1999) provides an alternative explanation for cyclical pricing based on retailers’
inventory dynamics and costs associated with placing orders and changing prices. This is one of
the first papers to use a structural model to produce an estimate of menu costs and notice that from
retailers’ perspective, the costs of cutting prices are relatively low, since it is the manufacturers
(wholesalers) who bear most of it. Therefore, the estimates we obtain should complement the
findings of Aguirregabiria (1999), insofar as we analyse the pricing problem from the manufac-
turers’ standpoint. Pesendorfer (2002) attempts to explain pricing patterns of two ketchup brands
using a model of intertemporal pricing. The main source of price dynamics in his paper is demand
accumulation due to consumer stockpiling and purchase acceleration in the low-price periods. In
order to test the implications of his theoretical model, the author runs a series of reduced form
regressions, in which he treats the pricing decision as a discrete choice problem, just like we do in
our setting. Another paper exploring the stockpiling side of the story is Hendel and Nevo (2013),
who, in addition to confirming some of the previous findings in the literature, are able to quantify
5It is important to note, that we consider price discounts as the only dimension of firms’ promotional activity in that paper. There
are other studies which use the label promotions to talk about advertising which increases the demand faced by the firm. See for
example the pioneering study by Schmalensee (1976).
6See also Nava and Schiraldi (2014) for another collusion-based explanation for sales.
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the welfare effects of sales in the market for soft drinks. They find the total effects to be posi-
tive, since the manufacturers are able to partially mimic the otherwise unattainable third degree
price discrimination. The net impact of sales on consumer welfare, on the other hand, turns out
to be ambiguous: price-sensitive households tend to benefit from the temporary price markdowns,
whereas households that are non-storers experience a decrease in welfare, relative to a uniform
pricing scenario.7
The body of theoretical literature trying to explain why sales occur is still growing. Some recent
papers try to broaden the scope of potential explanations for sales by including sellers’ rational
inattention (Mateˇjka, 2016) and consumers’ loss aversion (Heidhues and Ko˝szegi, 2014). These
papers, together with the ones discussed in the previous paragraph, highlight that there are multi-
ple ways to explain why temporary sales occur, and, confronted with the data, one usually finds
mixed evidence when it comes to evaluating welfare effects.
 Multiproduct oligopoly. Even though multiproduct firms are a widespread phenomenon now,
economic theory still provides mixed guidance regarding the consequences of existence of such
firms for welfare and market power. One important fact about multiproduct oligopolies is that
not all of the theoretical implications of traditional single-product models pertain to settings with
multiple differentiated products (see e.g. McAfee (1995), Johnson and Myatt (2006)). Analysing
market structure in the presence of multiproduct firms, Anderson and De Palma (2006) found that
since the product lines are usually too narrow and profits higher than with single-product firms,
multiproduct environments encourage entry. Multiproduct pricing has been recently analysed by
Shelegia (2012), who found that in a world characterised by information frictions, in a static equi-
librium, prices of substitutable goods offered by multiproduct firms are uncorrelated and firms
play mixed strategies. Rhodes (2014) analysed multiproduct retailing and arrived at a striking
result that with two multiproduct firms selling the same two goods and consumer search, firms
randomly choose whether to hold a sale, on which product and by how much the price should
be reduced. In the empirical literature, Nevo (2001a) found price-cost margins emerging from a
multiproduct Nash-Bertrand pricing consistent with data from the breakfast cereal industry. These
margins are found to be lower than ones that would result from collusive pricing, but higher than
in the case of single-product firms. The reason for this is that multiproduct firms are able to in-
ternalise part of the competition effects. A recent paper that is perhaps most closely related to
our study is Pavlidis and Ellickson (2017), who consider oligopolists’ dynamic pricing strategies
7When the good is storable, Hendel, Lizzeri, and Roketskiy (2014) show that cyclical patterns of high and low prices might arise
even when consumers are homogenous.
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in the presence of consumer switching costs and umbrella branding in the yogurt industry, that is
selling multiple differentiated products under the same brand name. The key differences between
their paper and our approach are that they do not consider supply side frictions, treat prices as
continuous choices, and consider a complete information environment.
 Pricing with consumer switching costs. A widely acknowledged consensus in the consumer
switching cost literature is that their existence creates two countervailing effects for firms: in-
vesting and harvesting and gives them an incentive to price dynamically. Villas-Boas (2015)
surveyed vast theoretical and empirical literature to conclude that depending on the assumptions
about firms’ and consumers’ planning horizons, switching costs might result in higher (Beggs and
Klemperer, 1992) or lower (Dube´ et al., 2009) profits and equilibrium prices. Dube´ et al. (2008)
and Dube´ et al. (2009) empirically analyse the implications of switching costs for monopolist’s
and oligopolists’ pricing strategies, respectively, in the orange juice and margarine industry. The
main finding of the second paper is that oligopoly profits can be lower by more than 10% in the
presence of brand loyalty, since the investing motive tends to prevail. Recent contributions of Arie
and Grieco (2014) and Pearcy (2014) establish theoretical properties of pricing equilibria under
logit demand and switching costs, mostly confirming the empirical findings of Dube´ et al. (2009).
An important policy implication from the Arie and Grieco (2014) paper is that lower equilibrium
prices resulting from brand loyalty do not necessarily translate into net welfare gains, since people
might be persistently consuming lower-utility products to avoid paying the switching cost.
 Dynamic oligopoly with adjustment costs. A new feature we introduce to a model with
consumer-side switching cost are supply side frictions in the form of costs of adjusting prices.
Early theoretical works on oligopoly models with adjustment costs include Fershtman and Kamien
(1987) and Driskill and McCafferty (1989). According to the taxonomy of strategic incentives de-
veloped by Lapham and Ware (1994), Bertrand competition with price adjustment costs generates
an incentive to raise prices in order to induce competitors’ softer behaviour. In a duopoly, both
firms turn out to be better off because of the additional costs. Jun and Vives (2003) confirm this
result, noting that the nature of competition (i.e. whether it is in quantities or prices) does not
really matter for the comparison of an MPE outcome with a static Nash equilibrium.
As far as empirical work in this area is concerned, Slade (1998) attempts to quantify the magnitude
of fixed and variable cost of adjusting prices of saltine crackers assuming the industry is monopo-
listically competitive. Similarly to us, she treats the pricing decision as discrete8 and structurally
8While we explicitly say that firms can choose between two prices for each of their goods, Slade (1998) instead defines the binary
decision variable, dit as equal to 1 if the price goes down or up and 0 if it stays the same. Conditional on dit = 1, the actual price is
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estimates a dynamic discrete choice model. In that sense, our model extends her approach to
strategic, multiproduct firms. The other important difference is that she does not model consumer
behaviour at the micro level, but uses aggregate demand estimates to construct a goodwill state
variable. Her results suggest that adjustment costs are important and vary across products and
supermarket chains. In a related paper, albeit without using a dynamic structural model, Slade
(1999) finds that in a strategic setting, the existence of fixed costs exacerbates price rigidities and
leads to less frequent adjustments, which, if observed in many industries and aggregated, might
have serious repercussions at the macro level.9 Kano (2013) further extends Slade’s model to show
that ignoring strategic interactions might lead to a biased estimate of menu costs. Recently, Elli-
son et al. (2015) studied dynamic pricing with adjustment costs using high-frequency data from
an online seller, attributing price stickiness to managerial frictions.
 Econometrics of dynamic games. Last but not least, our work broadens the scope of applica-
tions of dynamic games estimation techniques, pioneered in the seminal works of Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2007), Bajari et al. (2007) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). To the best of
our knowledge, pricing problems have not been analysed in this framework to date, even though
slightly different structural econometric models have been used to study dynamic pricing, see
e.g. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) who consider an auction setting, Sweeting (2012) whose
model is single-agent and Lee, Roberts, and Sweeting (2012) for a similar problem of pricing
perishable goods by a price leader and fringe competitors.
1.3 Data and industry background
 Data. The data used is this chapter come from Kantar Worldpanel, which is a representative,
rolling survey of UK households documenting their daily grocery purchases between November
2001 and November 2012. The average sample size for the wave starting in 2006 is around 25,000
households and for each of their shopping trips, SKUs (barcodes), prices, quantities and store of
purchase are recorded at a daily frequency, together with product characteristics and indicators of
promotional status.10 To find a balance between analysing a stationary environment with no new
product introduction and negligibly little repositioning, and having enough variation in the data,
determined randomly according to an empirical distribution of observed price changes.
9Hence, our work is also loosely related to the menu cost literature, see Levy et al. (1997), Dutta et al. (1999), Guimaraes and
Sheedy (2011).
10Various subsamples of this large data set have been used in previous research on consumer behaviour, such as Griffith, Leibtag,
Leicester, and Nevo (2009), Seiler (2013), Dubois, Griffith, and Nevo (2014), and therefore we refer the reader to these papers for
details regarding the data collection procedure.
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we restrict our attention to a 200-week subsample from 2009 to 2012.
We chose to focus on the butter and margarine industry for a variety of reasons. The prod-
ucts involved are regularly purchased, branded and expenditures within this category make up a
small part of households’ budgets,11 so depending on individual preferences, there is both room
for brand loyalty and switching. Moreover, dairy products are perishable and have a relatively
short shelf life. This suggests that stockpiling is limited and allows us to abstract from dynamic
considerations on the demand side.
 Sales channels. The most important sales channels for the manufacturers are the four largest
supermarket chains. More than 83% of purchases recorded in our sample were made in one of the
four: Asda, Morrisons, Sainsbury’s or Tesco. As shown in table 1.1, their market shares are stable
year-to-year and Tesco is a clear market leader. Among the big 4 chains, Morrisons has consis-
tently the lowest market share. The fifth largest supermarket chain, Co-op, caters on average only
for 3% of the market. Given the relative importance of the 4 big supermarkets in the UK market,
in what follows we will focus our attention only in purchases of butter and margarine observed in
Asda, Morrisons, Sainsbury’s and Tesco.
Table 1.1: Expenditure shares of main supermarket chains in the butter and margarine category.
STORE OF PURCHASE
Year
2009 2010 2011 2012 2009-2012
Aldi 1.61% 1.61% 2.19% 3.10% 2.32%
Asda 19.52% 18.94% 19.59% 20.22% 19.58%
Co-op 2.54% 3.27% 3.19% 2.91% 3.01%
Iceland 1.85% 2.03% 2.04% 2.01% 1.99%
Lidl 2.44% 2.53% 2.58% 2.69% 2.56%
Morrisons 14.43% 14.40% 14.70% 14.35% 14.47%
Netto 1.31% 1.11% 0.49% - 1.08%
Sainsbury’s 15.18% 16.27% 15.91% 15.14% 15.64%
Tesco 34.00% 33.69% 33.66% 33.70% 33.77%
Waitrose 1.83% 1.99% 1.92% 1.88% 1.91%
Note: Shares defined as sum of expenditures on butter and margarine in a given chain during the period
of interest (year) divided by total expenditures in all stores. Four biggest chains and their average market
shares were highlighted. Netto sold their stores to Asda in 2011. Source: own calculations using the Kantar
data.
 Producers. The market is dominated by three big players: Arla, Dairy Crest and Unilever.
Within each of the four retail chains, their products comprise from 75% (Tesco) to approximately
80% (Asda) of total sales. Each supermarket has also its own brand. Adding the store brand, the
11The annual value of UK butter and margarine industry in 2014 is estimated to be £1.35bn.12 Yet, at the household level,
purchases of goods belonging to this category make up slightly more than 1% of total grocery expenditures (Griffith et al., 2017).
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four-firm concentration ratio, CR4 exceeds 90%.13 The remaining manufacturers are either small
dairies that cater local markets (such as Dale Farm Dairies in Northern Ireland), or firms that are
big players in other industries.14 Two of the three market leaders, Arla and Dairy Crest, are also
major manufacturers of other dairy products (milk, cheese and yogurt), while Unilever is world’s
third-biggest consumer goods producer, who at the same time is the biggest margarine manufac-
turer in the world. The sales of margarine make up around 5% of Unilever’s total revenue.15
 Products. Butter and margarine come in different pack sizes (250g, 500g, 1kg and 2kg) and
formats (block and spreadable). In our detailed data set, we observe more than 100 distinct brand-
pack-format combinations produced by 12 manufacturers. Four of them are the supermarkets
themselves, who sell own brand products exclusively in their outlets. Since the number of dis-
tinct brand-pack size-format combinations observed in the data is substantial we will restrict our
attention to the 500g spreadable segment. We decided to focus on this subsample of all products
for a number of reasons: first, this is the largest segment, comprising more than 50% of indus-
try sales, in which butters, margarines and own brand alternatives coexist in all stores. Secondly,
spreadables are much less frequently used for cooking and baking than block butters and mar-
garines. Therefore the consumption and, consequently, interpurchase times should be relatively
stable. This is important both for the discrete choice assumption in the demand model, as well
as for the assumption that there are no unexpected or seasonal aggregate demand shocks in our
framework. The drawback of our choice is that the outside good might also include purchases of
smaller packs of the same brand, e.g. 250g packs of Lurpak or Flora, so the loyalty effect may be
underestimated.16
Within the 500g segment we select six branded (the largest two of Arla, Dairy Crest and Unilever
in the segment) and a composite own branded product for all four largest supermarket chains.
Table 1.2 lists the name, the corresponding manufacturer and the type (butter/margarine) of the 6
selected brands. In the 2009-2012 period, all the brands mentioned in table 1.2 were long-term in-
cumbents, some of them being present in the UK for more than 40 years. Long-run market shares
13In Tesco, for instance, over the 4-year period of our sample, Unilever had a share of 30.3%, Arla 23.9%, Tesco store brand
21.2% and Dairy Crest 18.3%. CR4 = 93.7% Similar calculations for Asda, Morrisons and Sainsbury’s are available upon request.
14Lactalis is the manufacturer of Pre´sident butter, whose long-run market share is around 0.5%, but it is a much more important
player in the cheese industry.
15See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-04/unilever-plans-to-split-
spreads-business-into-standalone-unit (access on March 7, 2018).
16To check that by selecting a subset of products we do not distort the market structure, we computed expenditure- and volume-
based market shares using the selected sample. Compared to the entire market, firm- and brand-level market shares in the 500g
spreadable segment are quantitatively proportionate, with the only exception being Arla’s higher share at the cost of lower share of the
store brand. This is due to the fact that, in all 4 supermarkets, the most popular own brand products are 250g block butters. Yet, the
shares of store brands remain non-negligible, and hence we believe that even after narrowing down the set of products we are still able
to provide a faithful depiction of the entire industry.
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Table 1.2: Manufacturers and brands of top 6 branded products.
MANUFACTURER BRAND BUTTER/MARGARINE
Arla Anchor Butter
Lurpak Butter
Dairy Crest Clover Margarine
Country Life Butter
Unilever Flora Margarine
I Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter Margarine
of the brands are relatively stable, yet one observes considerable variation at a weekly level, which
we will document next. See table A.6.1 in appendix A.6 for more details on long-run market
shares of all products.
 Prices. We do not have supermarket-level price data. We only observe prices actually paid by
the consumers. Therefore we construct daily time series of prices for the six spreadable products
listed in table 1.2 in the four big supermarket chains by taking the median price paid in a given day.
This approach can be justified by the fact that after the 2000 enquiry, the Competition Commission
imposed national pricing rules on the UK chain stores. This also means we do not have to impute
missing prices for particular stores, because we can simply take the price observed in a different
outlet of the same chain.
As with most grocery products, most price variation at the SKU level comes from periodical move-
ments between regular (baseline) and sale prices.17 Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of prices of six
500g spreadable products in Tesco manufactured by the three biggest firms.
Usually, the regular price remains at the same level for an extended period of time, up to 18
months. For most branded products in our 200-week sample we observe a maximum of three
changes of the regular price. Promotions can be as deep as 50% and the depth might vary across
supermarket chains, but over 3-6 month periods one can actually observe only two price regimes
for each product. As opposed to the high-low pricing of national brands, supermarkets employ
everyday low price strategies for their private labels. This implies that average prices of store
brands are consistently much lower than the prices of branded products – see table A.6.2 in the
appendix. Within segments of the market defined by size-format combination, promotional prices
of branded butters and margarines sometimes tend to match the prices of own brand products and
very rarely fall below that level.
17See Hosken and Reiffen (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for reviews of empirical regularities about prices.
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Figure 1.1: Prices of 500g spreadable butters and margarines in Tesco stores.
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Note: Prices in Tesco stores between 01/01/2009 and 28/10/2012.
Figure 1.2: Price promotions and market shares of Country Life (500g spreadable) in Tesco.
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Note: Normalised prices and market shares in Tesco between 01/01/2009 and 28/10/2012.
We also document that promotions have important effects on market shares. This point is
illustrated in figure 1.2. In the upper part of the figure we plotted the time series of normalised
prices of DC’s Country Life 500g in Tesco stores. To built this time series we attributed to the
product the average regular price if Country Life 500g was not marked with a promotion flag
in that period and the average promotional price otherwise. In the lower part of the figure we
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plotted the market shares of Country Life 500g for the same time span. All promotional periods
are associated with spikes in market shares. After the promotion shares appear to return promptly
to their pre-promotional levels.
In summary, the butter and margarine industry is a typical example of multiproduct oligopoly.
The market is dominated by a small set of firms selling products under different brand names.
Prices of these products are far from being continuous. For branded products we observe a finite
and relative small number of prices during our 200 weeks sample. Most of the price changes are
between regular and sales prices and price promotions have a clear effect on market shares. Store
brands are also important in the industry. Prices of spreadable products sold under store brands are
more stable and usually lower than promotional prices of branded products. These elements will
play a prominent role in the construction of our dynamic pricing model. The two other building
blocks of our model: price adjustment costs and consumer loyalty, will be discussed in detail in
the next section.
1.4 Descriptive evidence
This section provides preliminary evidence of consumer loyalty and price inertia in the context of
the UK butter and margarine industry. We document brand-switching patterns at the individual
level and look at the persistence and rigidity of retail prices. We conclude with a set of reduced-
form regressions which shed light on the relationship between current pricing decisions, past prices
and past market shares.
1.4.1 Consumer loyalty
Consumers that are loyal to a brand are expected to buy the same brand more often. Loyalty, in
other words, implies that consumer choices exhibit some degree of inertia over time. In order
to check whether this behaviour is present in our data, we investigated brand switching patterns
observed in the household-level data.
For all purchases recorded in the data set, we calculated the empirical frequencies correspond-
ing to the transition probabilities of the loyalty state, according to two different definitions of
loyalty. Our first definition of consumer loyalty (see table 1.3) implies that consumers’ memory
reaches only one period back – see Horsky, Pavlidis, and Song (2012) and Eizenberg and Salvo
(2015) – i.e., according to the first definition, loyalty will be calculated as the fraction of house-
holds choosing the same brand between two adjacent weeks. Our second definition is consistent
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with Dube´, Hitsch, Rossi, and Vitorino (2008), Dube´, Hitsch, and Rossi (2009) and Pavlidis and
Ellickson (2017). These papers define consumer loyalty as the fractions of consumers that buy the
same brand between two subsequent purchases and, therefore, the time between purchases does
not matter (table 1.4).
Table 1.3: Consumer switching patterns for purchases made in two subsequent weeks.
Purchase at t Purchase at t+ 1
ANC LUR CLO COU FLO ICB SB
ANCHOR 73.59% 6.62% 2.71% 5.21% 6.34% 2.56% 2.97%
LURPAK 3.64% 80.27% 1.52% 3.52% 5.43% 2.21% 3.41%
CLOVER 2.05% 2.93% 73.83% 1.97% 8.92% 5.48% 4.82%
COUNTRY LIFE 6.74% 9.18% 3.27% 68.40% 5.61% 3.19% 3.61%
FLORA 2.55% 4.24% 4.39% 1.79% 75.08% 6.58% 5.37%
ICBINB 1.71% 2.70% 3.85% 1.44% 10.37% 72.14% 7.79%
STORE BRAND 2.13% 4.79% 4.15% 1.80% 8.93% 8.99% 69.20%
Note: Frequencies based on a sample of 126,508 individual purchases between 01/2009 and 10/2012. Store brand here
is a composite generic good including Asda, Morrisons, Sainsbury’s and Tesco own brand products. The highlighted
entries on the diagonal denote the percentage of loyalty-driven purchases.
Table 1.4: Consumer switching patterns
Purchase at t Subsequent purchase
ANC LUR CLO COU FLO ICB SB
ANCHOR 62.82% 9.22% 4.02% 7.22% 8.23% 3.92% 4.57%
LURPAK 4.49% 74.26% 2.21% 4.31% 6.98% 3.09% 4.66%
CLOVER 2.83% 3.63% 58.98% 2.42% 14.59% 10.05% 7.50%
COUNTRY LIFE 9.71% 12.51% 4.88% 54.25% 8.02% 4.83% 5.80%
FLORA 2.80% 4.72% 6.19% 1.96% 65.47% 10.36% 8.50%
ICBINB 2.12% 3.26% 6.31% 1.72% 17.08% 56.90% 12.61%
STORE BRAND 2.16% 4.70% 5.17% 2.01% 11.93% 12.15% 61.89%
Note: Frequencies based on a sample of 569,338 individual purchases between 01/2009 and 10/2012. Store brand here
is a composite generic good including Asda, Morrisons, Sainsbury’s and Tesco own brand products. The highlighted
entries on the diagonal denote the percentage of loyalty-driven purchases.
The first striking observation about the two tables is that, regardless of the definition, loyalty
seems to play a decisive role in the determination of consumer choices. Restricting our attention
to purchases in the two subsequent weeks, we observe a stronger loyalty effect, which might
indicate that some consumers exhibit shorter memory.18 The fractions of loyalty-driven purchases
are relatively similar across products. Even though brand commitment seems to play a key role in
this industry, there is still a fair number of consumers who switch products every period and firms
18Since 22.2% of observations used to calculate the transition probabilities in table 1.4 are the same ones as the data used to
construct table 1.3, we checked what part of the loyalty effect wears off after 1 week. When the interpurchase time is more than 2
weeks, the fractions are approximately 10 p.p. lower than the ones in table 1.4. After 10 weeks, about 40% of consumers are still loyal
to national brands, whereas the effect for store brand disappears almost completely.
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might be willing to price aggressively to fight for them. In line with the intuition, consumers who
bought butter last period will be more willing to buy butter again next time, rather than switch to
margarine or store brand. Rather not surprisingly, switching to store brand is especially popular
among consumers of the cheapest margarine brand – I Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter.
1.4.2 Price rigidities
We look at the frequency of price changes and duration of promotions as possible indicators for
price adjustment costs for the suppliers. In table 1.5 we provide descriptive statistics for weekly
price changes based on the 200-week period. Given our selection of products, the maximum num-
ber of changes is 2 for each of the firms. The means in table 1.5 reveal that prices, on average,
Table 1.5: Frequency of price changes.
FIRM MEAN STD. DEV. %(1) %(2)
ASDA
Arla 0.347 0.527 29.65% 2.51%
Dairy Crest 0.357 0.521 31.66% 2.01%
Unilever 0.271 0.493 22.65% 2.21%
MORRISONS
Arla 0.412 0.560 34.17% 3.52%
Dairy Crest 0.342 0.545 27.14% 2.01%
Unilever 0.277 0.461 26.55% 0.56%
SAINSBURY’S
Arla 0.472 0.687 25.13% 11.06%
Dairy Crest 0.317 0.591 18.59% 6.53%
Unilever 0.281 0.483 25.13% 1.51%
TESCO
Arla 0.533 0.695 30.15% 11.56%
Dairy Crest 0.437 0.631 28.64% 7.54%
Unilever 0.469 0.673 26.77% 10.10%
Note: Table presents average number of per-firm weekly price changes (without
specifying direction) in each of the supermarket chains. Fourth and fifth column
show the percentage of weeks with 1 and 2 price changes, respectively.
change much less frequently than every period. For all firms, adjustments occur most often in
Tesco, with both three firms having approximately 1 price change every other week. In the re-
maining three retailing chains, Unilever is the least likely to change its prices – 75% of the time it
makes no adjustments, while Arla changes prices of both Anchor and Lurpak in Sainsbury’s and
Tesco on more than 10% of all occasions.
Naturally, the full picture is much more complicated,19 than what we see in table 1.5 but even
19For simplicity, we not only abstracted from all strategic aspects of price adjustments here, but also did not specify which
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at this very general level we can still derive some implications relevant to our structural model.
First, we may expect the adjustment costs to be non-negligible for all firms. Our second hypothesis
is that they vary across firms and, to a lesser extent, across supermarkets, just like in Slade (1998).
Third, the descriptives show no evidence of any form of economies of scope, or synergies, since
adjustments of more than one price per firm occur relatively rarely.
Another piece of evidence suggesting that costs of adjusting prices might play an important
role in this industry is presented in table 1.6.20 For all six products we observe between 20 and
27 distinct sale spells in the 200-week sample. Average duration of a single spell is around 3-4
weeks, depending on the brand. However, we also witness much shorter and much longer periods
of reduced prices, varying from one to as many as 20 weeks. These numbers seem to be an
additional piece of evidence for the existence of price rigidities, and because of relatively high
dispersion in the duration of sales, we can also exclude the possibility that promotions always last
for a fixed number of weeks. Within the context of our model, we would be observing longer sale
spells if a firm fails to attract sufficient number of new consumers immediately after decreasing
the price.
Table 1.6: Durations of promotions in Tesco stores.
PRODUCTS BY MANUFACTURER # SPELLS MEAN DUR. STD. DEV. MIN MAX
Arla
ANCHOR 27 3.74 2.11 1 10
LURPAK 27 4.52 3.58 1 20
Dairy Crest
CLOVER 20 3.80 2.04 1 9
COUNTRY LIFE 24 3.12 1.39 1 6
Unilever
FLORA 26 3.96 3.54 1 16
ICBINB 22 3.54 2.11 1 9
Note: # SPELLS denotes the number of distinct promotional spells in the 200-week sample. Remaining columns describe
the distribution of durations of sales.
1.4.3 Implications of consumer loyalty and price adjustment costs for price dynam-
ics
The evidence shown so far in this section suggests there is a high degree of inertia in consumer
choices and equilibrium prices. Inertia in choices may be directly related to consumer loyalty,
while inertia in prices can be attributed to the presence of price adjustment costs in the industry.
movements are upward and which downward.
20For the sake of brevity, we only present results from Tesco here, see appendix A.6 for the remaining results.
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We now examine how these two elements affect price decisions.
To do this we estimate a series of descriptive regressions of current prices on past prices and
shares. Intuitively, if price adjustment costs are relevant then, all else constant, brand j’s current
price will be correlated with its past price. Analogously, one way of uncovering the importance of
consumer inertia to price dynamics is through the analysis of (partial) correlations between brand
j’s current price and its past share. Inertia in consumer choices imply that, all else constant, market
share of brand j at time t will depend positively on its market share in the past. This dependence,
in turn, may change manufacturers’ incentives to set prices in the present period.
The set of observed prices for the products in our sample is relatively small. In particular,
price movements generally correspond to switches between regular and promotional prices. For
this reason, instead of modelling prices directly we model promotion decisions, i.e. the dependent
variable in our models will be a dummy variable that assumes 1 if brand j was marked with a
promotional flag in a given period and zero otherwise.21 More specifically the regression equation
that we study takes the form:
ajmt = α+
∑
k
βk · akm,t−1 +
∑
k
γk · skm,t−1 + αjm + jmt, [1.1]
where, ajmt is a dummy variable that assumes 1 if brand j was in promotion in supermarket m in
period t and zero otherwise; sjmt is the market share of brand i in supermarket m in period t; αjm
is a supermarket/brand fixed-effect; jmt is an idiosyncratic error term and (α; {βk}k ; {γk}k) are
coefficients to be estimated. The second summation includes (past) shares of all branded products
plus the share of the store brand. The first summation only includes (past) actions of branded
products. We do not include the store brands because there is little variation in their prices (see
section 1.3) and their effects will not be identifiable with a fixed effects regression.
We present the results of this regression in table 1.7. To estimate the coefficients of interest
we stacked data for Asda, Morrisons, Sainsbury’s and Tesco and used a fixed effects estimator.22
Each column has the estimated coefficients for each of the 6 brands. We emphasise two important
findings. First, the coefficients in the main diagonal of the upper part of the table show that current
actions depend positively on past actions. The coefficients are large and significant at 1%. In
particular, the point estimates imply that if a brand had been sold at promotional prices during the
previous week it is 46-58 percentage points (depending on the brand) more likely to be sold at
21As it will become clear later on, this formulation is also consistent with some practical assumptions that we have to make in
order to estimate and solve the structural model.
22We also run OLS regressions separately for each supermarket. The results of these regressions are qualitatively and quantitatively
similar to those in table 1.7. For brevity they are not shown.
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Table 1.7: Price regressions
Arla DC Unilever
ANCHOR LURPAK CLOVER C. LIFE FLORA ICB
at−1
Price Anchor 0.465*** -0.074 0.008 -0.022 -0.016 0.026
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Price Lurpak -0.058 0.513*** 0.009 -0.059 -0.025 0.043
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Price Clover -0.025 -0.044 0.547*** 0.019 -0.000 -0.015
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Price Country Life -0.000 -0.012 -0.011 0.534*** 0.001 -0.045
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
Price Flora -0.027 0.025 -0.048 0.008 0.523*** -0.073*
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Price ICBINB -0.032 0.025 0.000 -0.096** 0.019 0.585***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
st−1
Share Anchor 3.523 1.680 1.332 -0.058 1.169 1.374
(1.51) (1.73) (2.15) (1.69) (1.34) (1.80)
Share Lurpak 0.774 -0.113 -1.171 1.805 0.298 0.505
(1.22) (0.98) (0.76) (1.36) (1.07) (0.53)
Share Clover 0.185 1.270 2.069*** -0.322 -0.336 0.348
(0.11) (0.60) (0.32) (0.49) (0.28) (0.33)
Share Country Life -2.750** 0.659 1.817 3.308 -1.764 2.657
(0.69) (1.68) (2.11) (2.54) (2.53) (1.69)
Share Flora 0.295 0.289 0.085 -0.874** 1.226* 0.105
(0.37) (0.42) (0.41) (0.26) (0.52) (0.45)
Share ICBINB 0.572 -0.442 -0.317 1.320*** 0.417 1.723***
(0.37) (0.49) (0.21) (0.19) (0.42) (0.22)
Share Store Brand -1.262 -0.689 -0.198 -1.189 -0.387 -1.947*
(1.34) (0.87) (1.35) (1.01) (0.48) (0.65)
Observations 796 796 796 796 796 796
R-squared 0.289 0.298 0.393 0.346 0.335 0.488
Note: fixed effects regressions for each brand for 4 cross-sections (supermarkets). at−1 refer to promotional
status in the previous period and st−1 to shares in the previous period. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10%.
promotional prices during the current week. In line with the patterns shown in tables 1.5 and 1.6,
these results indicate that sources of price rigidities such as adjustment costs can play an important
role in this industry. Second, the effect of consumer loyalty on price decisions does not seem to
be as important as the effect of price adjustment costs on current prices – in spite of the strong
correlations between past and current consumer choices (see tables 1.3 and 1.4). Coefficients
attached to (own) past shares are significant at 10% for 3 of the 6 brands only. Furthermore, when
these coefficients are significant, their magnitudes appear to be small. For example, an increase
of 1 percentage point in the market share of Clover at t − 1 increases the probability of a Clover
promotion in 2 percentage points at period t. It is worth noting that the off-diagonal coefficients
suggest that the role of strategic interactions between firms may be limited, but it cannot be ruled
out completely. Our structural analysis below will proceed under the assumption that firms are
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competing in a pricing game, which encompasses a collection of single-agent decision problems.
It is worth emphasising that the regressions in this section do not take into account potentially
important features of the industry, such as multiproduct nature of the firms and forward-looking
behaviour. Moreover, the fact that the coefficients corresponding to lagged market shares are low
can be explained by the fact that in some states of the world firms prefer to invest, which would
imply positive correlation between the promotional status dummy and lagged market share, and in
other states their profit-maximising decision is to harvest, implying negative correlation. A simple
linear specification cannot disentangle these mutually offsetting effects. All those different forces
can however be captured by our structural model studied in the following section.
1.5 Model
The descriptive analysis in the previous section suggests that price rigidities and consumer inertia
are important in the UK butter and margarine industry. This section develops a dynamic model
to explain how pricing decisions in the butter and margarine industry are affected by these two
elements. Since we treat pricing decisions as discrete choices, the way we describe the game
draws heavily on concepts developed in the empirical dynamic discrete games literature.23 We
characterise the equilibrium of the model and discuss the identification of its primitives below.
The model we present involves forward-looking, multiproduct oligopolists engaged in a dy-
namic pricing game over non-durable goods. The consumers in our model are assumed to be
myopic, so their expectations about future prices do not play any role in their contemporaneous
choices.24 Instead, dynamic pricing incentives arise from brand loyalty, which can be alternatively
interpreted as inertia or switching cost. Firms offer temporarily lower prices to attract new or re-
turning consumers and use the fact that at least some of them will remain loyal when the price
returns to the regular (high) level.
The second dynamic component of our model is the cost incurred when prices are being ad-
justed, so that the framework falls into the wider class of oligopoly games with adjustment costs,25
and can be seen as an extension of Slade’s (1998) single-agent, one-product model to a multiprod-
23For more details on this class of models, we refer the reader to recent literature surveys, for example Arcidiacono and Ellickson
(2011) or Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2013).
24Apart from tractability, the problem with having both forward-looking firms and consumers is that in a Markov perfect equilib-
rium the information sets of consumers and firms are identical, and so are their expectations regarding future states of the world, as in
Goettler and Gordon (2011). In order to avoid making this assumption, one should change the equilibrium notion to explicitly allow
for asymmetric information between firms and consumers, for example by adapting the framework of Fershtman and Pakes (2012).
25See e.g. Fershtman and Kamien (1987), Lapham and Ware (1994), Jun and Vives (2003), and chapter 9 of Vives (2002) for a
broader perspective.
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uct setting with strategic players.26
1.5.1 Preliminaries
We consider a discrete time game with infinite horizon, where periods are denoted by t = 1, . . . ,∞.
Firms, indexed by i = 1, . . . , N , compete over a discounted sum of profits in a single mar-
ket,27 by choosing whether to charge low or high price for each of the goods they produce,
where the low/high prices can vary across products.28 The set of products offered by firm i is
Ji = {i1, i2, . . . , i|Ji|}, where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set. We let all products be differen-
tiated, so that the entire set of products available to the consumer isJ = ⋃Ni=1 Ji. We assume the
market is mature and rule out entry of firms and introduction of new products.29
On the demand side, there is a mass H of households. We assume they are myopic and face a
discrete choice problem in each period. By assumption H does not change over time. The same
households visit the stores each period, but they have the option of choosing the outside good.
The sequence of events within each period is as follows. First, firms observe last period’s
prices, demand realisations and a random draw from the distribution of private cost shocks. Based
on this information, they simultaneously choose between regular (high) or promotional (low)
prices for all products they manufacture. If the prices differ from last period’s ones, they pay
an adjustment cost.30 After the prices are set, consumers make purchases, firms learn the real-
isation of demand and receive period profits. The game moves on to the next period and state
variables update according to their transition laws.
1.5.2 Firms
Let Ai denote the set of actions available to player i. Since, by assumption, there are two regimes
for the price of each good and the prices are set simultaneously for the entire portfolio of products
of each firm, this is a finite set with cardinality equal to |Ai| = 2|Ji|. For example, if |Ji| = 2,
player i can choose among 4 actions and Ai = {(pHi1 , pHi2 ), (pHi1 , pLi2), (pLi1 , pHi2 ), (pLi1 , pLi2)}, where
pH and pL denote high and low price, respectively.
In general, there is no need to assume that the number of possible actions is the same for all
26Building on Slade (1998), Slade (1999) and Kano (2013) emphasise why strategic interactions might matter for the estimates of
adjustment costs.
27In the empirical application of the model, we define market as a single national retailing outlet.
28It is straightforward to extend the model to allow for the pricing decision to be choice between more than two possible values.
As long as the decision is discrete (number of actions finite), our results hold.
29In section 1.3 we showed that this assumption can be plausibly maintained in our data.
30We relegate a detailed interpretation of this cost to section 1.6.
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players, or make any other symmetry assumptions. Note also that for single-product firms, the
action space is binary and the structure of the problem becomes very similar to an entry/exit game.
The problem of firm i in period t is to choose an action ait ∈ Ai to maximise the expected dis-
counted stream of payoffs: Et
∑∞
τ=t
[
βτ−tΠi(aτ , zτ , εiτ (aiτ ))
]
, where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor and Πi(·) denotes firm i’s profit in period t. at = (a1t, a2t, . . . , aNt) collects the actions of
all players. Occasionally we will abuse the notation and write at = (ait,a−it). zt ∈ Z is the vec-
tor of publicly observed, payoff-relevant state variables, which in our model contains last period’s
market shares and actions, so zt = (st−1,at−1), and εit = (εit (ai))ai∈Ai is a vector of iid private
cost shocks associated with ai. The expectation is taken over the distribution of beliefs regarding
other players’ actions, next period’s draws of ε, and the future evolution of state variables.
We assume that the private shock enters the profit function additively, so that it can be ex-
pressed as:
Πi(at, zt, εit) = pii(ait,a−it, st−1) +
∑
`∈Ai
εit(`) · 1(ait = `) [1.2]
+
∑
`∈Ai
∑
`′ 6=`
SC`
′→`
i · 1(ait = `, ai,t−1 = `′),
where SC`
′→`
i is the adjustment cost of switching from action `
′ to ` and 1(·) is the indicator
function. The first part of (1.2) is the static profit accrued over the time period and can be written
as:
pii(ait,a−it, st−1) = H ·
∑
j∈Ji
(pjt(ait)−mcj) · sjt(ait,a−it, st−1) [1.3]
We use the notation pjt(ait) to emphasise the 1-to-1 relationship between firm’s action and the
price of product j. mcj is a constant marginal cost and sjt is the market share derived from the
consumer’s problem. To keep the notation parsimonious, fixed cost of operating is normalised to
zero, although one can still interpret the ε’s as shocks shifting fixed costs from period to period.
As we do not consider firm entry or exit, this is a fairly innocuous assumption.31
Rewriting the expectation in terms of beliefs and perceived transition laws, firm i’s best re-
31In principle, we could still have fixed cost in the profit function while describing the theoretical model. However, in contrast
to the entry and exit game, it would not matter for the optimal choice of strategy, since it would appear on both sides of all the
inequalities defining firms’ best responses. From an econometric point of view, this structural parameter would not be identified (see
Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014) for an extensive discussion of this problem pertaining to a dynamic entry game).
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sponse is a solution to the following Bellman equation:
Vi(zt, εit) = max
ait∈Ai
{ ∑
a−it∈ ×
j 6=i
Aj
σi(a−it|zt) ·
[
Πi(ait,a−it, zt, εit) [1.4]
+ β
∑
zt+1∈Z
G(zt+1|zt,at)
∫
Vi(zt+1, εit+1)dQ(εit+1)
]}
In the expression above, we used the notation σi(a−it|zt) to denote firm i’s beliefs that given the
state variable realisation zt, its rivals will play an action profile a−it. If a−it = (`1, . . . , `i−1, `i+1, . . . , `N ),
by independence of private information in equilibrium we have:
σi(a−it|zt) =
∏
k 6=i
Pr(akt = `k|zt)1(akt=`k) [1.5]
where Pr(·) is the conditional choice probability (CCP, Hotz and Miller (1993)). In the second part
of expression (1.4), we implicitly assumed that the joint transition probabilities of public and pri-
vate state variables are conditionally independent and can be factorised asG(zt+1|zt,at)Q(εit+1).
This is a standard practice in the dynamic games literature (see assumption 2 in Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2007) or M2 in Sanches et al. (2016b)).
Before we define the equilibrium, we will outline the consumer’s problem in our model. In
section 1.6 we show how we recover the primitives of the game from the observed data, which,
according to the notation we adopted here, are {pii,SCi, G, β,Q}Ni=1, where SC is a vector of
adjustment costs.
1.5.3 Consumers
Consumers in our setting are assumed to arrive in the market every week and choose one product
j ∈ J or refrain from buying anything, thus picking the outside option of not buying anything,
which, following the usual convention, we denote using the subscript 0. As mentioned earlier, in
contrast to firms, individuals in our model are not sophisticated and their decisions are myopic.
However, at the instant of purchase, they still remember what their previous choice was, as it
directly affects their current utility. We consider one possible interpretation of state dependence,
namely product (brand) loyalty.32 For loyal consumers, current utility is higher if they purchase the
same product they did on the previous occasion, and firms have an incentive to charge temporarily
lower prices in order to build up a base of loyal customers who will be willing to pay a higher
32Dube´, Hitsch, and Rossi (2010) examine other explanations for state dependence in discrete choice models of demand for
margarine and orange juice, such as search and learning. Their main finding shows that only loyalty is not rejected in the scanner data
set they use.
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price in the future. The presence of an outside good allows us to account for the fact that not all
consumers make purchases every week, while we remain agnostic about their consumption habits.
Importantly, the complexity of the aggregate demand function derived from the individual-
level problem should be a compromise between tractability and realism. Moreover, it has to satisfy
the Markov property, as seen in (1.3). Already because of the fact that consumers are not forward-
looking, we avoid having to model their expectations about future prices of all products. A richer
specifications of consumer heterogeneity can lead to a sharp increase in the dimension of the state
space,33 but on the other hand, some theoretical models of sales and dynamic pricing (e.g. Conlisk
et al. (1984), Hendel and Nevo (2013)) emphasise that sales arise as a result of price discrimination
between groups of consumers with different preferences.
For the purpose of this study, we assume out persistent consumer heterogeneity. This stands in
contrast to Dube´ et al. (2009) and Pavlidis and Ellickson (2017), who both allow for random co-
efficients in their demand models, but are forced to make arbitrary simplifying assumptions while
analysing the supply side game to limit the dimension of the state space and keep the problem
tractable.
In what follows, we assume that individual household, indexed by h, chooses an alternative
from the set J ∪ {0} to maximise its contemporaneous utility given by:
uhjt = δj − η · pjt + γ · 1(yht−1 = j) + ξhjt j = 1, . . . , |J | [1.6]
uh0t = ξ
h
0t [1.7]
δj are alternative-specific intercepts, fixed over time. 1(yht−1 = j) equals one if household h’s
purchase at t − 1 was the same as the one in the current period. γ is a parameter measuring
the degree of consumer loyalty (if γ > 0).34 In this setting, there is no persistent consumer
heterogeneity and households differ only by the realisation of their private shocks, ξhjt, and their
previous purchase.
Under the assumption that ξ’s are independent type-I extreme value shocks, the probability
that household h will purchase good j at time t is:
Prht (j|pt, yht−1) =
exp(δj − η · pjt + γ · 1(yht−1 = j))
1 +
∑|J |
g=1 exp(δg − η · pgt + γ · 1(yht−1 = j))
[1.8]
33More specifically, since lagged market shares are a part of zt, with H consumer types we would have H · |J | + N payoff-
relevant state variables to keep track of.
34In principle it is possible to have one loyalty parameter for each good in the choice set. From the descriptive evidence in tables
1.3 and 1.4 we do not see, however, clear differences in the patterns of brand choice inertia. To keep the model parsimonious we
assume that the loyalty parameter is the same across brands.
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Note that, according to (1.8), the only dimension of household heterogeneity is reflected in pur-
chase history. Since we are ultimately interested in aggregate market shares, we can use the law of
total probability to integrate it out (omitting conditioning sets and superscripts to ease notation):
Prt(j) =
|J |∑
g=0
Prt−1(g) · Prt(j|pt, yt−1 = g) [1.9]
What we call Prt(j) in (1.9) is the same as sjt in (1.3), just like in the standard multinomial logit
model. Since characteristics of the goods do not change over time, we can remove them from the
set of payoff-relevant state variables, and therefore aggregate market shares are characterised by
the following Markov process (Horsky et al., 2012):
sjt(ait,a−it, st−1) =
|J |∑
g=0
sg,t−1 · Prt(j|pt(at), yt−1 = g) [1.10]
= s0,t−1
exp(δj − η · pjt)
1 +
∑|J |
g=1 exp(δg − η · pgt)
+ sj,t−1
exp(δj − η · pjt + γ)
1 +
∑|J |
g=1 exp(δg − η · pgt + γ · 1(g = j))
+
|J |∑
g=1
g 6=j
sg,t−1
exp(δj − η · pjt)
1 +
∑|J |
g′=1 exp(δg′ − η · pg′t + γ · 1(g′ = g))
Since
∑|J |
g=0 sg,t = 1 for all t, (1.10) can be further rearranged so that firms do not have to keep
track of an additional state variable (share of “no purchases” every period).
In our baseline specification, we assume that consumers’ memory reaches only one period
back. This approach, suggested by Horsky, Pavlidis, and Song (2012) and recently employed by
Eizenberg and Salvo (2015), might not be the optimal way of modelling consumer loyalty, but
is the only one in which, after aggregation, firms can keep track of past market shares to predict
current demand. Dube´, Hitsch, Rossi, and Vitorino (2008), Dube´, Hitsch, and Rossi (2009), and
Pavlidis and Ellickson (2017), on the other hand, define the state variables as the fractions of
consumers loyal to each of the goods at the beginning of each period. We present this alternative
specification in appendix A.1. Conceptually, the key difference at the micro level is that choosing
the outside option does not change the loyalty state of an individual consumer. As appealing as this
sounds, there are two potential disadvantages of this specification: first, it assumes that consumers
who purchase very infrequently are endowed with the same degree of loyalty as people who buy
every period; secondly, looking from the firms’ perspective, the interpretation of the state variables
becomes problematic.
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1.5.4 Equilibrium
We focus on stationary pure strategy Markov perfect equilbria. Stationarity means that we can
abstract from calendar time and omit the time subscript and assume firms will always play the
same strategies upon observing the same realisation of (z, ε). Formally the equilibrium to this
game is a vector of firms’ optimal price decisions – i.e. firms solve problem (1.4) taking as
given their (rational) beliefs on the actions of other players – for every possible realisation of
the state vector, (z, ε). Since the game can be seen as a particular reinterpretation of the Ericson
and Pakes (1995) dynamic oligopoly framework, the proof of equilibrium existence follows from
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and Doraszelski and
Satterthwaite (2010). We refer the readers to these papers for a more detailed discussion of this
equilibrium and proofs of its existence.
1.6 Identification and estimation
This section discusses the identification and the estimation of the primitives of the dynamic pric-
ing model. We first describe the structural and parametric restrictions that we use to identify the
model. Our identification is constructive and follows from a recent paper by Komarova et al.
(forthcoming). We then proceed to a description of our estimation strategy. In practice the es-
timation procedure relies on the two step approach pioneered by Hotz and Miller (1993) with
parametric approximations of the value function as in Sweeting (2013). In the last part of this
section we report and discuss the structural estimates.
1.6.1 Identification
The primitives in our model are {pii,SCi, G, β,Q}Ni=1. We can break down our set of assumptions
into two separate groups. In the first, we impose restrictions on the data in order to recover them
stems from economic theory that involves: the timing of the game, the equilibrium concept, and the
specification of the period payoff function.35 In the second, we impose parametric restrictions that
make our problem tractable. They include the assumptions on the distribution of demand and cost
shocks, which are both assumed type-I extreme value. The demand system and the process that
governs the transition of states, denoted by G, can be identified outside the dynamic programming
model from data on consumer choices. Subsequently, the remaining parameters in the model to
be identified are {pii,SCi, β}Ni=1. The identification of these parameters is based on the Markov
35Here we are only alluding to the fact that pii(ait,a−it, st−1) = H ·
∑
j∈Ji (pjt(ait) −mcj) · sjt(ait,a−it, st−1), and
not discussing how sjt depends on the prices and past market shares which relies on a parametric assumption
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Perfect Equilibrium of our dynamic model. Next we discuss in details the identification of these
objects.
The identification of adjustment cost parameters in our model relies on Komarova, Sanches,
Silva Jr., and Srisuma (forthcoming), who show differences in adjustment cost parameters can
be identified and individual adjustment costs can be identified under a normalisation.36 Here we
assume the producers pay an adjustment cost only when the regular price is reduced.37 This as-
sumption is motivated by the notion that price reductions are associated with different forms of
promotional activities – including relocation of products to shelves with more visibility, leaflets
printing, production of TV commercials, compensating for retailers’ lower markups etc. – and
that these costs are ultimately paid by the manufacturers. The existence of such fees has been doc-
umented both in the marketing literature (cf. Kadiyali et al. (2000), Chintagunta (2002)), popular
press and industry reports which reveal that ”70% of supermarket suppliers make either regular
or occasional payments toward marketing costs or price promotions”.38 Since the magnitude of
these payments is unknown to the public and kept confidential, the estimates that we provide are
interesting on their own and are much more than just an input to the counterfactual analysis. In
appendix A.2 we show that our empirical model shares the same setup to employ the identifica-
tion strategy illustrated in Komarova, Sanches, Silva Jr., and Srisuma (forthcoming). We derive
the closed-form identification of the adjustment costs in our model in appendix A.3. In addition,
Komarova et al. (forthcoming) argue that the discount factor can generally be identified in a para-
metric model. In particular their Proposition 1 shows the discount factor is robust to normalisations
in the adjustment costs. This implies that our estimates of the discount factor are independent of
the restrictions we are imposing in the model in order to identify the vector of price adjustment
costs.
Before moving to the description of our estimation strategy, a brief discussion on the identifi-
cation of the CCPs is necessary. While our main source of variation is coming from the repeated
play over time, to precisely estimate the CCPs we pool data from the four big supermarkets and
include a supermarket fixed effect – see subsection 1.6.2 for arguments justifying this choice. In
what follows we assume that the same equilibrium is played over time in all available markets
conditional on the fixed effects.
36In essence this result is a generalisation of Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014).
37One can also prove identification under a different set of restrictions from the one we propose here, for instance it would suffice
to assume that for every good the costs are symmetric (equal for changing prices from high to low and vice versa).
38See The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/aug/25/supermarkets (access on Au-
gust 15, 2017).
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1.6.2 Estimation
The estimation of the model relies on the following modelling two assumptions. First, we treat the
big three manufacturers, Arla, Dairy Crest and Unilever, as the players involved in the dynamic
pricing game. Each firm sets prices for the two different products they manufacture – see table 1.2.
Given that the manufacturers in our model are market leaders with substantial bargaining power to
influence price decisions, assuming that the manufacturers set prices is more realistic than assum-
ing that supermarkets set prices and manufacturers are completely passive39 – see Slade (1998).
This assumption is also commonly employed in other empirical papers that use scanner data and
do not have access to wholesale prices (e.g. in Nevo (2001b), Dube´ et al. (2009)). Following this
approach, marginal costs faced by the decision makers are assumed to include a retailer markup.
Since marginal costs in our model are constant over time, this also means that retailer markups are
fixed.
Second, the four retailing chains are treated as separate markets in which the same game
is played independently. Store brand can be chosen by the consumers and is considered in the
demand model, but as in Slade (1998), we believe that it is more appropriate to assume that super-
markets take the residual demand and do not act as active players.40
There are also other reasons why we would not want to consider a game played between super-
market chains. First of all, there are by far more dimensions of competition between retailers than
pricing of one category of goods. It would seem implausible to treat the profits of supermarkets
in the butter/margarine category as separable from all their other activities (advertising, loyalty
programs, opening of new outlets etc.). Even if we did assume so, the number of distinct products
offered by each supermarket is much higher than the number of brands in the portfolios of each
manufacturer. As each additional product significantly increases the computational complexity of
the problem, we suspect that the solution to the problem would soon turn out to be infeasible.
Subsequently, the set of players is {Arla, Dairy Crest, Unilever}. They offer the following
products: JArla={Anchor, Lurpak}, JDairy Crest = {Clover, Country Life}, JUnilever =
{Flora, ICBINB}. The actions available to Arla areAArla = {(pHAnchor, pHLurpak); (pHAnchor, pLLurpak);
(pLAnchor, p
H
Lurpak); (p
L
Anchor, p
L
Lurpak)}, and the sets of actions of the remaining players can be
39A further argument is that in the presence of private labels that are known to yield higher margins for the retailers, supermarkets
should have no incentives to price national brands aggressively (Meza and Sudhir, 2010). Lal (1990) argues that manufacturers use
price promotions to limit store brand’s encroachment into the market. Moreover, in the data we also observe smaller manufacturers,
whose products are never on promotion. If we endowed supermarkets with all the bargaining power, it would be hard to justify
why they decide to use different pricing strategies for products coming from different manufacturers. Finally, in two independent
studies, Srinivasan et al. (2004) and Ailawadi et al. (2006) find that retailers hardly ever benefit from price promotions, and it is almost
exclusively the manufacturers who can enjoy increased profits from temporary sales.
40This means that the market share of the store brand is a payoff-relevant state variable for the remaining firms. For simplicity
we assume that the price of own brand product does not change with time, otherwise it would be an additional dimension of the state
space.
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defined in a similar manner. To determine the actual values of pH∗ and pL∗ , we calculated the median
weekly prices over the 200-week period, conditional on whether the product was on promotion or
not (see table A.6.2 in the appendix).
Outline of the estimation procedures
The estimation procedure involves multiple stages which we outline below:
1. Use household-level data to estimate the demand system parameters (δ, γ, η).
2. Plug (δˆ, γˆ, ηˆ) into (1.10) to obtain an estimate of sjt(ait,a−it, st−1).
3. Use market-level data to estimate firms’ conditional choice probabilities, i.e. obtain P̂ri(ai =
`|z) for all i and z.
4. Use CCPs to get {ŜCi}Ni=1 in closed form following Komarova et al. (forthcoming).
5. Plug the demand and SC estimates into the conditional value functions and estimate the
discount factor, and parameters in the period profit function using the approach of Komarova
et al. (forthcoming).
Two things are worth noting here. First, step 4 can be performed independently of step 5 since,
the costs of adjusting prices, SC, are independent of β and period payoffs, pi. Therefore the esti-
mates of SC are robust to any potential misspecifications in pi. Furthermore, we can significantly
reduce the number of parameters in the model with minimal effort since these SC can be com-
puted in closed form in terms of the CCPs. Secondly, step 5, differently from steps 1-4, depends
on the estimation of expected value functions – the term
∫
Vi(zt+1, εt+1)dQ(εi,t+1) in equation
(1.4). When the variables in the state space are continuous and/or the dimension of the state space
is large, as is the case in our application, traditional methods used to compute value functions41 do
not work appropriately. Consequently we employ a different approach and compute value func-
tions using (flexible) parametric approximations – see Sweeting (2013), Fowlie et al. (2016) and
Barwick and Pathak (2015). The algorithm used here is similar to the one used in Sweeting (2013)
and is described in the appendix. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the estimation of the
demand system, the estimation of the CCPs and finally the estimates of the dynamic parameters
of our model.
41See Hotz et al. (1994), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), or Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
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Demand
With a representative sample ofH households drawn from the populationH and observed through
T periods, and given our specification of consumer demand in (1.8) and the assumption that the
unobserved choice shocks are independent over products, households and time, we can consis-
tently estimate the parameters of the demand system using maximum likelihood. Since we are
not modelling supermarket choice, the estimation samples consist of households that were record-
ing butter/margarine purchases in only one of the supermarkets in the sample period. To check
whether restricting the sample to non-shoppers does not induce non-random selection, we inves-
tigated the distribution of market shares in the full and restricted samples, to find no substantial
differences apart from a moderately higher share of store-brand products at the expense of Arla’s
brands. Our demand estimates are shown in table 1.8.
Table 1.8: Demand estimates
ASDA MORRISONS SAINSBURY’S TESCO
δAnchor
−2.775
[−2.899;−2.651]
−2.883
[−3.043;−2.723]
−3.175
[−3.314;−3.036]
−3.836
[−3.910;−3.763]
δLurpak
−2.064
[−2.193;−1.945]
−2.083
[−2.236;−1.930]
−2.862
[−3.004;−2.719]
−3.375
[−3.445;−3.306]
δClover
−3.077
[−3.175;−2.980]
−2.757
[−2.860;−2.654]
−3.507
[−3.605;−3.409]
−3.814
[−3.866;−3.761]
δCountry Life
−2.930
[−3.051;−2.810]
−3.213
[−3.363;−3.063]
−3.792
[−3.934;−3.649]
−4.519
[−4.596;−4.442]
δFlora
−2.450
[−2.524;−2.375]
−2.334
[−2.415;−2.253]
−2.756
[−2.836;−2.676]
−3.075
[−3.117;−3.033]
δICBINB
−2.516
[−2.580;−2.453]
−2.819
[−2.892;−2.745]
−3.369
[−3.447;−3.291]
−3.624
[−3.665;−3.583]
δSB
−2.903
[−2.970;−2.835]
−2.919
[−2.994;−2.845]
−2.772
[−2.844;−2.699]
−3.149
[−3.184;−3.115]
η
−0.745
[−0.799;−0.691]
−0.655
[−0.717;−0.594]
−0.356
[−0.414;−0.299]
−0.159
[−0.190;−0.128]
γ
3.037
[3.002; 3.071]
3.008
[2.967; 3.049]
2.931
[2.896; 2.967]
3.277
[3.256; 3.297]
N 104,946 71,294 102,939 280,828
pseudo-R2 0.285 0.363 0.137 0.180
Note: Estimates obtained using the baseline definition of loyalty (only purchases in t− 1 matter). All parameters
are significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. 95% confidence intervals reported below estimated coefficients,
constructed using robust standard errors. SB denotes store brand.
In all four markets, consumer loyalty (measured by γ) appears to play a crucial role in de-
termining consumers’ choices. In fact, given the magnitude of the negative alternative-specific
intercepts, within an acceptable range of prices, we can see that it is almost the loyalty effect alone
making a purchase more attractive than the outside option. The price coefficients, η, are negative
in all cases and reflect differences in the composition of each supermarket’s clientele which are in
line with common knowledge: people shopping in Asda and Morrisons are more price-sensitive
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than Tesco and Sainsbury’s customers.
We conducted two robustness checks: table A.7.1 shows results obtained under the assumption
that a consumer can stay loyal for more than one period, while table A.7.2 presents what happens
if we let γ vary across products. As expected, for the first case, loyalty parameters turn out to be
lower than in the baseline case which we attribute to consumers’ imperfect memory. When we
let γ vary across products we find some differences – in particular consumers appear to be less
loyal to margarine brands and, intuitively, to the supermarkets’ own-label products. Even though
we reject the null that all γ’s are equal, richer specification of the demand model does not lead to
dramatic improvements in terms of the pseudo-R2, and therefore we treat the specification with
just one loyalty coefficient as baseline. Furthermore, a homogenous loyalty parameter is more
consistent with a psychological interpretation of consumer inertia, while with product-specific
loyalty parameters one can think of them being endogenously affected by product characteristics
or firms’ marketing activities.
A natural question arising in demand estimation is whether we can obtain consistent estimates
without controlling for potential endogeneity of prices. Due to the nature of the industry of interest,
it is hard to imagine that there can be any product characteristics unobserved by the consumers and
potentially correlated with prices that are not captured by product-specific intercepts. Moreover,
due to the timing assumption in our model, we know that prices are set prior to the realisation of
individual demand shocks. Hence, similarly to Griffith et al. (2017) and Pavlidis and Ellickson
(2017), we can conclude that endogeneity of prices should not be a major issue.
Conditional choice probabilities
Prior to discussing structural estimation of the components of the payoff functions, we present
reduced-form evidence in the form of multinomial logit estimates of conditional choice proba-
bilities (table A.7.3 in appendix A.7). The covariates correspond to the components of zt in the
theoretical model given our choice of players and products, as discussed in the previous section.
Ideally, we should be estimating CCPs separately for each player in each of the 4 markets in our
data using nonparametric methods. Even with a fully parametric specification, 200 periods quickly
turn out not to be enough to precisely estimate 51 coefficients per player with enough precision.
We therefore pooled data from four supermarkets and include fixed effects to account for the fact
that equilibrium strategies might differ across markets.
We explore richer specifications that include higher order terms and interactions between state
variables, and used post-LASSO as a regularisation tool to deal with the large number of param-
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eters. While LASSO outperforms standard multinomial logit with unpooled data, the gains from
sparsity were relatively modest when we used the entire sample, both in terms of in-sample fit and
out-of-sample predictive performance. Moreover, squared market shares and interactions were
usually not selected by the method. We also experimented with a random effects specification as
well as discrete lagged market shares, finding no substantial differences.42
The results in table A.7.3 are generally consistent with the descriptive evidence shown in
section 1.4. In particular, we see that (i) players seem to take into account what they, rather
than their competitors played last period and (ii) manufacturers’ reactions to own past shares and
competitors’ past shares seem limited. Yet, the analysis of the coefficients in the multinomial
model is much more involved. We refer the reader to section 1.4 for more details on these facts.
1.6.3 Dynamic parameters
Before showing the estimates of the dynamic parameters it is would be helpful to recall the steps of
our estimation procedure. First, in subsection 1.6.2 we show the estimates of the demand system.
Second, based on the demand estimates the law that governs the transition of states was obtained.
From the CCPs shown above and given the demand and state transition estimates the dynamic
parameters of the model can be finally recovered. This last step will be the main object of this
subsection.
 Adjustment costs. We start the description of our results with the parameters capturing price
adjustment costs. Following the identification arguments in subsection 1.6.1 we emphasise once
again that price adjustment costs can be recovered directly from the CCPs, independently from
the other model primitives. Our estimates are, therefore, robust to the specification of the demand
system, state transitions, discount factor and the other parameters in period payoffs. Table 1.9
reports the estimated dynamic parameters reflecting the costs of switching from high to low prices.
All the estimates are negative and their relative magnitudes reflect differences in costs across
products. Even though the figures for Arla have relatively large standard errors, they are quantita-
tively similar to the costs of other firms which are all statistically significant. Therefore, we believe
that the large standard errors are an artifact of the sampling variation in the Arla data, rather than
a feature of the industry making Arla different from the remaining players. There does not seem
to be a lot of variation across supermarkets, which is consistent with the results reported in Slade
(1998). Technically this result is reflecting the fact that the magnitude of supermarket fixed effects
42All additional results described above are available upon request.
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is relatively small in the CCPs.43 All three Arla, Dairy Crest and Unilever, seem to be incurring
very similar costs to change the prices for both of their products at the same time.
Table 1.9: Price adjustment costs.
ASDA MORRISONS SAINSBURY’S TESCO
Arla
SCAnchor -2.177 -2.508 -2.511 -2.497
(2.15) (2.56) (2.72) (2.33)
SCLurpak -2.388 -2.438 -2.451 -2.441
(2.05) (2.50) (2.6) (2.25)
SCBoth -4.430 -4.746 -4.765 -4.745
(3.00) (3.52) (3.60) (3.25)
DC
SCClover -2.589*** -2.584*** -2.583*** -2.582***
(0.68) (0.78) (0.88) (0.83)
SCCountry Life -2.149*** -2.154*** -2.131*** -2.155***
(0.64) (0.79) (0.9) (0.85)
SCBoth -4.536*** -4.544*** -4.547*** -4.557***
(0.84) (0.95) (1.06) (1.01)
Unilever
SCFlora -1.526** -1.612** -1.633** -1.627**
(0.50) (0.52) (0.51) (0.51)
SCICBINB -2.251*** -2.445*** -2.446*** -2.451***
(0.63) (0.61) (0.6) (0.6)
SCBoth -4.111*** -4.291*** -4.311*** -4.319***
(1.67) (1.64) (1.58) (1.52)
Note: Price adjustment costs are scaled by the variance of to the distribution of ε, which is
assumed type-I extreme value with mean 0. Standard errors obtained using 100 bootstrap
replications given in parentheses below the point estimates. Significance levels: *** 1%, **
5%, * 10%.
The estimates in table 1.9 are scaled by the standard deviation of the payoff shocks and hence
cannot be interpreted in monetary terms. To give to the reader a clearer picture of the magnitude
of these costs we estimate the remaining parameters in the payoff function and compute the ratio
between price adjustment costs and variable profits.
To provide this calculation, we need to estimate the remaining parameters in the variable profit
function. Unfortunately, our attempts to estimate marginal costs and market size, H , produced
implausible results.44 Our explanation for this is the following: based on Sanches et al. (2016b)
we can write the best response functions obtained from the solution of problem (1.4) as a linear
function of the parameters in the period payoffs i.e., best response functions for player i can be
represented as a system of the form Yi(σ,G, SCi) = Xi(σ,G) · θi, where Yi(σ,G, SCi) is a
43By excluding supermarket fixed effects from the CCPs the estimates of the other coefficients do not change significantly.
44We experiment with various different methods to estimate these parameters. Instead of using parametric approximations of the
value function we tried to estimate the parameters using forward simulations of the value function (Hotz et al., 1994). Alternatively we
tried to discretise the state space compute value function using the closed form expression for the ex-ante value function (Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler, 2008). All our attempts produced implausible estimates for marginal costs and H .
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column vector45 and Xi(σ,G) is a matrix with 3 columns – same number of rows as Yi(·). The
vector Yi(σ,G, SCi) depends on beliefs, transitions and on the estimates of adjustment costs ob-
tained above; Xi(σ,G) depends on beliefs and state transitions only. The vector θi contains the
three parameters of interest, namely, marginal costs for both products of player i and H (scaled
by the standard deviation of the payoff shock). In theory, this representation implies that the suf-
ficient condition for the identification of these parameters is that Xi(σ,G) has full column rank.
However, we find the variables in Xi(σ,G) were highly correlated with each other – correlations
were above 0.95 – which can lead to very noisy estimates of the marginal costs and H . This is
perhaps not very surprising given that we attempted to estimate a high-dimensional vector of cost
parameters without instruments or any additional cost-side data. Therefore we decided to pursue
a different strategy to estimate all the components of firms’ payoffs. Since marginal costs and
variance of the shocks in our model are not per se dynamic parameters, we calibrate them and
instead focus on estimating the discount factor which is more important for pricing dynamics. For
marginal costs, we used the estimates obtained by Griffith et al. (2017) on a subsample of our data
set. To select the best value H (scaled by the variance of the shocks), we estimate the discount
factor for different possible values of H and rely on various measures of model fit to select the
value that minimises the distance between observed and implied distributions of actions played
by firms. We present our goodness-of-fit measures in section 1.7, and show the sensitivity of the
remaining results to changes in H .
 Discount factor. Since the results are very similar for all markets, for the sake of brevity, from
this moment on we will only present results for the biggest (Tesco) and smallest (Morrisons) mar-
ket in terms of annual sales. We present the results for different values of H – using the calibrated
marginal costs. All values of H outside the range of values shown in the table provided much
worse fit to the data and are therefore omitted. The discount factors estimated using the method
outlined in appendix B3 and section 3 of Komarova et al. (forthcoming) are presented in table
1.10. Our results show that firms are forward-looking, with the discount factors close to the typ-
ical values assumed in models calibrated using weekly data. We conclude the forward-looking
behaviour of manufacturers is a crucial component of pricing models.
 Relative magnitudes of adjustment costs. In table 1.11, we relate the present value of adjust-
ment costs for all firms to their variable profits. The results are presented for different assumptions
about H . As seen in table 1.11, the magnitudes of promotional costs are relatively large. Over
45Number of rows is equal to the number of states times the number of possible actions minus one.
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Table 1.10: Estimated discount factors.
H
MORRISONS TESCO
β β
0.50
0.9807∗∗∗ 0.9970∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.01)
1.00
0.9815∗∗∗ 0.9970∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01)
2.00
0.9811∗∗∗ 0.9958∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
3.00
0.9790∗∗∗ 0.9936∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
4.00
0.9757∗∗∗ 0.9914∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
5.00
0.9708∗∗∗ 0.9895∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
6.00
0.9620∗∗∗ 0.9878∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
7.00
0.9472∗∗∗ 0.9860∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
8.00
0.9299∗∗∗ 0.9838∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
9.00
0.9079∗∗∗ 0.9805∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01)
Note: Results shown for different values of mar-
ket size scaled by the variance of the shock, un-
der the assumption that this value is the same
for all firms, but potentially different across mar-
kets. Standard errors obtained using 100 boot-
strap replications provided in parentheses below
the point estimates. Significance levels: *** 1%,
** 5%, * 10%.
the horizon of 200 weeks, firms have to sacrifice approximately 24-34% of their variable profits
in order to be able to charge promotional prices in some periods. These estimates are in line with
existing evidence in the macro literature.46 Since in absolute terms, these costs were very similar
across players and the firms we considered are the market leaders, one can imagine that these costs
constitute a much bigger fraction of the profits of smaller companies and local dairies, effectively
restricting the scope of their promotional activities. This is consistent with what we observe in
the data on smaller brands which were considerably less frequently on promotion.47 Our analysis
therefore shows price adjustment costs may have important implications for market structure.
In summary:
1. Table 1.8 suggests that loyalty is an important driver of consumer decisions, as previously
pointed out by our descriptive evidence (tables 1.3 and 1.4 in section 1.4);
2. Our adjustment cost estimates represent a large fraction of manufacturers’ payoffs. This
46For instance, Levy et al. (1997) use store-level data to study the process of changing prices. They find that these costs represent
35.2% of net margins of retailers. Using the same approach Dutta et al. (1999) study price adjustment costs of a large US drugstore
chain. Findings are similar to the findings of Levy et al. (1997). Price adjustment costs – physical and labor costs of changing prices
– amounts to 27.08% of net profit margins. In addition to physical costs involved in price adjustment processes Zbaracki et al. (2004)
quantify managerial and costumer costs of price adjustment using data from a large industrial manufacturer. Managerial costs are
defined as the managerial time and effort spent with pricing decisions; costumer costs are defined as the costs of communicating new
prices to consumers. Price adjustment costs adds up to 20.03% of company’s net margins. It is worthwhile mentioning that all these
evidence are direct, in the sense that they were obtained directly from accounting data.
47See figure A.6.1 in appendix C.
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Table 1.11: Magnitude of adjustment costs.
H
MORRISONS TESCO
Arla DC Uni Arla DC Uni
0.5 -34.70% -32.98% -30.81% -33.49% -33.46% -30.36%
1.0 -34.37% -32.71% -30.23% -33.16% -33.26% -29.89%
2.0 -33.78% -32.22% -29.22% -32.52% -32.93% -28.97%
3.0 -33.29% -31.74% -28.30% -31.84% -32.61% -28.11%
4.0 -32.79% -31.26% -27.48% -31.11% -32.27% -27.30%
5.0 -32.35% -30.72% -26.73% -30.44% -31.95% -26.50%
6.0 -32.09% -30.17% -26.07% -29.72% -31.62% -25.73%
7.0 -31.99% -29.41% -25.50% -29.04% -31.29% -25.01%
8.0 -31.80% -28.61% -24.94% -28.30% -30.96% -24.27%
9.0 -31.61% -27.60% -24.33% -27.52% -30.66% -23.58%
Note: The numbers in the table are ratios of adjustment costs to variable profits for each firm in two
different supermarkets. Both components of the payoff are calculated as average present values for 200
periods, averaged across 1000 simulated paths.
can help explain the price rigidities found in the descriptive evidence in section 1.4. The
magnitudes of our adjustment costs are in line with (direct) evidence found in the macro
literature and, judging by their relative importance on manufacturers’ payoffs, it is likely
that price adjustment costs have implications for the structure of this market.
3. The estimates of the discount factor point to a high degree of forward-looking behaviour
and their size is similar to the β’s typically assumed in the literature.
Next we examine the goodness-of-fit of the model and propose a series of counterfactual studies.
The key purpose of these counterfactuals is to study the implications of consumer loyalty on price
dynamics when price adjustment is costly.
1.7 Model fit and counterfactuals
This section begins with us justifying our choice of the grid used to calibrate H , as well as present
some measures of model fit. We will turn to our two counterfactual studies. In light of the find-
ings in sections 1.4 and 1.6, it seems that both, consumer loyalty and price adjustment costs, are
fundamental to the understanding of the price process in this market. We want now to quantify
the implications of consumer loyalty on price dynamics in the presence of price adjustment costs.
Intuitively, price adjustment costs may mitigate the incentives of firms to invest in a broader con-
sumer base through price promotions. To benefit from this of type strategy firms have to bear not
only temporary profit losses steaming from temporary price reductions but also the price adjust-
ment cost itself. Our counterfactuals will serve to illustrate this intuition. Second, the estimates
in subsection 3.5 indicate that price adjustment costs are substantial. An additional objective of
this section is to quantify the importance of price adjustment costs to consumers and firms. This
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last exercise may help us to understand how investments in practices and technologies that aim to
reduce price adjustment costs affect prices, profits and consumer surplus.
1.7.1 Model fit
This subsection analyses the fit of the model and describes the arguments that guided our choices
of H . We select H’s for each market by examining two measures of model fit (see table 1.12). To
calculate these measures, we take the vector of market shares observed in the first period of our
data as initial conditions, and simulate the model 199 periods ahead using the equilibrium CCPs.
We repeat the simulation 1,000 times and compare simulated and real data to calculate: (i) the
sum of absolute differences between the fractions of periods in which each action was played by
the three firms; (ii) sum of absolute differences between market shares of all brands.
While the numbers in the table may not have an obvious interpretation, it is clear that we
want to minimise both of them. For both markets, values of H higher than 9 yielded much worse
fit. Moreover, the expected payoffs quickly reach (computer) infinity as H increases making
the computation of counterfactual equilibrium infeasible. For the values of H ∈ {0.5, . . . , 9},
we observe that in general, lower values give rise to a better fit of the market shares, though the
differences are very small. We observe more noticeable differences for the fit of actions, and hence
rely on this metric for our choice of the best model (H = 8 for Morrisons andH = 3 orH = 4 for
Tesco). In principle we could also refine the grid around these values, but that would only affect
the computational time, without having any serious qualitative impact on our remaining results.
Table 1.12: Measures of model fit.
H
MORRISONS TESCO
Actions Shares Actions Shares
0.5 0.803 0.021 0.982 0.011
1.0 0.802 0.022 0.984 0.011
2.0 0.790 0.022 0.984 0.012
3.0 0.775 0.022 0.980 0.012
4.0 0.750 0.022 0.981 0.012
5.0 0.716 0.023 0.990 0.012
6.0 0.673 0.023 1.007 0.012
7.0 0.617 0.024 1.038 0.013
8.0 0.591 0.024 1.079 0.013
9.0 0.686 0.025 1.131 0.013
Note: For both supermarkets, two measures of model fit
are reported for different calibrations of H . The first one
(second and fourth column) is the sum of absolute differ-
ences between the fractions of periods with a given action
being played observed in the data and simulated from the
equilibrium of the model. The second statistic, reported
in columns 3 and 5, measures the absolute difference be-
tween observed and simulated market shares. Data from
the equilibrium of the model were simulated 1,000 times,
199 periods ahead, using the state observed in week 1 of
the data as initial conditions.
For the models providing best fit, we decompose the above measures of fit by firm and brand,
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respectively (see figures A.7.1 and A.7.2 in appendix D). The model does a good job fitting market
shares and predicting firms’ pricing behaviour. Only for Arla, we underestimate the number of
periods in which one of the brands is on sale. For the other firms we manage to replicate the
distribution of actions quite accurately.
1.7.2 Counterfactuals
Equipped with the estimates of the payoffs, we can now answer the questions posed at the be-
ginning of the chapter. Namely, we seek to understand (i) how consumer loyalty affects price
dynamics in the presence of price adjustment costs and (ii) how price adjustment costs affect
firms’ profits, equilibrium prices and consumer welfare.
 Consumer loyalty under price adjustment costs. To examine the first question we simulate
the pricing game using the estimates of price adjustment costs (see table 1.9), our calibrated values
for H (according to table 1.12), the corresponding discount factor estimates (see table 1.10) and
different values for γ, which is the parameter that captures consumer loyalty in our model. We
redo the same exercise setting SCi = 0 for all firms and compare equilibrium prices (averaged
across the 6 brands) produced by the models with and without price adjustment costs. To compute
equilibrium prices we solved the model using the value function approximation method described
in the technical appendix. Starting from the state vector observed at the first week in our sample
we simulate the model 199 periods ahead 1000 times and compute average prices across periods
and simulations. We solve the model using different initial guesses for the vector of equilibrium
probabilities, to detect possible multiplicity of equilibria, finding our algorithm to converge to the
same equilibrium every time.
Table 1.13 shows the results for Morrisons and Tesco. The first column has the factor that
we use to scale the parameter capturing consumer loyalty (γ in table 1.8). Columns 2 and 3 show
average prices and the percentage difference of prices between the model in the corresponding row
and the model without consumer loyalty (i.e. the model in the first row) for the MPE simulations
where price adjustment costs are set to zero. The two subsequent columns have the same statistics
for the models with price adjustment costs. The last column has the price variation between the
models with and without price adjustment costs.
The table shows some interesting results. First, increases in consumer loyalty are associated
with increases in equilibrium prices in the models with and without price adjustment costs. This
observation holds for both supermarkets. For lower levels of consumer loyalty the effects of
increases in the loyalty factor on prices are relatively small (but still positive). When the levels
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Table 1.13: Implications of consumer loyalty with and without price adjustment costs.
Loyalty factor
SC= 0 Estimated SC Price SC
Price SC=0Price Difference Price Difference
MORRISONS
0.00 1.750 - 1.797 - 2.69%
0.25 1.750 0.01% 1.798 0.02% 2.70%
0.50 1.751 0.03% 1.799 0.07% 2.73%
0.75 1.751 0.07% 1.800 0.18% 2.80%
1.00 1.753 0.16% 1.805 0.41% 2.94%
2.00 1.811 3.49% 1.896 5.47% 4.66%
3.00 1.858 6.16% 1.944 8.17% 4.63%
TESCO
0.00 1.740 - 1.754 - 0.80%
0.25 1.741 0.00% 1.755 0.01% 0.80%
0.50 1.741 0.01% 1.755 0.04% 0.82%
0.75 1.741 0.03% 1.756 0.10% 0.87%
1.00 1.742 0.07% 1.758 0.22% 0.95%
2.00 1.760 1.14% 1.816 3.50% 3.15%
3.00 1.769 1.62% 1.853 5.63% 4.77%
Note: Columns labeled “Price” contain average prices (across the 6 branded
products); columns labeled “Difference” contain the percentage difference be-
tween prices in the corresponding row with respect to the price obtained from
the model where the loyalty factor is zero (i.e. prices in the first row); the last
column has the price difference between the models with and without price ad-
justment costs in the corresponding row. The figures were obtained by simulating
the two models according to MPE choice probabilities 200 periods ahead, and
averaging across 1,000 simulation paths.
of consumer loyalty are already high, increases in the loyalty factor lead to a increase in prices.
These patterns are similar to those found in Dube´ et al. (2009) with one important exception. In
Dube´ et al. (2009) prices initially fall for lower consumer loyalty levels, whereas in our case firms
seem to have an insufficient incentive to invest in building up their consumer base.
Second, the consequences of consumer loyalty for prices are more pronounced in the model
with price adjustment costs. For example, in Tesco, a change in the loyalty factor from 0 to 3
causes a price variation of 1.62% in the model where price adjustment costs are zero and of 5.63%
in the model with price adjustment costs. The same conclusion holds for Morrisons and for each
brand separately. The differences in the magnitudes of these effects between Tesco and Morrisons
may be explained by differences in H . In particular this parameter is much smaller for Tesco than
Morrisons’, which suggests that changes in consumer switching costs will have more relevant
implications in Morrisons than in Tesco. Our conclusion is that price adjustment costs may act
as an additional barrier for firms that want to invest in consumer loyalty through temporary price
reductions.
Finally, in line with the descriptive regressions in section 1.4, price adjustment costs appear to
be more important to explain price dynamics than consumer loyalty. From our baseline estimates
(rows in bold) the inclusion of price adjustment costs in the model leads to a increase of 3% in
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average prices for Morrisons and of 1% for Tesco. This contrasts with the effects of consumer
loyalty on prices. In the model with price adjustment costs, an increase in the loyalty factor from
zero (no consumer loyalty) to one (baseline estimates of consumer loyalty) causes a price increase
of approximately 0.4% in Morrisons and of 0.2% in Tesco.
 Price adjustment costs, profits and consumer surplus. The results in table 1.13 also suggest
that, despite their magnitudes, price adjustment costs have a small effect on final prices. Next we
provide further evidence on this result. We start with an analysis of the effects of price adjustment
costs on profits and consumer surplus. The results of this study are shown in table 1.14.
To construct this table we compute the percentage differences between baseline (model with
price adjustment costs) and counterfactual (model without price adjustment costs) profits and mar-
ket shares of each manufacturer and consumer surplus. While we focus on the results for the two
calibrations of H which provide best fit of the model, the table includes also welfare measures
for alternative values of the parameter to show that our main qualitative conclusion is robust to
the choice of H . Not surprisingly, eliminating this type of friction has a large positive effect for
firms’ profits, ranging from 50 to almost 75%. This is considerably more than the magnitude of
the promotional costs alone (see table 1.11), which represent 20-30% of firms variable profits.
This difference is mainly explained by an increase in the expected value of the profitability shock
for the firms, i.e. the (conditional) expectation of term
∑
`∈Ai εit(`) · 1(ait = `) in equation (1.2).
Clearly, an important implication of this finding is that investments in managerial practices and
technologies that reduce price adjustment costs generate large returns for firms – see, for example,
Basker (2012) and Ellison et al. (2015) for other studies on the effects of process innovation of this
type on profits. Also, as alluded in section 3.5, these findings suggest that price adjustment costs
may have, in the long-run, considerable influence on market structure. Without price adjustment
costs potential entrants will expect considerably higher profits in the long-run. This effect might,
in the end, induce the entry of new competitors in the industry.
Consumer surplus, on the other hand, increases only by a modest percentage when price ad-
justment costs are removed from the model. Competition in this market appears to be limited,
which means that incumbents do not have incentives to pass the cost reduction to consumers. To
understand this result better, we further decompose our findings and look at other margins in table
1.15.
In both supermarkets, under costless price adjustment, we observe an increase in the number
of weeks where each firm has at least one of its brands on promotion. However, the drop in the
average long-run price paid by the consumers ranges only between 1 and 6p, which explains the
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Table 1.14: Counterfactual results with SC = 0.
H
MORRISONS TESCO
Arla DC Uni Arla DC Uni
0.5
∆s 0.63% 0.59% 0.30% 0.08% 0.06% 0.04%
∆Π 82.87% 75.38% 64.63% 78.88% 76.55% 63.41%
∆CS 0.44% 0.05%
2.0
∆s 0.88% 0.72% 0.61% 0.30% 0.13% 0.14%
∆Π 79.49% 72.99% 60.22% 75.64% 74.82% 72.89%
∆CS 0.70% 0.18%
4.0
∆s 1.47% 1.14% 1.20% 0.63% 0.26% 0.27%
∆Π 76.24% 70.01% 55.68% 71.49% 72.89% 55.08%
∆CS 1.25% 0.37%
6.0
∆s 2.41% 2.14% 1.84% 0.95% 0.38% 0.38%
∆Π 74.34% 67.16% 52.37% 67.55% 70.96% 51.14%
∆CS 2.04% 0.54%
8.0
∆s 3.97% 3.80% 2.77% 1.25% 0.51% 0.48%
∆Π 74.51% 64.16% 50.52% 63.80% 69.14% 47.67%
∆CS 3.27% 0.71%
Note: Numbers in the table are percentage differences between the counterfactual scenario and the baseline
model in: average market share (∆s), firm profits (∆Π) and consumer surplus (∆CS). The figures were
obtained by simulating the two models according to MPE choice probabilities 200 periods ahead, and
averaging across 1,000 simulation paths.
aforementioned modest increase in consumer surplus. The most important difference between the
baseline scenario and the counterfactual is in the duration of promotional periods – the lack of
adjustment costs makes firms choose shorter, albeit more frequent, periods of temporarily reduced
prices. We would therefore no longer be observing the persistence of prices which we spotted in
the original data, though this difference turns out to have very little effect on consumer surplus.
The results of this counterfactual can also be interpreted as partial equilibrium response to a
ban on promotional fees. While such regulation has not been proposed in the UK yet, similar
policies have been implemented in some countries to increase the degree of transparency in the
retailer-manufacturer relationships.48 Our results indicate that such a regulation would have a
modest impact on consumer welfare and would simply shift the profits from retailers to manufac-
turers in the vertical channel. This part of the result should be interpreted with caution because we
are not analysing the general equilibrium response of the downstream firms (supermarkets).
48See The Economist: http://www.economist.com/news/business/21654601-supplier-rebates-
are-heart-some-supermarket-chains-woes-buying-up-shelves (accessed on August 15, 2017): ”Some countries
have tried to protect consumers by making rebates illegal. Poland banned them in 1993 (...). And in 1995 America banned them
on alcoholic drinks (...). However, progress towards eliminating them on all products in America stalled after the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) concluded in 2001 that more research on them was needed before it could take any further action”. (access March
8, 2018).
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Table 1.15: Decomposition of main counterfactual results.
MORRISONS: H = 8 TESCO: H = 4
Baseline Counterfactual Baseline Counterfactual
Arla
No promotions
 Frequency 37.82% 26.50% 31.39% 26.56%
 Avg. duration 3.08 1.36 2.79 1.36
One promotion
 Frequency 46.88% 49.91% 49.09% 49.97%
 Avg. duration 2.43 1.33 2.49 1.33
Two promotions
 Frequency 15.29% 23.59% 19.51% 23.47%
 Avg. duration 2.07 1.31 2.24 1.31
pAnchor £2.25 £2.20 £2.23 £2.21
pLurpak £2.45 £2.39 £2.38 £2.34
Dairy Crest
No promotions
 Frequency 35.96% 26.19% 28.81% 25.70%
 Avg. duration 2.88 1.36 2.40 1.33
One promotion
 Frequency 47.80% 49.97% 49.14% 49.90%
 Avg. duration 2.37 1.33 2.40 1.33
Two promotions
 Frequency 16.23% 23.83% 22.05% 24.40%
 Avg. duration 2.05 1.32 2.30 1.33
pClover £1.49 £1.43 £1.48 £1.46
pCountry Life £2.14 £2.10 £2.09 £2.08
Unilever
No promotions
 Frequency 38.46% 27.99% 30.14% 26.62%
 Avg. duration 2.71 1.39 2.37 1.37
One promotion
 Frequency 47.72% 50.26% 49.95% 50.04%
 Avg. duration 2.13 1.34 2.17 1.33
Two promotions
 Frequency 13.83% 21.75% 19.92% 23.33%
 Avg. duration 1.77 1.29 2.00 1.31
pFlora £1.25 £1.21 £1.28 £1.26
pICBINB £1.05 £1.01 £1.07 £1.06
Note: The table compares various summary statistics in the baseline scenario where price adjustment is costly and in the counter-
factual with no promotional costs. For each firm, we present simulated frequency and duration of different actions (first six rows),
and average long-run prices of each brand, weighted by market shares, denoted as p∗.
1.8 Summary and conclusions
This chapter analysed multiproduct pricing in an environment where consumers exhibit inertia in
their choices and oligopolists might be facing costly price adjustments. Based on the empirical
observation that the distribution of retail prices has only a few mass points, we cast the problem as
a dynamic discrete game and analysed pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria. We employ recent
identification results by Komarova et al. (forthcoming) to arrive at a tractable estimation strategy,
which allows us to estimate the cost of adjusting prices and firms’ discount factor.
We apply the model to the UK butter and margarine industry and estimate the structural pa-
rameters using a detailed scanner data set. First, our estimates of price adjustment costs show that
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firms pay between 24-34% of their variable profits to change their prices. The magnitudes of these
costs are in line with (direct) evidence found in the macro literature – see, for instance, Levy et al.
(1997), Dutta et al. (1999), Zbaracki et al. (2004). Second, using the methodology proposed in
Komarova et al. (forthcoming) we also estimated the discount factor of butter and margarine pro-
ducers. Our discount factor estimates are within the range of values commonly assumed in other
dynamic pricing studies – see Dube´ et al. (2009) and Pavlidis and Ellickson (2017). This result
implies that firms’ forward-looking behaviour is a critical component of pricing models.
We use the model to understand the effects of consumer loyalty on prices when price adjust-
ment is costly. Our first counterfactual exercise finds that price adjustment costs dampen firms
incentives to invest in consumer loyalty, which exacerbates potentially negative effects of con-
sumer switching costs on prices. Our second counterfactual study shows that price adjustment
costs also have important effects on firms profits. By removing price adjustment costs from the
market we observe a significant increase in profits but little effect on prices and consumer welfare.
Given their magnitudes, it is very likely that price adjustment costs may have consequences for
market structure. Smaller firms may not have the capacity to pay these costs to lower their prices
frequently which, in turn, lowers their ability to enter and compete in this market. A systematic
investigation of price adjustment costs on entry and exit dynamics seems to be an interesting topic
for future research.
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Chapter 2
Identification and Estimation of a
Search Model: A Procurement Auction
Approach
2.1 Introduction
Many theoretical models have been developed to explain price dispersion of homogeneous prod-
ucts relying on the notion that search is costly for consumers; see the survey of Baye, Morgan,
and Scholten (2006). The econometrics literature has exploited the structure imposed by search
models to show nonparametric identification, relying on the fixed sample1 framework studied in
Burdett and Judd (1983). In this model, ex ante identical firms compete by setting prices in a
complete information environment, while a continuum of consumers choose how many prices to
sample. Price dispersion arises in equilibrium as firms employ a mixed strategy Nash pricing rule
in equilibrium. Hong and Shum (2006) alter the original model by assuming that consumers differ
in their search cost which is drawn from a continuous distribution. They then use the indifference
condition which defines the mixed strategy NE to show that this distribution can be identified from
data on prices alone. When the dataset available is limited to a single market, only a finite number
of points of the search cost distribution can be identified. The identification of the search cost
distribution over its entire support is possible, for instance, when we have more data on prices
from different markets, as shown by Moraga-Gonza´lez, Sa´ndor, and Wildenbeest (2013).
Since the main goal of Burdett and Judd (1983) was to establish the existence of price dis-
1In a fixed sample (nonsequential) search consumers decide simultaneously how many firms to search from. This stands in
contrast to sequential search. Some recent empirical studies found that nonsequential search models provide a better approximation to
consumers’ search behaviour observed in real life (De los Santos, Hortac¸su, and Wildenbeest (2012), Honka and Chintagunta (2017)).
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persion in the simplest possible environment with no heterogeneity on either side of the market,
the model might not be very well suited to most empirical applications. In this chapter we there-
fore consider a more general setting where firms can have heterogeneous costs of production.
Our model builds on the theoretical framework proposed by MacMinn (1980), where firms have
independent, private marginal costs.2 This approach leads to a game of incomplete information
played between firms that resembles a procurement auction. The subsequent solution concept is a
Bayesian-Nash pure strategy equilibrium, in which firms adopt monotone pricing rules. Therefore,
price dispersion observed in our model can be attributed to both search and ex ante differences in
firms’ productivity. We aim to provide a general framework for a structural econometric analysis
of such a search model.
The key contribution of this chapter is to provide a theoretical, both in terms of economics
and econometrics, treatment for analysing an empirical search model and lay out a corresponding
estimation methodology. We characterise the equilibrium of the model, provide conditions under
which one can identify the distributions of consumers’ search costs and firms’ marginal costs.
Finally, we propose nonparametric estimators for all of the identified objects in the model and
provide asymptotic properties of these estimators when appropriate data are available.
Our identification strategy differs from those employed to study models in the spirit of Burdett
and Judd (1983). The insight of Hong and Shum (2006) uses the constancy condition imposed by
a mixed strategy equilibrium to identify the distribution of consumers’ search cost. We do not have
such a restriction to exploit with the pure strategy BNE solution concept. Therefore, in addition
to price, we require data on a variable other than price to identify the proportions of consumer
search. We then assume the regression of this variable on price to be related to the proportions
of consumer search through a particular semiparametric index restriction. These proportions need
to be recovered in the first place, as they appear in the firms’ optimal pricing rules, which are
subsequently used to identify the distribution of marginal costs. Following our identification steps,
we propose a companion two-step estimation procedure:
Step 1. The proportions of consumer search are estimated. When the index specification
is linear, our estimator admits an OLS-type, closed-form solution.
Step 2. The firms’ marginal costs are estimated. These generated variables are then
used to construct a nonparametric estimator for the probability density function
of the marginal costs in a similar fashion to Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000,
2Similarly to us, Benabou (1993) considers a search model with bilateral heterogeneity. He does not, however, present any results
on nonsequential search, so we are more likely to see our results as an extenstion of MacMinn (1980), instead of a fixed sample version
of his model.
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hereafter GPV).
Despite its seemingly natural scope for applications3, we are not aware of any theoretical work
that considers our search model previously. We directly extend MacMinn’s partial equilibrium
analysis4 of fixed sample search model to a full equilibrium one with an arbitrary continuous
distribution of marginal costs defined over a compact support.5 We build on his insight that makes
the connection between the search and procurement auction models. The pricing problem of
each firm can be seen as a first price procurement auction problem with random participation; the
number and identity of bidders are stochastic. We characterise an equilibrium that generates a
continuous price distribution.
The model of search that is closest to the one we consider in this paper can be found in a recent
empirical study by Salz (2017). A version of our model can in fact be seen as a special case of
his. However, as an econometric problem, our search problems are not nested. In particular his
identification strategy is not applicable to our model.
Salz studies the trade-waste market in New York City. In his model buyers (consumers) can
haggle (search) directly with carters (firms), or use a broker who has access to a group of carters.
The haggling part is the same as our search problem. A broker acts as a clearinghouse where a
standard procurement auction game with known number and identity of bidders is played. Salz
assumes an equilibrium exists in his model. Importantly, Salz’s identification strategy relies on
the assumption that a broker always exists; see his Assumption 1. He also assumes both carters
that can be searched and those who participate with brokers have the same cost distribution.6
Therefore he can identify the firm’s cost distribution using the procurement auction data from the
brokers independently of the search mechanism. The identification for the remaining components
of his model subsequently relies on this.
Brokers do not exist in our model. We emphasize that we are not being critical of Salz’s
approach. His model captures important features of many real world industries. Nevertheless bro-
kers, or other clearinghouse facilities, need not exist in many other markets. For these pure search
models we show identification is possible with additional data. Our key identifying assumption
3Our model generates price dispersion in a transparent manner through heterogenous marginal costs. A mixed strategy solution
is harder to interpret.
4MacMinn derives firms’ best response functions taking search behaviour as given and proves that an equilibrium distribution of
prices exists for an arbitrary number of prices sampled. The paper does not, however, directly consider simultaneous determination of
search behaviour and optimal pricing. Hence, in line with other authors (Pereira, 2005), we refer to his paper as partial equilibrium
analysis.
5As opposed to the results in MacMinn (1980), which are derived assuming that firms’ costs are uniformly distributed.
6Salz assumes there are two types of carters. H(igh) and L(ow) cost types. Both types are present in both the broker and search
markets. A carter that participates in both markets generally will bid differently during the auction and haggling process.
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involving the semiparametric index restriction is empirically motivated. It contains as a special
case the assumption that some observable market outcomes are proportional to the probabilities
of firms completing a sale as consumers search in expectation. Natural candidates for such vari-
able could be market shares or sales figures. This idea is identical to linking market shares to the
choice probabilities, which is the starting point for the identification argument used in the study of
differentiated products markets in the IO literature (see Berry and Haile (2014)).
In terms of econometrics, the estimation of the demand side of our model is relatively straight-
forward. The estimators for the demand parameters are smooth functionals of the empirical pro-
cess of observed prices and will converge at a parametric rate; cf. Sanches, Silva Junior, and
Srisuma (2016a). The estimation of the distribution of marginal cost is more challenging. Follow-
ing the tradition set by GPV for nonparametric analysis of auction models, we focus on density
estimation and study its uniform convergence rate. The marginal cost PDF turns out to be the most
difficult object to estimate in our model.
We employ the same estimation strategy as GPV. We first use the observed prices to generate
the latent, or pseudo-, marginal costs and then perform nonparametric estimation using the gen-
erated variables. To this end we establish some key relations between the density function of the
observed and latent variables in our model. These findings are not just for theoretical interest but
have important practical implications. The crucial one is that the density of the observed price
generally asymptotes to infinity as the price approaches the upper bound of its support. Estimating
a density function with a pole requires particular care as standard kernel estimation techniques
are only suitable when the underlying density is assumed to be bounded on its support. For this
we characterise the behaviour of the price density at the upper boundary and suggest a transfor-
mation method that eliminates the boundary issue (cf. Marron and Ruppert (1994)). However, a
slower uniform convergence rate in the neighbourhood of the pole than other part of the support is
a necessary feature. We show our estimator has the same convergence rate as the GPV estimator
on any compact inner subset of the support. The density over an appropriately expanding support
will converge at a slower rate depending on the speed of the support expansion. We can make the
convergence rate to be arbitrarily close to the optimal convergence rate derived in GPV’s auction
problem.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and characterises
the equilibrium of the game. Section 3 presents our constructive identification strategy. Section
4 contains the theoretical results. Section 5 discusses ideas for extensions. Section 6 presents a
simulation study.
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2.2 Model
We consider a model in which there is a unit mass of consumers and a finite number of firms. Each
consumer has an inelastic demand for a single unit of a good supplied by the firms. Consumers
differ by search costs and employ a nonsequential search strategy to find the lowest price, at which
they purchase the product. We next formally introduce the elements of the game.
2.2.1 Supply Side
There are I firms. Let I ≡ {1, . . . , I}. Firm i draws a marginal cost of production Ri. Ri is
assumed to be a continuous random variable supported on
[
R,R
] ⊂ R. We denote its cumulative
distribution function (CDF) byH (·). The marginal costs of firms are independent from each other.
Firm i then faces the following decision problem:
max
p
Λ (p,Ri; q) , where
Λ (p,Ri; q) = (p−Ri)
I∑
k=1
qk
k
I
P
[
P(1:k−1) > p
]
.
Here q = (q1, . . . , qI)
> denotes a vector containing (qk)Ik=1 where qk denotes the proportion of
consumers searching k firms. For a given k, kI is the number of combinations that firm i gets
included when k firms are sampled.7 We use P(k:k′) to denote the k−th order statistic from k′
i.i.d. random variables of prices with some arbitrary distribution; P(1:k−1) denotes the minimum
of such k − 1 prices. Here we implicitly assume that all firms have equal probability of being
found and thus the game is symmetric. We discuss how this assumption can be relaxed in Section
5.2.
Firm’s Best Response
We assume there exists a candidate for an optimal symmetric pricing strategy β :
[
R,R
] →[
P , P
] ⊂ R with the following properties: (i) β is strictly increasing; (ii) β (R) = R, which is
the free entry condition imposing that P = R.
Let SI−1 denote a unit simplex in RI+. For any q ∈ SI−1, we can define Λ∗ (·; q) to be
the value function for a representative firm when all players are assumed to employ a strictly
7Let CIk ≡ I!(I−k)!k! denote the combinatorial number from choosing k objects from a set of I . Then CI−1k−1/CIk = kI .
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increasing optimal pricing strategy that we denote by β (·; q). We denote β−1 (·; q) by ξ (·; q).
Λ∗ (r; q) = (β (r; q)− r)
I∑
k=1
qk
k
I
(1−H (ξ (β (r; q) ; q)))k−1 .
Then by the envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal (2002)),
d
dr
Λ∗ (r; q)
∣∣∣∣
r=R
= −
I∑
k=1
qk
k
I
(1−H (R))k−1 , and
Λ∗
(
R; q
)− Λ∗ (R; q) = − I∑
k=1
qk
k
I
∫ R
s=R
(1−H (s))k−1 ds.
Thus for any r,
β (r; q) = r +
I∑
k=1
qkk
∫ R
s=r (1−H (s))k−1 ds
I∑
k=1
qkk (1−H (r))k−1
. [2.1]
It is easy to verify that β (·; q) is non-decreasing. In particular β (·; q) is continuously differen-
tiable with the following derivative
β′ (r; q) =
h (r)
(
I∑
k=2
qkk (k − 1) (1−H (r))k−2
)(
I∑
k=1
qkk
∫ R
s=r (1−H (s))k−1 ds
)
(
I∑
k=1
qkk (1−H (r))k−1
)2 , [2.2]
where h (·) denotes the probability density function (PDF) of Ri. The form of the derivative
suggests that: if q1 = 1 then β′ (r; q) = 0 for all r; otherwise β (·; q) will be strictly increasing
almost everywhere. We shall focus on the latter case as β (Ri; q) has a continuous distribution.
2.2.2 Demand Side
All consumers have the same valuation of the object but differ in search cost. Each draws a search
cost c from a continuous distribution with CDFG (·).8 She decides how many firms to visit before
conducting the search. Then a consumer with search cost c faces the following decision problem:
min
k≥1
c (k − 1) + EF
[
P(1:k)
]
.
We use EF [·] to denote an expectation where the random prices have distribution described by the
CDF F (·). As standard, we assume there is no cost for the first search. The valuation of the object
is set to R, so that purchase is always made.
8To ease notation we suppress any consumer-specific subscripts from the exposition of the model.
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Consumer’s Best Response
It is easy to verify that EF
[
P(1:k)
]
is non-increasing in k, and we have strict monotonicity when
price has a non-degenerate distribution. The marginal saving from searching one more store after
having searched k stores is:
∆k (F ) ≡ EF
[
P(1:k)
]− EF [P(1:k+1)] .
∆k (F ) is also non-increasing in k. When price has a continuous distribution it can be shown that
∆k (F ) =
∫
F (p) (1− F (p))k dp. [2.3]
It then follows that the proportions of consumers searching optimally will satisfy this rule:
qk (F ) =
 1−G (∆1 (F ))G (∆k−1 (F ))−G (∆k (F ))
for k = 1
for k > 1
. [2.4]
Since the search behaviour in our model is standard, the same expression is to be found in Hong
and Shum (2006) and Moraga-Gonza´lez and Wildenbeest (2007).
2.2.3 Equilibrium
For any q ∈ SI−1, β (·; q) in (2.1) gives an expression for the firm’s best response that induces a
price distribution. Conversely, given any price CDF,F (·), (2.4) gives the consumer’s best response
q (F ) = (qk (F ))
I
k=1. Therefore we can define a symmetric equilibrium for our game as follows.
DEFINITION (Symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium). The pair (q, β (·; q)) is a symmetric equi-
librium if:
(i) for every q when all firms apart from i use pricing strategy β (·; q), β (·; q) is a best
response for firm i;
(ii) given the price distribution induced by β (·; q), q is a vector of proportions of consumers’
optimal search.
For example the monopoly pricing strategy when all consumers search just once constitutes
an equilibrium with: βM
(
r; qM
)
= R for all r, and qM such that q1 = 1 and qk = 0 for
k 6= 1. However, (qM , βM (·; qM)) does not generate any price dispersion and can thus be easily
refuted by the data. We will focus on an equilibrium where consumers search more than once
with a positive measure. Since β (·; q) gives firms’ best response given any search behaviour, the
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equilibrium can be characterised by q that satisfies (2.1) and (2.4) simultaneously. We state this
as a proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. In an equilibrium with strictly increasing pricing strategy with an inverse
function ξ (·; q), q satisfies the following system of equations:
qk =
 1−G
(∫
H (ξ (p,q)) (1−H (ξ (p,q))) dp) for k = 1
G
(∫
H (ξ (p,q)) (1−H (ξ (p,q)))k dp
)
−G
(∫
H (ξ (p,q)) (1−H (ξ (p,q)))k+1 dp
)
otherwise
[2.5]
The characterisation above states that an equilibrium can be summarised by a fixed-point of
some map, say T . It can be shown using the implicit function theorem that T is a continuous map
under some regularity conditions.9 It is clear that T maps SI−1 to some subset of SI−1. Therefore
a general proof for an existence of an equilibrium with a price dispersion may be shown by using
a fixed-point theorem, such as Brouwer’s, by showing that T maps a certain subset of SI−1 onto
itself.
In subsequent sections we shall assume an existence of an equilibrium characterised by Propo-
sition 1. We henceforth drop the indexing arguments of equilibrium objects that are made explicit
in this Section for the purpose of discussions on best response; e.g. β (·; q) becomes β (·), EF [·]
becomes E [·] etc.
2.3 Identification
We identify the demand side first then proceed to the supply side. Our identification of the demand
side focuses on q. We assume another variable related to price is available. Once we can identify
q, identification of the firm’s cost distribution follows analogously to GPV.
2.3.1 Demand Side
Suppose we know the equilibrium price distribution of a search model. This is expected if we have
a random sample {Pim}I,Mi=1,m=1 of prices for I firms from M markets, and we let M → ∞. By
assumption Pim = β (Rim). Here Yim denotes an observable variable that is assumed to satisfy
9Continuity makes the application of Brouwer’s theorem straightforward, as opposed the the existence proof in Moraga-Gonza´lez,
Sa´ndor, and Wildenbeest (2017) where the mapping needed to be transformed to address the discontinuity around 0.
54
Assumption I below. The main identifying assumption we introduce in our work links Yim to the
expected probability firm i winning the sale of the object conditioning on setting price to be Pim.
ASSUMPTION I. There exists a finite and positive λ such that
E [Yim|Pim] = λ
I∑
k=1
qk
k
I
(1− F (Pim))k−1 . [2.6]
The expression above says: Yim is proportional to the probability firm i wins with price Pim.
Assumption I is analogous to the well-known assumption in the demand estimation literature in
IO that equates the observed market share with the choice probabilities; e.g. as used in Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). In our case, depending on the context, candidates for Yim could be
market share or sales volume. The unknown λ does not prevent identification since we have the
restriction that
I∑
k=1
qk must be 1. It is important to note that unlike in a discrete choice model,
where the choice probabilities sums to 1, the ex-post probability
I∑
k=1
qk
k
I (1− F (Pim))k−1 will
almost surely not sum to one across i. The role of λ in equation (2.6) ensures q can be interpreted
independently from this scale. For simplicity we assume λ to be the same for all m but this is not
necessary.
Let Y m = (Y1m, . . . , YIm)
> and Xm be an I×I matrix such that (Xm)ik = kI (1− F (Pim))k−1.
We vectorize Y m and Xm acrossm to form: Y =
[
Y>1 : · · · : Y>M
]> and X = [X>1 : · · · : X>M]>.
Then under Assumption I, we have
q =
E
[
X>X
]−1 E [X>Y]
ι>E [X>X]−1 E [X>Y]
, [2.7]
where ι denotes a IM × 1 vector of ones. Note that X has full rank almost surely when Pim has
a continuous distribution as columns in Xm form a polynomial basis of
{
(1− F (Pim))l−1
}I
l=1
.
Generally q is overidentified in the sense that it can be identified using (Ym,Xm) for anymwhen
F (·) is known.
2.3.2 Supply Side
The optimal strategy derived in (2.1) expresses the optimal price in terms of the latent marginal
cost. Although such expression is intuitive and natural from the theoretical analysis, it is not
immediately useful for empirical purposes.10 We instead consider defining β (·) as a maximiser of
10It is, however, useful for generating data in simulation studies.
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the following function:
Λ (p, r) = (p− r)
I∑
k=1
qk
k
I
(1−H (ξ (p)))k−1 .
Taking a (partial) derivative of the above with respect to p gives,
∂
∂p
Λ (p, r) =
I∑
k=1
qk
k
I
(1−H (ξ (p)))k−1
+ (p− r) ξ′ (p)h (ξ (p))
I∑
k=1
qk
k (k − 1)
I
(1−H (ξ (p)))k−2 .
We next use the insight from GPV by relating the distributions between the observed and unob-
served variables. Particularly:
F (p) = H (ξ (p)) and f (p) = ξ′ (p)h (ξ (p)) ,
so that the first order condition implies
I∑
k=1
qkk (1− F (p))k−1 = (p− ξ (p)) f (p)
I∑
k=2
qkk (k − 1) (1− F (p))k−2 .
We then obtain the explicit form for β−1 (·) as,
ξ (p) = p−
I∑
k=1
qkk (1− F (p))k−1
f (p)
I∑
k=2
qkk (k − 1) (1− F (p))k−2
. [2.8]
We can identify Ri from Pi, f (·), F (·) and {qk}Ik=1. Thus we can identify {Ri}Ii=1 through
{ξ (Pi)}Ii=1, and subsequently identify h (·) with data from multiple markets.
2.3.3 Constructive Identification
Suppose we have a random sample for firms from multiple markets {(Pim, Yim)}I,Mi,=1m=1. There is
a natural corresponding estimation strategy by replacing unknown population quantities by sample
analogs.
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Estimation of q
We first construct an estimator for F (·), such as the empirical CDF. We can estimate q using the
sample counterpart of (2.7); by removing the expectation operators and replace X by its estimate
X̂ that replaces the unknown F (·) by some estimator F̂ (·). Then
q̂ =
(
X̂>X̂
)−1
X̂>Y
ι>
(
X̂>X̂
)−1
X̂>Y
.
Our estimator of q is a smooth functional of an estimator of F (·). Therefore q̂ is expected to
converge at the parametric rate of
√
M .
Estimation of h (·)
We start by obtaining an estimate for Rim using:
R̂im = Pim −
I∑
k=1
q̂kk
(
1− F̂ (Pim)
)k−1
f̂ (Pim)
I∑
k=1
q̂kk (k − 1)
(
1− F̂ (Pim)
)k−2 , [2.9]
here f̂ (·) and F̂ (·) are some estimators for f (·) and F (·) respectively. We can then perform
nonparametric density estimation for h (·) with
{
R̂im
}I,M
i=1,m=1
. When we estimate f (·) and
F (·) nonparametrically, it is expected that the rate of convergence of R̂im (and subsequently the
estimator of h (·)) will be determined by f̂ (·); both q̂ and F̂ (·) converge at a faster rate.
2.4 Main Results
In the following section we present two theorems. Theorem 1 shows that the theoretical search
model imposes testable restrictions on the distribution of the observed prices. Theorem 2 gives the
convergence rate for ĥ (·).
2.4.1 Nonparametric Restrictions on the Data
Let P denote the set of strictly increasing CDFs with support in R. Let F (·) denote the joint CDF
of equilibrium prices.
THEOREM 1. Let I ≥ 2. Let F (·) ∈ PI with support [P , P ]I . There exists a distribution of
marginal cost with CDF H (·), with an increasing CDF H (·) ∈ P such that F (·) is the joint
CDF of the equilibrium prices in the search model if and only if:
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C1. F(p1, ..., pK) =
I∏
i=1
F (pi);
C2. ξ (·) defined in (2.8) is strictly increasing on [P , P ], and its inverse is differentiable on
[R,R] =
[
ξ (P ) , ξ
(
P
)]
.
Moreover, when H (·) exists, it is unique with support [R,R] and satisfies H (r) = F (ξ−1 (r))
for all r ∈ [R,R]. In addition, ξ (·) is the quasi-inverse of the equilibrium strategy in the sense
that ξ (p) = β−1 (p) for all r ∈ [P , P ].
Our Theorem 1 is analogous to Theorem 1 in GPV and the proof is presented in appendix B.1.
2.4.2 Large Sample Properties
In order to study the rate of convergence of our estimators we need to know some regularity
properties of the objects to be estimated. We begin with some regularity assumptions on the
distribution of the underlying cost.
ASSUMPTION A.
(i) For any observed price P : there exists R such that
P = R+
I∑
k=1
qkk
∫ R
s=R (1−H (s))k−1 ds
I∑
k=1
qkk (1−H (R))k−1
,
for q that satisfies Proposition 1, and there is an observable Y that satisfies Assumption I;
(ii) H (·) admits upto τ + 1 continuous derivatives on [R,R].
The equilibrium restrictions imply the following properties for the observed price distribution:
PROPOSITION 2. Under Assumption A:
(i) f (p) = 1p−ξ(p)
 I∑k=1 qkk(1−F (p))k−1
I∑
k=1
qkk(k−1)(1−F (p))k−2
;
(ii) infp∈[P ,P ] f(p) > 0;
(iii) limp→P f(p) =∞, furthermore 0 < limp→P f(p)(P−p)−1 <∞;
(iv) F (·) admits upto τ + 1 continuous derivatives on [P , P ];
(v) f(·) admits upto τ + 1 continuous derivatives on (P , P ).
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The findings we want to highlight here are (iii) and (v). The former reveals that f(·) has a pole
at the upper boundary. Kernel density estimation in a neighbourhood of a pole has to be treated
with care (e.g. see Section 5 in Marron and Ruppert (1994)). We suggest a transformation to deal
with this issue below.11 The latter suggests that the implied observed PDF is smoother than the
latent PDF; similar findings are also found in GPV based on the same rationale by an inspection
of (i).
Suppose we have data {(Pim, Yim)}I,Mi=1,m=1. We assume to have some preliminary estimators
for q, F (·), and f (·) that converge to zero at some rates as M → ∞. Let η0,M =
(
logM
M
) τ+1
2τ+3 ,
so that η0,M is the optimal rate of convergence for density estimation with τ + 1 continuous
derivatives (see Stone (1982)).
ASSUMPTION B. Suppose {(Pim, Yim)}I,Mi=1,m=1 satisfies Assumption A. There exists estimators:
q̂, F̂ (·), and f̂ (·) such that:
(i) ‖q̂− q‖ = O
(
1/
√
M
)
a.s.;
(ii) supp∈[P ,P ]
∣∣∣F̂ (p)− F (p)∣∣∣ = O (1/√M) a.s.;
(iii) For any positive sequence ε′M that decreases to 0 there exists some positive sequence δ
′
M
that decreases to zero such that supp∈[P+δ′M ,P−δ′M ]
∣∣∣f̂ (p)− f (p)∣∣∣ = o(η0,Mε′M ) a.s.;
(iv) There exist some positive sequences {δM} and {ηM} that decrease to zero such that η0M =
o (ηM ), supp∈[P+δM ,P−δM ]
∣∣∣f̂ (p)− f (p)∣∣∣ = O (ηM ) a.s.
Estimators for q and F (·) that converge at a parametric rate are going to be available under
weak conditions. We will focus on the uniform convergence properties of a kernel estimator for
f̂ (·). Studying uniformity over the entire support of Pim is difficult as the support is compact. It
is well-known that kernel estimators have problems at (and near) the boundaries; e.g. see Chap-
ter 2.11 in Wand and Jones (1999). On the other hand, if we consider any fixed inner subset of[
P , P
]
, then a kernel density estimator can achieve the convergence rate η0,M under standard con-
structions, for example by using a τ + 1 order kernel and setting the bandwidth to be proportional
to b0,M ≡
(
logM
M
) 1
2τ+3 ; see Ha¨rdle (1991). But these rates cannot be maintained when we allow
the support to expand to
[
P , P
]
as sample size grows. Existing results on the uniform convergence
rates for kernel estimators over expanding supports assume densities are bounded (e.g. see Masry
11There are also other auction models that have unbounded densities. E.g. in a first price auction with a reserve price (see GPV)
and in models with selective entry (see Gentry, Li, and Lu (2015)).
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(1996) and Hansen (2008)). They are therefore not immediately applicable to us due to the pole at
P .
Assumption B.(iii) says that any decreasing function ofM converging to zero slower than η0,M
can serve as an upper bound for supp∈[P+δ′M ,P−δ′M ]
∣∣∣f̂ (p)− f (p)∣∣∣ for some δ′M = o (1). This is
possible, for instance, with a kernel estimator using a transformation method. From Proposition
2.(iii) we know f (p) behaves similarly to
(
P − p)−1 for p close to P . Then let us consider
P †im ≡ − ln
(
P − Pim
)
. The support of P †im is [− ln
(
P − P ) ,∞). Denote the PDF of P †im by
f † (·). By a change of variable, we have:
f (p) =
f †
(− ln (P − p))
P − p .
It then follows that f † (·) is bounded and, in particular, f † (− ln (P − p)) is flat as p → P .
Furthermore it has the same smoothness as f (·) ,12 Consider the following estimators:
f̂ (p) =
f̂ †
(− ln (P − p))
P − p , where
f̂ †
(
p†
)
=
1
MIb†M
M∑
m=1
I∑
i=1
K
(
P †im − p†
b†M
)
for any p†,
and K (·) is a kernel function with a bandwidth b†M . Thus it can be shown that f̂ † (·) converges
uniformly at rate η0,M over some expanding support when we use a τ + 1 higher order kernel
coupled with bandwidth b0,M . The division by P − p slows down the rate of convergence for
f̂ (·) at the upper boundary. This can be controlled to be as slow as we like by letting δ′M go
to zero slowly. There is also a bias issue at the lower boundary. This can be avoided by setting
b†M = o (δ
′
M ).
Assumption B.(iv) then assumes an existence of an estimator for f (·) that converges uniformly
over
[
P + δM , P − δM
]
at an achievable rate ηM . We can extend the argument given for B.(iii)
and make ηM arbitrarily close to η0,M . More specifically, we can set δM = P − εM for some
decreasing positive sequence {εM} such that b0,M = o (δM ). Then B.(iv) holds with ηM = η0MεM .
Now that we have some estimators that satisfy Assumption B, we turn to R̂im as defined in
equation (2.9). We shall use a modified version of R̂im for the second stage estimation since we
only have the desired uniform convergence rate for f̂ (·) over an expanding support. For some
12For any p† ∈ [− ln (P − P ) ,∞), f† (p†) = exp (−p†) f (P − exp (−p†)).
60
positive sequence {δM} that decrease to zero, let
R˜im =
 R̂im for Pim ∈
[
P + δM , P − δM
]
+∞ otherwise
. [2.10]
When R˜im < ∞, R˜im is a smooth function of q̂, F̂ (·) and f̂ (·). Therefore we can obtain its
convergence rate that is determined by supp∈[P+δM ,P−δM ]
∣∣∣f̂ (p)− f (p)∣∣∣.
LEMMA 1. Under Assumptions A and B, for the same {δM} and {ηM} in B(d),
sup
i,m s.t. R˜im<∞
∣∣∣R˜im −Rim∣∣∣ = O (ηM ) a.s.
We explicitly define a kernel estimator for h (·) here as:
ĥ (r) =
1
MIbM
M∑
m=1
I∑
i=1
K
(
R˜im − r
bM
)
for any r.
As before, K (·) is a kernel function with a bandwidth bM . We can use Lemma 1 to quantify the
estimation error that arises from using R˜im instead of Rim, and obtain the convergence rate for
ĥ (·).
THEOREM 2. Under Assumptions A and B, and for the same {δM} and {ηM} as in B.(iv), let: (i)
K (·) be a symmetric (τ + 1)−order kernel with support [−1, 1]; (ii) K (·) is twice continuously
differentiable on [−1, 1]; (iii) {bM} for some positive real numbers decreasing to zero such that
δM = O (bM ). Then for any sequence {ςM} of positive real numbers decreasing to zero such that
bM = o (ςM ),
sup
r∈[R+ςM ,R−ςM ]
∣∣∣ĥ (r)− h (r)∣∣∣ = O(ηM
bM
)
a.s.
Theorem 2 shows that ĥ (·) converges at a slower rate than f̂ (·) by a factor of b−1M . We have
argued that the convergence rate for the latter can be made arbitrarily close to η0,M . Therefore
an appropriate choice of bM will ensure ĥ (·) converges uniformly at a rate arbitrarily close to
η0,M
b0M
=
(
logM
M
) τ
2τ+3 , which is the optimal rate of convergence for a related density function
derived in Theorem 3 of GPV.
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2.5 Possible Extensions
We briefly discuss how to extend our model and methodology. First we generalise Assumption I
by allowing for possibly nonparametric relation between Yi, and the probability that firm iwins the
sale with price Pi. Then we consider an asymmetric game where firms have different probabilities
of being found.
2.5.1 Relaxing Assumption I
We anticipate that Assumption I will be the most convenient in applications. However, the math-
ematical structure of the search problem is conducive to a nonparametric generalisation. In what
follows let xim be a I × 1 vector such that (xim)k = kI (1− F (Pim))k−1.13
ASSUMPTION I’. There exists a function φ : R→ R such that
E [Yim|Pim] = φ
(
x>imq
)
. [2.11]
Assumption I is a parametric special case of Assumption I’ when φ (·) is an identity function
multiplied by an unknown scale. More generally Assumption I’ only imposes that: Yi is a (possibly
unknown) function of the probability firm i wins with price Pim. When φ (·) is parametrically
specified, whether q is identifiable depends on the parametric specification. A sufficient, but not
necessary, condition for identification is strict monotonicity of φ (·).14 When φ (·) is unknown,
(2.11) imposes a semiparametric index restriction. Ichimura (1993, Theorem 4.1) provides a set
of conditions for identification of an index model like ours. Note that we cannot apply, at least
without any modification, the average derivative argument of Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989) to
identify q as our model does not satisfy their boundary conditions (see their Assumption 2). When
q is identified, regardless whether φ (·) is known or not, we would expect the estimator for q to
converge sufficiently fast to not affect the convergence rate for f̂ (·), and subsequently ĥ (·) under
general conditions.
13In principle we can also allow wim to be other known functions of {Pim}Ii=1. But q has a structural meaning so it is natural
to use powers of the price hazard functions as in Assumption I.
14Let φ−1 (·) denote the inverse of φ (·). Given that E [ximx>im] has full rank a sufficient we can write x>imq =
φ−1 (E [Yim|Pim]), so that
q =
E
[
ximx
>
im
]−1 E [ximφ−1 (E [Yim|Pim])]
ι>E
[
ximx>im
]−1 E [ximφ−1 (E [Yim|Pim])] .
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2.5.2 Asymmetric Search Probabilities
Consider a situation when firms have different probabilities of being searched. When a con-
sumer sets out to visit k firms, for `i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, we denote the probability that the set of
firms {`1, . . . , `k} get visited by ω`1...`k . Since there is no need to keep track of different per-
mutations of the same combination of firms, we only define ω`1...`k for `1 < . . . < `k. Let Ik ≡
{{`1, . . . , `k} : `j ∈ I and `j < `j+1 for all j}, and Iik ≡ {{`1, . . . , `k} ∈ Ik : `j = i for some j}.
I.e. Ik is the set of indices for all combinations of k firms. Iik is the set of indices for all combi-
nations of k firms that always include firm i. Let CIk ≡ I!(I−k)!k! denote the combinatorial number
from choosing k objects from a set of I . Note that Ik and Iik have cardinality CIk and CIk−1 respec-
tively. Note that:
ω`1...`i−1`i+1...`k =
I∑
{`1,...,`k}∈Iik
ω`1...`k for all i, k.
Using a similar argument to the one applied previously, in equilibrium it can be shown that the
optimal pricing strategy for firm i, βi (·) becomes:
βi (r) = r +
I∑
k=1
qk
∑
{`1,...,`k}∈Iik
ω`1...`k
∫ R
s=r
∏
j:1≤j≤k, `j 6=i
(
1−H (ξ`j (βi (s)))) ds
I∑
k=1
qk
∑
{`1,...,`k}∈Iik
ω`1...`k
∏
j:1≤j≤k, `j 6=i
(
1−H (ξ`j (βi (r)))) ,
over the region of r where βi (·) is strictly increasing.15 Here ξj (·) denotes the inverse of βj (·). It
is clear that we have asymmetric pricing functions that have been induced by differing probabilities
of being searched.
We can also write down the inverse function for p defined over the region where βi (·) is strictly
increasing,
ξi (p) = p−
I∑
k=1
qk
∑
{`1,...,`k}∈Iik
ω`1...`k
∏
j:1≤j≤k, `j 6=i
(
1− F`j (p)
)
I∑
k=2
qk
∑
{`1,...,`k}∈Iik
ω`1...`k
(∑
j:1≤j≤k, `j 6=i f`j (p)
∏
j′:1≤j′≤k, `j′ 6=i, `j′ 6=j
(
1− F`j′ (p)
)) .
We can extend Assumption I (and I’) accordingly and replicate our earlier identification strate-
gies. Particularly, we will need:
E [Yi|Pi] =
I∑
k=1
qk
∑
{`1,...,`k}∈Iik
ω`1...`k
∫ ∏
j:1≤j≤k, `j 6=i
(
1− F`j (p)
)
dFi (p) .
15The support of optimal prices now differ between (some) firms.
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2.6 Simulation
We consider a simple design for a game of search with I = 3. Consumers draw search costs
from a distribution with CDF G (c) =
√
c for c ∈ [0, 1]. Firms draw marginal costs from a
uniform distribution on [0, 1]. We use the system of equations in (2.5) to iteratively solve for the
equilibrium of the game.
We generate the data by drawing prices from (2.1) with q = (0.7852, 0.0455, 0.1693). We
generate Yi according to Assumption I with λ = 1. We generate the data for 333 markets, so
IM = 999. We follow the estimation strategy described in Section 3.3. In particular, we use the
empirical price CDF to estimate F̂ (·). We employ different bias correction and transformation
techniques to estimate the densities. For the bias correction we use the procedure proposed in
Karunamuni and Zhang (2008, henceforth KZ) that has recently been shown to be effective when
applied to auction models (see Hickman and Hubbard (2015), and Li and Liu (2015)). We use
the Epanechnikov kernel along with the forms of the plug-in bandwidths suggested in KZ. Since
KZ’s technique does not accommodate unbounded densities we also use the transformation we
suggested in Section 4.2 to address the upper support. We combine it with the KZ’s estimator to
correct for the bias at the lower boundary of the support. We repeat the experiment 10000 times.
The parametric estimators work extremely well and thus we only show graphs for the potentially
more problematic density estimation.
Figure 2.1 shows the true price density, the mean, 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles (dotted lines) of
the boundary corrected kernel estimator of KZ (in blue) and the kernel estimator that transforms
the data to deal with the pole (in red). It is clear that standard boundary correction procedure will
not be sufficient to deal with unbounded densities. On the other hand the transformation method
seems to serve the purpose very well.
We next consider three similar plots of the density estimation of marginal cost PDF (using
KZ). In Figures 2.2–2.4, we use the true Rim to estimate the density (in blue) as the benchmark.
The other density estimators (in red) in other figures contain estimated components. Those in
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 are also infeasible as they estimate Rim using the unknown f(·): the former
only estimates q and the latter in addition estimates F (·). The result for the feasible estimator
using R˜im as defined in (2.10) is in Figure 2.4. Again, we plot the mean and the percentiles using
solid and dotted lines, respectively.
Note that the boundary correction method of KZ does not completely eliminate the bias at the
boundary even for the estimator that uses Rim. This is expected. We can, in fact, observe some
improvements since density estimation without any bias correction would, in this case, converge
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Figure 2.1: Monte Carlo performance of kernel density estimators for the distribution of prices.
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Note: Red line shows the estimated density of prices using the transformation method for the upper limit of the support. Blue line is
the boundary-corrected kernel density estimator of Karunamuni and Zhang (2008). Dotted lines correspond to the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles in the simulations.
to 0.5 at both boundaries. The mean of the bandwidth use in these figures is around 0.17, and the
estimator performs much better in the interior of the support away from the boundary by at least
a bandwidth. Figures 2 - 4 also show that the main source of estimation error can be traced to the
estimation of the price PDF. This is not unexpected given that the PDF is the most difficult object
to estimate in the entire problem.
Figure 2.2: Monte Carlo comparison of two infeasible estimators.
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Note: Red line shows the estimated density of marginal costs, assuming that the Blue line shows the performance of an infeasible
estimator assuming that {F (·), f(·)} are known instead of estimated. Blue line shows the performance of an infeasible estimator
assuming thatRim are known. True density is U [0, 1]. Dotted lines correspond to the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles in the simulations.
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Figure 2.3: Monte Carlo comparison of two infeasible estimators.
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Note: Red line shows the estimated density of marginal costs, assuming that the Blue line shows the performance of an infeasible
estimator assuming that {f(·)} is known instead of estimated. Blue line shows the performance of an infeasible estimator assuming
that Rim are known. True density is U [0, 1]. Dotted lines correspond to the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles in the simulations.
Figure 2.4: Monte Carlo performance of the feasible density estimator.
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Note: Red line shows the estimated density of marginal costs. Blue line shows the performance of an infeasible estimator assuming
that Rim are known. True density is U [0, 1]. Dotted lines correspond to the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles in the simulations.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
Hong and Shum (2006) and a series of papers by Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. show that we can identify
the demand side of the market using just observed prices alone. We show when other market data,
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such as market shares, are available we can allow firms to be heterogenous and identify the supply
side as well.
We characterise the equilibrium in a search game with heterogenous consumers and firms that
supports price dispersion. We provide conditions to identify the model and propose a way to
estimate the model primitives. We show that the density of the unobserved marginal cost can be
estimated to converge at an arbitrary close to, but not achieving, the optimal rate derived in related
auction models (such as Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000)). The reason can be traced to the fact
that the density of the equilibrium price has a pole at the upper support.
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Chapter 3
Value of Information and the Impact of
Mortgage Intermediaries on Lender
Competition and Households’ Financial
Positions
3.1 Introduction
A large body of recent literature considers the role search frictions play in the determination of
borrower choices in mortgage markets (Allen, Clark, and Houde (2013, 2017), Woodward and Hall
(2012), Agarwal, Grigsby, Hortac¸su, Matvos, Seru, and Yao (2017), Alexandrov and Koulayev
(2018), Guiso, Pozzi, Tsoy, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli (2017), Deltas and Li (2018)). Since a
mortgage contract is the most complicated financial investment that most households undergo in
their lifetime, the consequences of inadequate decisions can be serious. Searching for a mortgage
involves not only comparing rates on different product types across banks, but also incurring the
opportunity cost of filling out applications, being interviewed by lender representatives, and the
risk that getting rejected might affect one’s future credit score. The difficulty of the choice situation
is further exacerbated by the pricing practices of lenders who use two-part tariffs and offer large
menus of very similar products. For example, Kashyap and Rostom (2018) report that the median
UK household taking out a mortgage faces a choice of 100 different options. No wonder, then,
that many households choose to outsource this decision to mortgage intermediaries, or brokers, in
the hopes of finding the best deal.
Differently from the US and Canada, the UK market is characterised by a very high percentage
68
of mortgages originated through brokers. The Intermediary Mortgage Lenders Association reports
that in the second quarter of 2015, 67% of borrowers used broker services, which corresponded
to 71% of total value of all new mortgages in that period (IMLA, 2015). This figure roughly
corresponds to what we observe in our administrative data for 2016 and 2017. Since brokers in
this market appear to be important agents affecting both borrower choices and lenders’ pricing
decisions, our work addresses two questions related to their activity: 1) what is the value of infor-
mation they currently provide to consumers; 2) how would the market outcomes change if every
mortgage applicant could costlessly access broker-like advice.
To answer these questions we formulate a structural model of search, in which heterogeneous
consumers decide whether to use a broker or contact different lenders directly. Our choice of a
search framework is motivated by a significant proportion of unexplained price dispersion we doc-
ument in the data. On the supply side, lenders, who possess private information about the marginal
costs of providing the loan, choose the price assuming that the same loan can be sold directly or
through an intermediary.1 Brokers are then treated as a platform which enables the borrowers who
decide to use them to find the cheapest product, thereby reducing the monopoly power lenders ex-
ercise over poorly informed consumers. Under this assumption, the model becomes an extension
of a search framework proposed by MacMinn (1980). Namely, the pricing problem is equivalent
to a first-price procurement auction with an unknown number of competitors. This allows us to
leverage the literature on nonparametric estimation of auction models and the identification results
presented in the second chapter of this thesis to recover the unobserved primitives of the model –
the distributions of borrower search costs and lender heterogeneity.
We use an extensive dataset on over 1.3M mortgage contracts from 2016 and 2017 to estimate
these distributions conditional on a large set of consumer demographics and loan characteristics.
Our structural estimates suggest that search cost distributions substantially differ across demo-
graphic groups with the median cost of obtaining an additional quote ranging from 5 to 30% of the
median monthly mortgage cost of around £300. On average, search is more costly for borrowers
who live in rural areas and non-first time buyers. On the supply side, we find that despite high con-
centration, the market is relatively competitive with an average Lerner index of 11.64%. Lenders’
margins exhibit dispersion across mortgage types with higher LTV and longer term loans being on
average less profitable.
To provide the answer to our first question, the estimates are then used to simulate optimal
prices and search behaviour in a new equilibrium where intermediation is not available. We calcu-
1Frankel (1998) called this price coherence, a term that was recently popularized in the economic literature by Edelman and
Wright (2015).
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late the value of information as the difference in the expected consumer surplus between the base-
line and the counterfactual scenarios. The average effect of brokers for the entire market is positive
and corresponds to savings of £112.15 per month on a median-sized mortgage. This figure can be
further decomposed into savings due to lower prices (change of 33.7%) and lower average search
expenditure (16.33% lower than without brokers). However, not all mortgagors benefit equally
from the current market structure. Value of information is much higher for younger, low-income,
first time buyers and all borrowers who choose 2-year fixed rate products. Remarkably, borrowers
choosing longer fixed-rate deals or shorter amortisation periods could be better off if brokers were
not present in the market. This finding can be linked to the low estimated dispersion of marginal
costs, which in turn implies that marginal benefits from acquiring additional information are too
low to justify paying broker commissions.
The overall positive effect can be attributed to the externality brokers impose on the direct mar-
ket (Salz, 2017). The existence of intermediaries reduces lenders’ market power who are unable to
price discriminate between informed and uninformed consumers. This explanation is reinforced
by looking at the counterfactual distribution of price-cost margins – with no intermediation, the
average Lerner index reaches almost 28% and margins on over a fourth of all mortgages exceed
40%.
In a second counterfactual we look at the effects of a hypothetical market centralisation, which
can be achieved by establishing a market-wide platform where lenders post prices and borrowers
are automatically matched with the best offer. In the context of the UK market, this simulates the
effects of growing popularity of online brokerage platforms, which not only work as price com-
parison tools, but rather act as online brokers and assist consumers through the entire application
process. Under the assumption that direct sales are no longer possible and the platform is free to
use by borrowers, we find that prices on a centralised market would on average decrease by 6.41%
and the platform would allow consumers to save £27.63 per month. Borrowers, however, are the
only agents in the market who benefit from centralisation in our model, as lenders’ margins drop
by nearly 50%. Since instead of human knowledge, online platforms use machine learning algo-
rithms to generate advice, to provide a total welfare effect one would also need to weigh the rather
modest reduction in prices and search expenditure against the the sunk cost of physical brokers
exiting the market.
On the whole, this chapter makes two main contributions: to the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to provide an estimate for the value of information added by mortgage brokers. We
also document directly how changes in market structure affect pricing and competition between
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banks. Since we allow for rich patterns of observed and unobserved heterogeneity, we are able
to show that even though the net effects of brokers’ presence are positive, not every borrower is
better off in a world where intermediation is possible. Secondly, the structural model presented
here is novel and provides an attractive framework for studying welfare effects in industries with
two-sided platforms and search frictions. Importantly, the estimators do not require any optimi-
sation, structural features are identified in closed form, and the results are robust to distributional
assumptions about search costs and firm heterogeneity.
 Related literature. This work is most closely related to the growing body of empirical papers
using structural models of consumer search to study mortgage markets in countries other than
the UK. Among those studies, Allen et al. (2017) is probably the one methodologically closest
to our study, since the authors consider a search and bargaining framework with bilateral hetero-
geneity. The main difference is that Allen et al. (2017) focus on the role of loyalty advantage
and do not study the role of intermediation, excluding brokered loans from the estimation sample.
The paper by Woodward and Hall (2012) is on the opposite side of the spectrum, as it focuses
solely on brokered mortgages, showing that mortgagors in the US market would be better off by
obtaining offers from multiple brokers. We abstract from search for brokers and assume that the
intermediaries operate in a competitive sector and have no incentives to provide dishonest advice.
Guiso et al. (2017) do consider distorted advice and use Italian data to study whether in-house
bank advisers steer borrowers into taking up more risky and expensive adjustable rate mortgages
more frequently than fixed rate mortgages. Whereas they do find welfare losses associated with
suboptimal advice, they also discover that banning advice altogether would result in an average
annual loss of AC998. This number is lower than our estimates, but since the advice in our model
is considered to be fully impartial, we consider our estimates to be informative of the upper bound
on the change in consumer surplus. In another recent study, Agarwal et al. (2017) use data on ac-
tual search behaviour and rejected mortgage applications to document that, contrary to predictions
stemming from standard search models, more search does not always result in lower prices. To
explain this finding, the authors introduce screening and the probability of getting one’s mortgage
application rejected into a standard search model, finding that a standard framework is only able
to recover true search cost scaled by the probability of approval. While our data do not inform us
about rejected applications, we remain agnostic whether our search cost estimates also indirectly
account for the probability of being rejected. Alexandrov and Koulayev (2018) investigate the
interplay of search and preference for non-price characteristics (such as brand effects) to explain
suboptimal shopping efforts in the US market. Finally, even though Deltas and Li (2018) do not
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have a structural model in their paper, they present an empirical evidence on how search costs in
the US mortgage market can be reduced by network externalities.
We also contribute to the literature studying the role of brokers in retail financial markets
(Bergstresser et al. (2007), Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b), Egan et al. (2018) Egan (2018)) and the
relatively small literature using IO search models to study welfare effects of intermediation in other
markets. For example, Gavazza (2016) investigates the role of dealers in the secondary market for
business aircraft and Salz (2017) looks at the role of brokers in contracting trade waste removal
in New York City. In particular, the structural model here resembles Salz’s framework where the
same firms participate in both direct and brokered markets and cannot charge different prices.
Our main finding corroborates Salz’s conclusion that overall, intermediation reduces information
frictions and can be seen as a positive externality reducing market power. However, we are also
able to show that the effects can be negligible or even negative for certain types of consumers. Our
identification strategy relies on a weaker set of assumption and hence differs from Salz’s approach.
We discuss the econometric differences in detail in section 3.4.1.
Finally, this research is tangentially related to two strands of theoretical literature: an array
of papers studying the effects of middlemen (e.g. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), Biglaiser
(1993), Yavas¸ (1994), Spulber (1995), Hall and Rust (2003)), and an active literature on multi-
sided platforms (e.g. Armstrong (2006), Rochet and Tirole (2006), Galeotti and Moraga-Gonza´lez
(2009), Edelman and Wright (2015), de Cornie`re and Taylor (2017)). The way we treat brokers in
the model is reminiscent of a platform with endogenous buyer entry.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 outlines main institutional features of the
industry, describes the data and provides some reduced-form evidence on price dispersion and
the impact of brokers on transaction prices. Section 3.3 introduces the theoretical model and
in section 3.4 we discuss nonparametric identification of its primitives and outline the estimation
method. Our main results are presented in sections 3.5 and 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes and provides
directions for future research.
3.2 The UK mortgage market and data
This section provides an overview of the main institutional features of the industry, describes the
data used in our analysis and uses reduced-form techniques to establish several empirical facts
about, which then guide the assumptions in the structural model.
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3.2.1 Institutional overview
The UK mortgage market is relatively concentrated. Whilst there are a lot of financial institutions
issuing mortgages, the concentration ratio of the six biggest banks exceeds 70%. As in the US,
mortgage terms in the UK typically amortise over 25 years, although longer durations are also
common2. However, unlike the US, the contracts can be seen as short-term, as refinancing is
common after the expiry of the initial period. The four most common products are 2-, 3-, and
5-year fixed rate mortgages (FRM) and 2-year adjustable rate mortgage (ARM). For our analysis,
we focus only on FRMs, which make up over 90% of all mortgage contracts. Upon the expiration
of the initial period, to keep the interest rate fixed, mortgagors can enter a new contract with the
same or a different lender. The most popular type of mortgage in the UK is the 2-year fixed rate
(over 60% of all contracts).
For each type of product, banks post quoted rates that vary according to the contract period
and the ratio of the loan size to the property value (loan-to-value ratio, or LTV). When selecting
a mortgage, and conditional on the LTV and loan size, borrowers face a trade-off: they can either
choose to pay an upfront fee to the lender in return for lower monthly payments, or pay no fee
but make higher monthly payments. Lender fees are small, however, especially relative to the
size of the mortgage. Median loan fees are £999 and 40% pay no fees at all. As documented
by Kashyap and Rostom (2018) and Iscenko (2018), among others, lenders typically offer broad
product portfolios with different combinations of fees and interest rates. In addition to that, they
also offer loans with optional cashback (a one-off lump sum payment to new borrowers) or flexible
repayment schemes (i.e. possibility of over- or underpayment) which are priced differently.
A striking feature of the UK market is that almost 70% of mortgages are accessed via brokers.
This number is significantly bigger than the share of brokered mortgages in the US (Alexandrov
and Koulayev (2018) report roughly 10%) or Canada (Allen et al. (2017) have 28% of brokered
contracts in their data). The Intermediary Mortgage Lenders Association (IMLA) report a general
upward trend in the fraction of borrowers who use intermediaries by noting that since the financial
crisis, the value share of mortgages originated via brokers has increased from about 50% to 71%
in the second quarter of 2015 (IMLA, 2015). Applying for a mortgage directly typically involves
face-to-face interviews at local bank branches, filling our lengthy application forms and facing the
risk of rejection which can eventually impact one’s credit rating. Brokers’ task is provide advice
about the most suitable product and assist borrowers through the application process. The market
for intermediation is competitive and geographically dispersed: as noted by IMLA (2015), ”(...)
2The median first time buyer amortises over 30 years.
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the UK mortgage broking business is dominated by small firms serving local client bases. Ac-
cording to data from the Financial Adviser Confidence Tracking Index in September 2015, 69%
of broking firms employed only 1 or 2 mortgage advisers with another 20% employing 3 to 5.”.
While there is no regulation in place that obliges all brokers to search through all available mort-
gage products3, broker services offer affordability comparisons across banks that are different
from those of lenders’ in-house advisers. Intermediaries are compensated in one of three ways:
they can receive commissions directly from borrowers, procuration fees from lenders, or charge
both parties.4 In our data, the median fee paid by borrowers to brokers is relatively small: a lump
sum of £349, or an average of £10 per month over the duration of the initial period.
3.2.2 Data
We use administrative data from the Product Sales Database (PSD), a loan-level dataset containing
information on all new mortgage originations in the UK. The data contain information taken at the
time of a mortgage application, including mortgagor characteristics such as age and income; loan
details such as the issuing bank, interest rate, and loan size; and property details such as the
purchase price and location. Whilst the data begin in 2005, the data quality is patchy until 2008.
Following the financial crisis, data collection and monitoring substantially improved, and in 2016,
key relevant variables were added, such as indicators for brokered/direct and fees. For this reason,
our main analysis begins in 2016 and ends in the last quarter of 2017.
Our final sample includes over 1.3M contracts originated in the period of interest. Since we
do not have data on any observable characteristics of brokers and do not know which of them
search the entire market, we focus only on the big six lenders, assuming that their products are
available to every potential borrower in the country. Another reason to focus on the big players
only is because in our model we abstract from lenders’ budget constraints and capital requirements
which are much more important for small lenders (Benetton, 2018). We also exclude adjustable
rate mortgages which are a small fraction of the UK market and any loans with non-standard FRM
period or LTV over 95%. Further details on the sample construction and summary statistics can
be found in appendix C.1.1.
3The intermediaries that do that are known as whole-of-market brokers.
4Woodward and Hall (2012) argue that in the US brokers are indifferent between their source of compensation. A different
strand of (mostly theoretical) literature studies how different compensation schemes can alter brokers’ incentives (see e.g. Inderst and
Ottaviani (2012a)). Our study abstracts from this issue by assuming that any payments from lenders to brokers constitute a part of
lenders’ costs which are eventually passed onto borrowers in the form of higher prices.
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3.2.3 Mortgage cost
Since the total mortgage price faced by borrowers typically consists of two components (interest
rate and upfront fees), in this sections we define a cost metric which allows us to compare different
loans along one, unified dimension. Constructing a scalar measure of cost will turn out to be
vital for the structural model, since all estimates will be denominated relative to it. To construct
the measure, we use the fees, initial rate and initial fixed-rate deal period length to compute the
monthly cost for the borrower. The monthly economic (”sunk”) cost is the interest component of
the monthly payment plus any upfront fees added onto the loan by the lender:
p = iL+
Fee
N
, [3.1]
where N is the initial period of the mortgage contract (2, 3, or 5 years), L is the size of the
loan, and i is the fixed interest rate. Since in the structural model we take the loan size as given,
to adequately compare costs of mortgages with different initial loan amounts, we normalise the
monthly cost of the loan to correspond to a median loan value in the sample, £150,000. Our
approach is similar to Allen et al. (2017) who normalise their price variable to correspond to the
monthly payment on a $100,000 loan.
3.2.4 Reduced form findings
In this section we use the PSD data to provide descriptive evidence of several features of the UK
mortgage market that will lend credence to our choice of the modelling framework. First, we
document dispersion in the transacted prices. Second, we show that borrowers who used brokers
on average have lower monthly costs, but the sign changes once we factor in broker fees. Finally,
we show that observable borrower and product characteristics are poor predictors for the decision
whether to delegate search to a broker, which suggests that an underlying unobservable (such as
search cost) might be the main factor driving this decision. Overall, the type of evidence we present
is akin to that in section 3 of Salz (2017), which justifies using similar modelling assumptions.
Price dispersion
First we examine mortgage price dispersion by choice of sales channel (direct or broker). We do
this by looking at the level of unexplained variation after regressing mortgage prices on observed
characteristics, separately for the two different channels. More specifically, we run the following
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hedonic regression:
pijt = X
′
ijtβ + ψt + ξj + uijt [3.2]
where pijt is the mortgage price for household i, from bank j, at time t. In this analysis we use
two different definitions of price – interest rate (where we control for the level of upfront fees on
the right-hand side) and the normalised economic cost defined in section 3.2.3. Xijt is a vector
of household and loan characteristics, e.g. household income, LTV, and the mortgage term.5 ψt
and ξj are time and bank fixed effects6. Table 3.1 reports 1 − R2 (unexplained variation) and the
coefficient of variation, using two different measures of mortgage cost for our dependent variable:
the interest rate (in basis points) and normalised monthly interest payments (in £) during the initial
period of the loan.
Panel A in Table 3.1 reports results using our first dependent variable, whilst Panel B reports
results for our second measure. On average, the level of unexplained variation is about 30% and
is higher for the outcome variable which includes upfront fees, but this varies by broker usage.
This proportion is quantitatively similar to the percent of unexplained variation in the Canadian
data reported by Allen et al. (2017) who report 1-R2 of 0.39.7 The table also compares the results
with and without lender fixed effects. Adding fixed effects to the specification allows us to con-
trol for any persistent differences in price across banks, whilst leaving the variation within banks
and any transitory differences across lenders unexplained. Our results suggest that controlling
for fixed effects substantially reduces the proportion of residual variation in the direct segment,
but has virtually no effect on the R2 in the regression using broker data. This finding is consis-
tent with the assumption in our model that brokers help borrowers find the most suitable product
across lenders. Suppose there exists a lender that, on average, sets higher interest rates than its
competitors. Adding a fixed effect for that bank will help explain an additional portion of un-
observed variation in prices in the direct segment of the market, especially if consumers do not
shop around. However, in the brokered segment, intermediaries compare such a product against
competing offers, so it is unlikely that borrowers who use a broker would be advised to take up
such a product.
5More specifically, we control for household income, house price, loan size, LTV (included as a set of dummy variables corre-
sponding to LTV thresholds), first-time buyer (FTB) status, region, mortgage type, length, and other product characteristics, as well as
their interactions and allow for potential nonlinearities.
6We also run the same specification without bank fixed effects.
7See also Allen et al. (2014) for a detailed study of price dispersion in the Canadian market.
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Table 3.1: Price dispersion by sales channel.
Panel A: Interest rate
No FE With FE
Direct Broker Direct Broker
1−R2 0.316 0.181 0.232 0.172
Coefficient of variation 0.307 0.316 0.307 0.316
Panel B: Interest payments
No FE With FE
Direct Broker Direct Broker
1−R2 0.369 0.364 0.283 0.355
Coefficient of variation 0.294 0.305 0.294 0.305
Note: Table presents 1-R2 from the regression defined by 3.2, separately by direct and
broker sales channels and for two different definitions of price. The second row in each
panel is the coefficient of variation defined the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.
Price benefits provided by brokers
To establish whether brokered mortgages on average are cheaper, we check whether households
who used a broker received a better price than households who did not after we control for a flex-
ible function of individual and product characteristics. Table 3.2 reports results from regressions
where the dependent variable is either the quoted interest rate (in basis points, bps) on a mortgage
product or the monthly cost of the mortgage in interest and fees (our preferred definition from
section 3.2.3). In all cases, the coefficient is negative and significant suggesting that those who
shopped with a broker received a cheaper product. However, the monetary savings appear to be
modest and are about 7 bps when measured by the interest rate and about £5 per month when
measured in terms of monthly payments.8
Table 3.2: Price benefits of using a broker.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Interest Interest Interest Monthly Monthly
Payment Payment
Used a broker -7.761*** -6.710*** -7.428*** -5.103*** -3.562***
(0.0824) (0.0822) (0.0816) (0.119) (0.122)
Lender Fees Linear Linear Non-linear - -
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,309,067 1,309,067 1,309,067 1,309,067 1,309,067
R2 0.768 0.772 0.778 0.627 0.632
Note: *** denotes significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Interest is measured in basis points.
Monthly interest is the component of the initial monthly payment that goes towards payment of the interest, including
lender fees, and normalised by the size of the loan. Controls are income, house price, loan size, LTV, first time buyer and
mortgage term. Time fixed effects are at the monthly level. Regional fixed effects are at the Government Office Region
level and include a flag for an urban region. Non-linearities in lender fees are controlled for using a fifth-order spline.
8Since some of the brokers in our sample are compensated directly by borrowers while others only receive commissions from
the lenders, we test whether different broker compensation schemes affect their incentives to provide unbiased advice. We therefore
run the same regression for two subsamples of the data – one which only includes brokers who are only paid by the lenders and one
which only includes those who are not receiving any commissions from the banks. The sign and the magnitude of the effect measured
by the coefficient of interest do not change by much across the subsamples, suggesting that brokers on average offer cheaper loans,
regardless of who they are paid by. The results are presented in appendix C.1.4.
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Table 3.3: Impact of using a broker on price plus broker fees.
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monthly payment + broker fee
Used a broker 1.729*** 2.985*** 7.049*** 11.40***
(0.122) (0.126) (0.140) (0.152)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional FE No Yes No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,309,067 1,309,067 792,023 792,023
R2 0.607 0.610 0.626 0.632
Note: *** denotes significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Monthly interest
is the component of the initial monthly payment that goes towards payment of the interest, including
lender and broker fees, and normalised by the size of the loan. Columns (1) and (2) show estimates
obtained using the entire sample whereas columns (3) and (4) restricts the sample to only brokers
who charge borrowers directly (i.e. the fees are non-zero).
The dependent variable used in the regressions presented in table 3.2 is constructed in a way
to control for lender fees only and our definition of monthly cost does not include broker com-
missions. Once we add broker fees divided by the number of months in the deal period to reflect
monthly cost, the sign of the coefficient switches to positive (see table 3.3).
The findings summarised in tables 3.2 and 3.3 are in line with the descriptive evidence Salz
(2017) used to justify the assumption that buyers with higher search cost select themselves into the
brokered market. Brokers seem to be offering lower prices on average, but once their commissions
are factored in, the final cost turns out to slightly higher than the average in the direct market.
This finding is crucial to justify that borrowers with higher search costs are more likely to use
brokers. Without the sign reversal, standard models of search would have difficulties explaining
why brokers are not used by everyone in the market. To provide some intuition, suppose that one
always expects to pay less by going to the broker. Then borrowers with low search costs would
have an incentive to pretend that their cost is high and use them as well.
Predicting broker use
The final fact we document in this section is that observable characteristics of the borrower do not
really help predict who uses brokers. Table C.1.6 in Appendix C.1.3 reports results from a linear
probability model where we regressed the brokered/direct indicator on a large set of observable
personal characteristics (e.g. age and income), mortgage product characteristics (e.g. product
type and mortgage term), and regional fixed effects. Because of potential reverse causality issues
once we control for product characteristics, we do not attempt to extrapolate our interpretation of
the effects beyond conditional correlations. Irrespective of the observable characteristics that we
control for, the R2 is never greater than 0.13, even if we allow for multiple interactions between
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variables.9 This is consistent with our hypothesis that observables have little predictive power
in understanding who uses brokers. This opens up scope for an unobserved component, such as
search cost, to be a more important driving force behind borrowers’ decisions.
3.3 Model
This section introduces a stylised model of mortgage pricing when consumers can search across
different lenders directly or use a broker. As in Allen, Clark, and Houde (2017) we assume that
there exists an initial period outside the model where the borrower chooses the property she wishes
to purchase, associated loan size, and the main characteristics of the mortgage, e.g. duration and
whether she needs a flexible repayment scheme. Therefore, the dimension of search we consider
is one where the borrower can compare similar products across different banks. The assump-
tions on the intermediation technology closely follow the ones in Salz (2017). We treat brokers
as non-strategic players, and assume that they act in the borrowers’ best interest by choosing the
best offer available in the market at a given time.10 This assumption allows to treat brokers sim-
ilarly to a price comparison platform, or, in the parlance of Baye et al. (2006), an information
clearinghouse.11
The framework we present here extends MacMinn (1980) and my search model with bilateral
heterogeneity from chapter 2 by adding another stage to the consumers’ problem where they de-
cide whether to use an intermediary or search. Consider an environment with a finite number of
J lenders and a continuum of borrowers with unit demands. Borrowers, indexed by i, receive iid
draws from a continuous search cost distribution κi ∼ G(·|xG). xG is a vector of observables
which can shift the distribution of search cost. They can be thought of covariates defining con-
sumer type and include characteristics of the individuals, such as age, income, or location, as well
as some characteristics that also describe the product (e.g. whether the borrower is a first-time
buyer). Lenders are heterogenous in their marginal cost of providing the loan, cij ∼ H(·|xH),
which is their private information. H is continuously distributed on a compact support [c; c¯].12
9Even though the R2 is not a perfect measure of predictive power, we also looked at distributions of predicted probabilities
(propensity scores) of using a broker for borrowers who in reality used a broker and those who did not, finding a large degree of
overlap between them (see figure C.1.1 and a similar figure in the appendix of Iscenko and Nieboer (2018)).
10This assumption does not allow us to study the consequences of distorted financial advice as in Guiso, Pozzi, Tsoy, Gambacorta,
and Mistrulli (2017), so we can interpret our estimates as the upper bound on the value of brokers – if in addition to charging
commissions they also provided suboptimal advice, their impact on consumer welfare would be lower. In other words, we abstract
from the fact that brokers can be facing potential conflicts of interest between providing the best advice and being compensated by the
lender, as discussed by Inderst and Ottaviani (2012c) and Woodward and Hall (2012)
11Early theoretical models which consider price dispersion in markets where some consumers can access sellers directly or use
such a clearinghouse include Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Rosenthal (1980), Varian (1980), and Baye and Morgan (2001) among others.
12We allow the support to be different for different xH .
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Since we are considering a market with posted prices, xH is a vector of covariates which includes
key characteristics of the mortgage13, but could also include some elements of xG if price discrim-
ination or bargaining are an important feature of the market (Allen et al., 2017). While direct price
negotiation is not a typical feature of the UK mortgage market14, its effects are somewhat mim-
icked by the fact that lenders typically have broad product menus15 and it is virtually costless to
introduce a new mortgage with a slightly different rate/fees combination. Therefore, the fact that
the marginal cost is transaction-specific (i.e. varies across lenders and borrowers) should be seen
as an approximation to residual product differentiation which is not captured by the conditioning
variables.
3.3.1 Borrowers
Having drawn their search cost, borrowers decide whether to engage in a non-sequential search or
use a broker. The search technology is such that i chooses the optimal number of price draws, k,
to solve:
min
k≥1
(k − 1)κi + E
[
p(1:k)|xG,xH
]
[3.3]
Just like in Hong and Shum (2006), we assume that the first draw is costless16, and the valuation
of all consumers is equal to the upper bound of the support of the marginal costs (highest observed
price). E
[
p(1:k)|xG,xH
]
is the expected lowest among k prices drawn from the equilibrium distri-
butionF(p|xG,xH), which arises as a result of lenders’ profit-maximising pricing decisions given
borrowers optimal search behaviour. Unlike Burdett and Judd (1983) where firms and consumers
are ex ante identical, the equilibrium price dispersion arises both as a result of search and lender
heterogeneity.
The cost of using an intermediary is the expected rate paid for the mortgage suggested by the
broker plus any commission charged for using the service:
E
[
pB|xG,xH]+ %(xG,xH) [3.4]
13Specifically: the mortgage term, LTV band, FTB status, duration of the initial deal, indicators whether it is a flexible or cashback
mortgage.
14See the discussion in Benetton (2018) and for anecdotal evidence that some rates are negotiated check https:
//www.theguardian.com/money/2013/nov/19/secret-remortgage-rates-special-customers (accessed
15/09/2018).
15For example, Kashyap and Rostom (2018) report that the median borrower can choose form 19 different loans within the same
lender.
16In the context of our application, this could be interpreted as the offer from the bank that the consumer has a current account
with. In that sense, this brings our model closer to Allen et al. (2017), where borrowers first receive a free offer from their home bank
and then decide whether to search or not. The main difference is that we do not assume that the home bank has a cost advantage over
the competitors.
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Under the assumption that brokers inform the borrower of the best possible deal, we can treat them
as auctioneers holding reverse first-price auctions. Therefore, E
[
pB|xG,xH] = E [p(1:J)|xG,xH],
so the price is the expected price obtained by searching all J lenders.
Let k∗(κi) be the optimal number of searches for an individual with unit search cost equal to
κi. Then the choice of direct search versus using an intermediary is the solution to the following
cost minimisation problem:
min
{Broker, Direct}
{
E
[
pB|xG,xH]+ %(xG,xH), (k∗(κi)− 1)κi + E [p(1:k∗)|xG,xH]} , [3.5]
Following the insight of Hong and Shum (2006) and lemma 1 in Salz (2017), due to the
linearity of search costs in the number of searches and the fact that E
[
p(1:k)|xG,xH
]
is non-
increasing in k, the borrowers in equilibrium will endogenously sort themselves into types defined
by the number of searches by forming cut-off points along the search cost distribution:
0 ≤ κJ(xG,xH) < κJ−1(xG,xH) < · · · < κk(xG,xH) < κk−1(xG,xH) < κ¯(xG,xH) ≤ ∞
In the above, κk should be understood as the highest search cost so that everyone with κ ∈
[κk, κk−1] searches exactly k firms. Because we are assuming that brokers are used by individuals
with high search cost, κ¯ is the search cost of the consumer who is indifferent between searching
k − 1 firms and delegating her search efforts to a broker.
Define ∆B(xG,xH) = 1− G(κ¯(xG,xH)|xG) as the proportion of borrowers who access the
mortgage using a broker. Let q =
[
q1(x
G,xH), . . . , qJ(x
G,xH)
]
be the proportions of borrow-
ers who search 1, . . . , J times. Figure 3.1 below illustrates the equilibrium sorting of borrowers
according to the number of searches.
3.3.2 Lenders and equilibrium
Assume that all j = 1, . . . , J lenders have an equal probability of being sampled in the search
market. In the price-setting model we depart from two key assumptions used by Salz (2017).
Firstly, firms are not able to set different prices in the search and brokered markets, which is remi-
niscent of the notion of price coherence of Edelman and Wright (2015). Secondly, the same firms
participate in the direct and brokered markets. Since we assumed that non-price characteristics
were chosen by the borrowers outside of the model, the total profit function is additively separable
in profits from every single transaction. Therefore, the same pricing game is played in each of the
product-markets defined by the conditioning variables, so for clarity of exposition, we suppress
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium sorting.
κ
G(
κ
|x
G
)
κ`(x
G,xH) κ`−1(xG,xH) κ¯(xG,xH)
1
−
∆
B
−
q˜ `
−
1
−
q˜ `
1
−
∆
B
−
q˜ `
−
1
1
−
∆
B
∆B : % brokered
Search cost distribution
Note: Figure shows equilibrium sorting of buyers into types defined by the number of searches and use of brokers. The
proportion of borrowers who use brokers is the blue shaded area under the search cost density. The areas between the
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scale.
the conditioning sets. Firm j with marginal cost cij solves:
max
p
∆B ·ΠB(p, cij) + (1−∆B) ·ΠD(p, cij ; q), [3.6]
where ΠB(·) and ΠD(·) are the profits in the brokered and direct search market, respectively.
Suppose all lenders have equal probabilities of being found by borrowers. Then the probability
of being searched by a borrower who samples ` lenders is `J and we can restrict our attention to
symmetric equilibria. Following Burdett and Judd (1983) and assuming that brokers hold first-
price auctions, we can rephrase the problem as:
max
p
∆B · (p− cij)(1−F(p))J−1 + (1−∆B) · (p− cij)
J∑
`=1
q`
`
J
(1−F(p))`−1 [3.7]
Due to costs being lenders’ private information drawn from the same distribution, the probability
that a lender with ` − 1 competitors wins the contract (is the cheapest amongst ` firms) is (1 −
F(p))`−1.
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Let q˜` = (1−∆B)q` for ` = 1, . . . , J − 1, and q˜J = ∆B + (1−∆B)qJ . Then the maximisation
problem simplifies to:
max
p
(p− cij)
J∑
`=1
q˜`
`
J
(1−F(p))`−1, [3.8]
which is the same as the price-setting problem in the pure search problem considered in chapter
2 with distorted search probabilities q˜ = [q˜1, . . . , q˜J ]. Let β (cij ; q˜) denote the optimal strategy
given beliefs about borrowers’ search decisions. Using the envelope theorem with the boundary
condition that β(c¯; q˜) = c¯ yields the optimal pricing strategy:
β (cij ; q˜) = cij +
J∑`
=1
q˜``
∫ c
s=cij
(1−H (s))`−1 ds
J∑`
=1
q˜`` (1−H (cij))`−1
. [3.9]
The equilibrium price distribution, F , emerges as a result of lenders pricing according to (3.9).
We are now ready to define a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game:
DEFINITION . The pair (q˜, β (·; q˜)) is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium if:
(i) for every q˜ when all firms apart from j use pricing strategy β (·; q˜), β (·; q˜) is the best
response for firm j;
(ii) given the price distribution induced by β (·; q˜), q˜ is a vector of proportions of consumers’
optimal search.
We restrict our attention to monotone pure-strategy equilibria. The action space is compact and
the pricing functions are strictly increasing in cost so the existence results from Reny (2011) apply.
In general, lenders’ payoff function can be seen as a mixture of two auctions – one where all firms
participate (broker), and one where the number of competitors is unknown (direct search). Mixing
probabilities are then determined in equilibrium by optimal search decisions made by borrowers.
3.4 Identification and estimation
This section discusses the identification of the model’s primitives, that is the set of conditional
search cost distributions G(·|xG) and distribution of cost of providing the loan, H(·|xH). We
argue that the model imposes enough structure on the data for the aforementioned distributions to
be nonparametrically identified.
Throughout the section we assume that for each mortgage, we observe the price, pij , whether
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it was accessed directly or via a broker17, and the values of the borrower and loan characteristics,
xG and xH , respectively. In addition to that, we assume that we can observe (or construct from
the data) lender market shares for each of the combinations of conditioning variables and broker
commissions. The goal of nonparametric identification is then to establish a mapping from these
data to the unobserved primitives using the theoretical restrictions imposed by the model. The
main identification theorems for a pure search model are presented in chapter 2 and appendix B,
and draw on findings from the literature on nonparametric auction estimation, in particular Guerre,
Perrigne, and Vuong (2000).18 We therefore only devote space in this section to emphasise certain
aspects of the identification strategy which have not been discussed in previous literature.
3.4.1 Differences from Salz (2017)
The identification strategy and estimation techniques used here differ from those employed by
Salz (2017) due to altered assumptions on the supply-side of the model. This section discusses the
differences.
The main point of departure is that we do not assume that the composition of firms offering
their products directly and through brokers is different. In our setting, the same lenders offer their
loans directly or through a broker. Because we only focus on the biggest six lenders, we do not
rely on the ex ante classification of firms into high and low types, which is one of the fundamental
identifying assumptions made by Salz (2017).19 We therefore restrict our attention to symmetric
equilibria, where all firms have the same underlying cost distribution. This allows us to use the
data from both brokered and direct mortgages when estimating H, unlike Salz (2017) who used
only brokered data to recover firms’ cost distributions.
The second difference is that we do not work with residualised prices20, so that we do not need
to make the assumption that the cost is additively separable in a linear index of characteristics.
Instead, we nonparameterically estimate cost separately for each combination of xH . This allows
to capture potential nonlinear patterns pricing and underlying cost distributions. For example,
with the linear index restriction, the estimated cost distributions for 70% LTV and 90% LTV loans
could differ only in their means while the fully nonparametric approach we adopt here allows also
for different higher moments.
17In practice the information on the proportion of brokered loans should suffice.
18See also Athey and Haile (2007) for a comprehensive overview.
19The identifying assumption in Salz (2017) is that the econometrician needs to observe at least one firm of type H and one of
type L in the brokered and direct markets. Then one can use the structure imposed by broker auctions to recover the distribution of
costs for low and high type firms.
20That is residuals from a hedonic regression of prices on a vector of loan characteristics.
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Finally, to identify the distribution of search costs, our approach uses data on prices and mar-
ket shares and a technique that minimizes the distance between market shares predicted by the
model and the data. We then use the estimated proportions of borrowers searching different num-
ber of lenders to estimate the distributions of marginal costs. Salz (2017), on the other hand,
first estimates the distribution of costs from prices of brokered contracts, and then uses those es-
timates to recover proportions of businesses (consumers in his model) searching different number
of waste disposal firms. Our approaches are therefore non-nested and valid under different sets of
assumptions.
3.4.2 Role of exclusion restrictions
In the exposition of the model and the ensuing empirical analysis, we refer to two types of condi-
tioning variables: xG shift the consumer search cost distribution and can be thought of as variables
defining consumer type. xH are primarily mortgage characteristics that directly affect the cost of
providing the loan from the lenders’ perspective. The two sets of variables can contain some
common elements, or, in the most extreme scenario, fully overlap.
A natural question is whether lack of exclusion restrictions precludes identification of the
unobserved cost distributions. In general, the answer is no, but it might lead to a situation where
the distribution of search cost is only identified at very few points on its support. This discussion
is related to the finding in Hong and Shum (2006) which was further elaborated by Moraga-
Gonza´lez, Sa´ndor, and Wildenbeest (2013) – namely, absent any other dimension of variation in
the data (e.g. across local markets or time), one is unable to identify the search cost distribution
beyond a set of J − 1 points where J is the number of firms. A solution to this problem is to pool
estimates from multiple markets, as shown e.g. by Sanches et al. (2016a).
Exclusion restrictions help generate such markets. In principle for each consumer type (de-
scribed by xG) we can pool estimates from different mortgage types (xH ). To provide a specific
example21, assuming that all first-time buyers, aged 30+, who live in cities and their income is
above the median have the same distribution of search cost, one can first obtain different sets of
estimates for each type of mortgage and then combine them to obtain a smoothed version of the
search cost CDF. Absent any other variation in the data, one might have to resort to a parametric
specification to be able to conduct meaningful counterfactual inference.
21Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. (2013) suggest that pooling data is possible across much more heterogeneous markets than the ones in
our application: ”(...) to estimate the costs of search in the market for carpentry, one could pool data from the various professional
services needed to refurbish a house: a carpenter, an electrician, a painter, a plumber, a bricklayer, a tiler, etc.”.
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3.4.3 Estimation steps
We now describe the main steps of the estimation algorithm based on the constructive identification
presented in chapter 2. In short, we begin with obtaining the empirical distributions of prices,
which are then used in conjunction with data on market shares to back out the proportion of
borrowers searching different number of lenders. In this step, we need to impose the constraint that
the proportion of borrowers who know offers from all lenders is no smaller than the proportion of
brokered loans in the data. Next, as discussed in the preceding subsection, we pool the data across
markets to obtain the estimate of the full search cost CDF. Finally, we use equilibrium bidding
function to construct pseudo-costs and then use kernel techniques to obtain their density.
To ease the notation, let s index distinct discrete combinations of (xG,xH) and, for the sake
of brevity, let Fs(p) ≡ F(p|s), fs(p) ≡ f(p|s), and ∆Bs ≡ ∆B(s). The estimation algorithm
consists of the following 5 steps:
1. In the first step we estimate Fs(p) and fs(p), separately for all s ∈ {xG × xH}, where
the cardinality of the set of covariates depends on how the variables are discretized and can
potentially be very large. The CDF is estimated simply as:
Fˆs(p) = 1
ns
ns∑
i=1
1{pi ≤ p}.
To estimate the density, we need to to address the problem of bias near the lower bound-
ary and the possibility that the density near the upper boundary may be unbounded. To
tackle this, we use an asymmetric Beta kernel suggested by Chen (1999) that performs well
on densities defined over compact supports22 together with the transformation method of
Marron and Ruppert (1994) near the upper boundary.
2. Using our transaction data, we construct a vector of observed market shares23, Y s =
(Y1s, . . . , YJs)
> for every s. Let Xs be a Js×Js matrix such that (Xs)j` = `Js (1−Fs (pj))
`−1.
Then under Assumption I from chapter 2 we have:
q˜(s) =
E
[
Xs
>Xs
]−1 E [Xs>Ys]
ι>E
[
Xs
>Xs
]−1 E [Xs>Ys] , [3.10]
where ι denotes a vector of ones. To obtain an estimate of q˜s, we use the estimated CDFs
from step 1 and evaluated them at the average price charged by firm j conditional on s,
22The implementation comes from the npuniden.boundary function from the np package in R (Hayfield and Racine, 2008).
23We experimented with both aggregate market shares over the entire period of the sample as well as quarterly shares. With a fine
grid for (xG,xH), obtaining precise estimates of quarterly shares requires a lot of data to prevent
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obtaining
(
X̂s
)
j`
= `Js
(
1− F̂s (p¯j)
)`−1
as the sample analogue of the Xs matrix.24 The
intuition behind this step is that, conditional on price, the observed difference in market
shares can only be explained by some consumers having different number of offers to com-
pare than others. Therefore the variation in market shares conditional on price identifies the
search proportions.
To accommodate the restriction that q˜Js(s) ≥ ∆Bs , we use constrained quadratic program-
ming to solve the least squares problem (3.10). The right-hand side of the constraint, ∆Bs is
the proportion of brokered mortgages and can be directly obtained from the data.
3. Estimate the vectors of cutoff types κs ≡ κ(s) for each s ∈ {xG × xH}, where for ` ∈
{1, . . . , Js − 1}:
κ`(s) = EFs
[
p(1:`)
]− EFs [p(1:`+1)]
and the marginal type who is indifferent between using a broker and searching directly is
estimated as:
κ¯(s) =
%(s)− (EFs [p(1:k∗)]− EFs [p(1:J)])
k∗ − 1 .
%(s) is the average broker commission and k∗ is the equilibrium number of searches of the
marginal type. To determine k∗, we find the lowest `, such that κ`(s) < κ¯(s).25 To estimate
the expectations of the order statistics, we draw repeatedly from the price distributions and
calculate the sample averages of the minimum prices.
Finally, ˆ˜q(s) estimated in the previous step can be used to recover G evaluated at the cutoff
points as follows:
G(κ¯(s)|xG) = 1−∆Bs
G(κk∗(s)|xG) = 1−∆Bs − ˆ˜qk∗(s)
...
...
G(κJs−1(s)|xG) = 1−∆Bs − ˆ˜qk∗(s)− · · · − ˆ˜qJs−1(s)
24The identifying assumption suggested in chapter 2 is that the observed market shares are systematically related (proportional) to
the ex-ante probabilities of winning the procurement auction. A slight difficulty in the empirical application using transaction data is
that constructing market shares from transaction data typically requires summing over multiple transactions by the same firm, which
tend to be associated with different prices. Therefore one needs to choose at which price should the CDF be evaluated. Using the
average is consistent with the proportionality assumption – since lenders are assumed to have the same underlying cost distribution,
we can only explain differences in aggregate market shares in the data by lower/higher draws fromH and consequently lower/higher
average prices quoted.
25Clearly, κ¯(s) is not identified if k∗ = 1, so when someone who now is indifferent between using a broker or not would not
search beyond the first offer she receives for free if intermediation was not available. In such a case, we replace κ¯(s) = κ1(s) + 
where  ∼ Unif[0, κ1(s)].
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4. Let {sH(x)}|xG|x=1 denote the collection of partitions of {xG × xH} such that xG = x. The
cardinality of each of those sets, |sH(x)|, is equal to the cardinality of xH , say nH . For each
of the sets we now have nH estimates of the cutoffs {κt}t∈sH(x) and {G(κt|xG)}t∈sH(x).
We then pool the estimates using the method suggested in section 4 of (Sanches et al.,
2016a). Specifically, separately for each x, we seek to minimize the following least squares
criterion function:
Ψx(g) =
1
nH
nH∑
t=1
Jt−1∑
`=1
[G(κt`|xG = x)− g(κt`)]2 ,
where g is a flexible function of the cutoffs. To impose appropriate shape restrictions on the
estimated CDF, we choose Bernstein polynomials26 to construct the sieve.
This step results in a sieve-least squares estimator for G(·|xG), whose theoretical properties
and assumptions needed for consistency are discussed in Sanches et al. (2016a).
5. In the final step we recover the distributions of lenders’ marginal costs. This step is reminis-
cent of recovering the distribution of valuations from observed bids in a first-price auction
(Guerre et al., 2000). First, for each observed price, we construct pseudo-marginal costs
using the inverse of the bidding function:
cˆij(s) = pij −
Js∑`
=1
ˆ˜q``
(
1− Fˆs (pij)
)`−1
fˆs (pij)
Js∑`
=1
ˆ˜q`` (`− 1)
(
1− Fˆs (pij)
)`−2 , [3.11]
As before, let {sG(z)}|xH |z=1 be defined as the collection of partitions of {xG×xH} such that
xH = z. We can now pool the generated pseudo-costs corresponding to each value of xH :
{cˆij(t)}t∈sG(z) and proceed to estimate H(·|xH) and h(·|xH). As with the price density,
we estimate the density using boundary kernels to reduce the bias.
3.5 Results
We now provide an overview of the estimation results obtained by applying our structural model
and estimation strategy to the PSD data. Since we are interested in recovering search and marginal
cost distributions conditional on observed heterogeneity, the number of different search cost distri-
butions is equal to the number of bins defined by the chosen partition of xG, and, correspondingly,
26A Bernstein polynomial of order P is a set of p = 0, . . . , P + 1 functions where gpP (κ) = P !p!(P−p)!κ
p(1− κ)P−p
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the number of distinct marginal cost distributions is equal to the cardinality of xH .
As discussed in section 3.4.2, exclusion restrictions are not necessary for theoretical identi-
fication of the model’s primitives,27 they turn out to be useful in practice. With some variables
excluded from xG but included in xH , we are able to pool search cost cutoff estimates and the
corresponding values of the survival function originating from different markets defined by differ-
ent xH . This allows us to identify the distribution on a wider support, instead of only on a small
collection of discrete points.28
Borrower and loan characteristics used in the structural model are displayed in table 3.4. Their
choice was primarily driven by the tradeoff between computational feasibility and willingness
to accommodate rich borrower and product-level heterogeneity. Since the model needs to be
solved for each combination of (xG,xH), we rely on a rather coarse discretization of continuous
variables. A related issue is that for kernel methods to provide a reliable estimate of the pdf of
observed prices we need possibly many data points in each of the bins. Therefore, out of the
initial 27,648 bins we used only those with 50 or more observations. This leaves us with 3,697
combinations (86.68% of the total number of mortgages in our main sample) representing the
most popular products and borrower types. While by doing this we are no longer working with the
entire universe of mortgages, the scope of loans we look at is still much broader than in previous
literature using search models to study mortgage markets.29
Table 3.4: Covariate selection.
Variable Discretization # bins
xG (16 combinations)
Age <30, 30+ 2
Income Below median, Above median 2
FTB status FTB, Non-FTB 2
Location Urban, Rural 2
xH (1,728 combinations)
LTV ≤70, 71-75, 76-80, 81-85, 86-90, 91-95 6
Deal length 2-, 3-, 5-year 3
Duration <10, (10;15], (15;20], (20;25], (25;30], (30;35] 6
Loan value 4 quantiles 4
Flexible Yes, No 2
Cashback Yes, No 2
Total: 27,648 bins
Note: Table presents the selection of conditioning variables used in the estimation of the structural models. The total number of bins
is the cardinality of the Cartesian product of the elements of xG and xH .
We use the definition of monthly mortgage cost from 3.2.3 as the price variable. To remove
27G andH are identified even if xG = xH .
28See Moraga-Gonza´lez et al. (2013) for a discussion on identifying search cost distributions using data from multiple markets
and Sanches et al. (2016a) for the theoretical properties of the method employed here.
29For example, Allen, Clark, and Houde (2013) look exclusively at FTBs taking out loans with 25 year amortisation and 5-year
initial deal period.
89
any dispersion stemming from macroeconomic shocks (e.g. changes to the BoE interest rates), we
detrend the prices and denominate them in January 2016 GBP by taking the residual from regress-
ing prices separately within each (xG,xH ) cell on a full set of monthly dummies. Ultimately, the
monetary magnitudes of all results in this and the following section should be interpreted relative
to a monthly interest and fee payment on a median-sized mortgage denominated in prices from the
beginning of 2016.
3.5.1 Borrowers’ search costs
Our main estimation results are summarised in table 3.5. The estimated quantities represent the
monthly unit cost of contacting an additional bank and obtaining a price quote. The median costs
range from £22.04 (young first time buyers living in urban areas) to £107.91 (low income, non-
first time buyers aged 30+ in urban areas). In relative terms, they represent between 5.85 and and
35.1% of the median interest-only payment.
Table 3.5: Summary statistics for estimated search cost distributions.
# xG bin Median
Median
Med(κ)/p¯
searchers
1 Age <30 — Low income — FTB — Rural 23.38 16.68 5.87%
2 Age 30+ — Low income — FTB — Rural 56.11 20.32 14.55%
3 Age <30 — High income — FTB — Rural 47.07 16.78 13.01%
4 Age 30+ — High income— FTB — Rural 23.04 14.97 6.63%
5 Age <30 — Low income — Non-FTB — Rural 42.38 22.94 12.14%
6 Age 30+ — Low income — Non-FTB — Rural 55.07 21.60 16.71%
7 Age <30 — High income — Non-FTB — Rural 45.64 12.96 14.30%
8 Age 30+ — High income — Non-FTB — Rural 46.32 22.51 14.91%
9 Age <30 — Low income — FTB — Urban 28.77 8.73 7.01%
10 Age 30+ — Low income — FTB — Urban 50.95 10.80 12.74%
11 Age <30 — High income — FTB — Urban 22.04 6.39 5.85%
12 Age 30+ — High income — FTB — Urban 24.03 6.12 6.55%
13 Age <30 — Low income — Non-FTB — Urban 101.77 18.52 28.59%
14 Age 30+ — Low income — Non-FTB — Urban 107.91 18.02 32.17%
15 Age <30 — High income — Non-FTB — Urban 31.87 14.95 9.76%
16 Age 30+ — High income — Non-FTB — Urban 104.80 17.80 33.82%
Note: Table presents selected features of nonparametrically estimated search cost distributions for 16 different borrower types (referred
to as xG bins). The third column contains the median search cost in GBP/month in the initial period. Fourth column shows the median
search cost among borrowers who do not use brokers. Fifth column shows the ratio of the median search cost to the median and mean
price paid.
These results are higher, but still quantitatively similar to other estimates provided in the lit-
erature. For instance, Allen et al. (2017) estimate the mean search cost to be $29/month, while
Agarwal et al. (2017) convert their estimate expressed in basis points to $27/month on a repre-
sentative loan. The main reason why our estimates are higher is because of the assumption that
consumers with high search cost use brokers and the fact that on average over 70% of the mort-
gages in our data are brokered. This is also the reason why higher percentiles of the search cost
distribution are not identified30 – the data are informative about the fraction of borrowers with
30This is why in some cases we could not calculate the interquartile range.
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κ > κ¯ but without parametric assumptions we cannot identify the shape of the distribution above
κ¯. What helps to some extent is variation in κ¯ induced by different combinations of xH , yet this
does not allow for identification of G on [0,∞).
The median search costs among the borrowers who end up are substantially lower, ranging
from £6 to about £22.51. The part of the distributions corresponding to searchers are also plotted
in figure 3.2. The results point to a high degree of heterogeneity across different demographics. We
also find that some of the distributions are clearly bimodal, with the first peak below £10, showing
that the consumers who do not use brokers can efficiently search on their own. To compare the
distributions across different demographics, we constructed an additional array of graphs in which
we compare distributions across one trait keeping the other ones fixed (see figure C.2.2 in appendix
B). The two main findings that emerge from that comparison are that borrowers from rural areas
seem to have higher search costs than inhabitants of cities and, perhaps surprisingly, FTB’s search
costs are stochastically dominated by the costs of non-FTBs.
Figure 3.2: Estimated search cost CDFs.
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Note: Search cost denominated in January 2016 GBP (£) per month. Bernstein sieves were
used to impose shape restrictions (non-decreasingness). The respective distributions are iden-
tified on [κmin(xG,xH), κmax(xG,xH)], that is the lowest and highest cutoff estimated
in the data.
The first finding is intuitive – since search involves interviews at bank branches, the process
is more costly for borrowers living in areas with low presence of lenders. The second observation
is trickier to interpret, as it rejects the possible role of learning in the reduction of future search
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costs. However, since the interval between the first and subsequent purchase or remortgage is typ-
ically several or more years, experience from the first purchase might not be playing a major role.
Moreover, given that our data set does not include borrowers refinancing with their previous loan
provider, our estimate of the search cost might also be absorbing part of the otherwise unobserved
switching cost.31
To our surprise, we did not find any unambiguous effects of age or income, which can be
seen as proxies for financial literacy (Hastings et al., 2013). One potential explanation can be
that our definition of search cost does not separate between cognitive and opportunity cost and
the two effects might be counterbalancing each other. To assure that our findings are robust to
different ways of defining age and income bins, we also estimated search costs with more finely
discretized grids. Namely, we considered 4 different age buckets and 4 income quartiles, resulting
in 64 different distributions. This did not really provide us with any additional insights into the
effects of age and income on search cost, while keeping the conclusions on the effect of FTB
status and location virtually unchanged. We therefore decided to stick with the more parsimonious
specification.
3.5.2 Lenders’ costs and margins
We now present the estimates of the supply-side primitives, i.e. lenders’ marginal costs and asso-
ciated markups. Instead of showing estimated CDFs for all possible combinations of conditioning
variables, xH , we only look at some aggregate statistics of marginal distributions to make sure that
the estimates align with common sense. For example, we expect mortgages that are riskier from
the banks’ perspective (e.g. higher LTV, longer term) to be associated with higher risk premia
which are expected to be capture by the cost estimates. Table 3.6 summarises our main results.
Intuitively, the averages of the estimated costs increase in LTV and length of the amortisation
period, and are higher for loans with 5-year fixed rate period than for shorter periods of fixed rate.
Given that in our definition of price we normalised the quantity of the loan to correspond to the
median value, it is not surprising that we do not find major differences in costs across the four
quartiles of the loan value distribution. We do not find major differences in the cost distributions
for mortgages offering flexible repayment schemes or cashback. Densities of marginal32 distribu-
tions of costs are shown in figure 3.3. Clearly, LTV level as the main indicator of loan’s riskiness
is the main driver of cost. The third figure in the top panel exhibits an increase in cost variance as
31Several authors studied the role of switching costs in the banking industry – see e.g. Kim et al. (2003), Deuflhard (2016), Honka
et al. (2017).
32Here we use marginal in the context of a statistical definition of a marginal distribution.
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Table 3.6: Summary statistics for estimated marginal costs and margins.
xH category
Marginal cost Price-cost margin
Mean Median IQR Mean Median IQR
LTV
≤ 70 258.9 258.2 66.8 14.07 8.45 11.26
71-75 293.3 282.8 80.4 9.89 6.22 7.17
76-80 288.3 281.8 66.2 11.09 6.82 8.26
81-85 318.8 309.2 69.0 9.04 5.65 6.96
86-90 407.8 405.1 64.6 8.75 5.65 5.79
91-95 519.9 524.8 52.5 5.12 2.95 3.32
Deal
2 years 305.6 276.6 117.2 10.60 6.58 8.07
3 years 260.5 263.0 66.4 19.61 12.90 15.18
5 years 306.3 300.7 62.0 13.44 7.63 10.6
Term
≤ 10 years 248.7 253.6 74.4 17.98 11.38 17.63
(10;15] 251.2 252.2 66.9 16.63 10.20 15.05
(15;20] 267.7 266.8 68.7 14.16 8.67 11.56
(20;25] 298.0 285.6 91.3 11.22 6.96 7.68
(25;30] 323.1 303.4 116.3 9.62 6.09 6.54
(30;35] 369.1 343.0 155.6 7.16 4.54 5.59
Value
Q1 302.7 288.7 91.8 15.07 9.39 13.21
Q2 321.1 301.0 113.4 11.23 6.98 8.24
Q3 309.8 291.5 98.9 10.13 6.05 7.36
Q4 287.6 269.1 92.4 10.08 6.13 6.93
Flexible
Regular 309.5 289.0 109.8 12.04 7.15 9.25
Flexible 275.5 274.0 66.7 9.30 5.89 7.24
Cashback
No cashback 306.3 288.5 97.1 11.14 6.63 8.24
Cashback 294.5 272.8 118.8 14.85 9.97 12.43
Note: Means, medians and interquartile ranges of estimated marginal cost and price-cost
margins defined as PCMij =
pij−cij
pij
. Costs expressed in £, PCMs in %.
the mortgage duration increases. Since most mortgagors refinance, the loans with 25+ years are
mostly those of first-time buyers, so we can also interpret this finding in terms of the cost of ser-
vicing loans being more idiosyncratic for first-time borrowers who amortise over longer periods
of time.
The distribution of markups is right-skewed with an average of 11.64% and median of 6.97%
(see figure 3.4 and more detailed results in figure C.2.1 in appendix B). Despite high market
concentration, the six biggest banks do not seem to be able to exert substantial market power.
While the estimates might appear to be low, it is worth emphasising that the model does not define
the PCM in the canonical way as the markup over the interbank swap rate (such as LIBOR) or the
Bank of England base rate. Instead, since our definition of price includes also the upfront fees and
we do not model lenders’ fixed costs in any other way, we believe that the estimate is closer to the
cost of servicing the loan over the fixed-rate period, including the cost of processing the mortgage
application, hedging against the risk of default etc. Our estimates of the markups are higher than
those obtained by Allen et al. (2017) in a recent study of the Canadian mortgage market, where
the average Lerner index is estimated to be 3.2%. This is still more than 3 times lower than the
average and 2 times lower than the median of our estimates.
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Figure 3.3: Marginal distributions of marginal costs.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of price-cost margins.
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Overall, the results in this section are consistent with some recent evidence33 that in the last
few years the market became more competitive and lenders are no longer able to enjoy high mar-
gins. From the perspective of the structural model’s mechanics, low markups emerge as an artefact
of high proportion of borrowers using brokers, whose presence, by construction, stimulates com-
petition between lenders. We will return to this discussion in the following section.
33See, for example, The Guardian (27/04/2017): Low rates, tight margins: the mortgage mar-
ket looks worryingly familiar: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/apr/23/
mortgage-market-lower-rates-tight-margins-worryingly-familiar (accessed 10/09/2018).
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3.6 Counterfactuals
We use the estimates from the previous section to derive our main results. In the current market
setting, borrowers possess different information sets due to heterogeneous search costs. Those
with low search costs are able to efficiently search through products offered by competing lenders,
while those with higher search costs either have only one mortgage to choose from or need to use
an intermediary.
In the first experiment, we are interested in quantifying the value of information provided by
brokers to consumers with high search costs. To do that, we need to simulate counterfactual market
outcomes in a scenario where brokers are not present in the marketplace. Since intermediaries
originally reduce the monopoly power of lenders, we expect the prices and markups to be higher in
the new equilibrium. Borrowers, on the other hand, will no longer have to pay broker commissions,
but their total search expense will change.
The second counterfactual concerns a hypothetical market centralisation. Suppose the regula-
tor establishes a platform, where all lenders need to post their prices and borrowers are matched
to the best offer. This setting is equivalent to a pure first-price procurement auction with no search
involved. We study how such regulation would affect consumer surplus and the prices set by the
lenders.
3.6.1 Value of information provided by brokers
In the absence of intermediation, the borrowers’ problem is to choose the optimal number of
searches given their search cost. Therefore, to find the new equilibrium, we solve the fixed-point
problem defined in the space of (new) optimal search proportions denoted as q˙:
q˙` =

1− G [∫ H (ξ (p, q˙) |xH) (1−H (ξ (p, q˙) |xH)) dp |xG] for ` = 1
G
[∫ H (ξ (p, q˙) |xH) (1−H (ξ (p, q˙)) |xH)` dp |xG]
for ` > 1
−G
[∫ H (ξ (p, q˙) |xH) (1−H (ξ (p, q˙)) |xH)`+1 dp |xG]
[3.12]
As discussed in chapter 2, Brouwer’s theorem guarantees the existence of a fixed point. While
uniqueness cannot be proved, we experimented with different starting points finding that the algo-
rithm converges to the same solution in the interior of the simplex.34 The new search proportions
then feed into the firms’ pricing functions to generate a set of counterfactual conditional price
34In several cases we observed the FP iteration to converge to a degenerate (monopoly) solution with q˙1 = 1. In such cases we
tried a different starting points to find a solution in the interior. If this method failed, we took the monopoly outcome to be the only
solution to the problem, otherwise we discarded it.
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distributions F˙(·|xG,xH) which can then be sampled from.
The auction model assumes that for all consumers, the valuation of the mortgage is at least as
high as the upper limit of the support of the cost distribution. Therefore, realised consumer surplus
for a borrower paying p is:
CS = v¯ − p− SE
SE stands for search expenditure and is equal to κ(k − 1) if the borrower with search cost κ
accessed the loan directly by contacting k banks, or % if she used a broker and paid commission
equal to %.
Without intermediation,
C˙S = v¯ − p˙− ˙SE
where p˙ is the new price drawn from F˙ and ˙SE is the new realised search expenditure which now
does not include the possibility of using a broker. We now define the value of information (VoI)35
as the difference between the expected CS and C˙S:
VoI = E(CS − C˙S) = E(p˙− p) + E( ˙SE − SE) [3.13]
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 report our main counterfactual results. We estimate the average value of
information provided by brokers in this market to be £112.15. Given our definition of price, this
means that the existence of brokers helps an average mortgagor save over £112.15 per month in
sunk expenditures (i.e. those not related to paying off the principal). If brokers were not present
in the market, borrowers would be spending on average 33.7% more in prices and 16.33% in
search cost. This results suggest that the role of borrowers in limiting lenders’ monopoly power
which arises when consumers do not search enough is substantial. Importantly, intermediation
generates a positive externality for borrowers who search directly.36 We now look at the same
figures disaggregated by consumer and mortgage type to see whether everyone is indeed better
off.
Table 3.7 breaks down the main result by borrower characteristics. Clearly, young, low-
income, first-time buyers benefit the most. The counterfactual price increases they would be fac-
ing in a world with no intermediaries reach up to 55.75%. They are also matched by significant
35The definition adopted here is slightly different from e.g. Baye, Morgan, and Scholten’s (2006) discussion of the Varian (1980)
model who define value of information as the difference between the expected price of consumers who access the clearinghouse and
those that do not.
36This is a natural consequence of the price coherence assumption and is somewhat different from the same finding in Salz (2017)
who allowed separate price setting in the two market segments.
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Table 3.7: Value of information: breakdown by borrower types.
VOI %∆p %∆SE
Overall 112.15 +33.70% +16.33%
Age
<30 199.98 +55.75% +65.49%
30+ 93.16 +28.94% +5.70%
Income
Low 125.32 +36.80% -18.62%
High 99.31 +30.68% +50.43%
FTB
FTB 151.77 +40.83% +62.98%
Non-FTB 97.70 +31.10% -0.67%
Location
Urban 114.20 +33.89% +26.05%
Rural 104.62 +33.02% -19.46%
Note: Second column of the table reports the estimated average value of infor-
mation as defined in equation (3.13) in GBP per month. The third and fourth
columns report the average percentage change in prices and search expenditures,
respectively. Calculations made by simulating new prices and search behaviour
from the new equilibrium, assuming that lenders drew had the same cost draws
as in the baseline scenario.
changes in the total cost of search. Interestingly, in some cases the cost of search is lower in the
baseline scenario. This is the case if in the new equilibrium most consumers receive only one
offer, which is assumed to be costless. Typically this would be the case with getting a mortgage
from one’s home bank37, though, unlike Allen et al. (2017), we do not have any additional data to
corroborate this conjecture.
Disaggregating the results by product type (table 3.8) yields more interesting results. Re-
markably, we find that not everyone benefits from intermediation. Borrowers with 3- and 5-year
fixed rate deals those who amortise over less than 20 years in total either benefit by very little or
are worse off. These results are driven by a modest changes in equilibrium prices which come
hand in hand with massive reductions of total search expenditure. This implies that currently the
level of consumer search for those products is low, and consequently, even with brokers present,
commissions, market power and prices are already at high levels.38
Moreover, the presence of intermediaries substantially affects pricing of mortgages with longer
amortisation periods. Removing brokers from the markets would double the prices of 30-year and
longer mortgages. Similarly, brokers help buyers of loans with flexible repayment schemes or
cashback, both by exerting a negative pressure on lenders’ prices and reducing overall search
expenditure.
Overall, our results should be interpreted with some important caveats, as our model does not
deliver predictions for some general equilibrium effects. First, we treated broker fees as exoge-
nously given, and while based on our main result it would be tempting to conclude that increasing
37The bank with which the borrower has her current/savings account.
38Relatively higher mean markup estimates in 3.6 confirm this hypothesis.
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Table 3.8: Value of information: breakdown by loan characteristics.
VOI %∆p %∆SE
Overall 112.15 +33.70% +16.33%
LTV
≤70 81.31 +27.02% -26.37%
71-75 150.53 +48.41% +90.52%
76-80 81.09 +26.08% +26.06%
81-85 178.54 +53.77% +98.04%
86-90 165.72 +38.28% +48.36%
91-95 61.44 +12.08% -50.29%
Deal
2 years 165.13 +49.28% +48.25%
3 years -1.40 +1.47% -67.62%
5 years -3.99 -0.54% -52.44%
Term
≤10 years 4.89 +4.73% -86.19%
(10;15] -14.32 -1.99% -77.46%
(15;20] 2.35 +2.52% -69.37%
(20;25] 74.63 +23.76% -43.84%
(25;30] 123.01 +36.02% +7.88%
(30;35] 363.74 +104.36% +284.55%
Value
Q1 115.35 +34.79% -50.97%
Q2 78.82 +23.13% -28.31%
Q3 117.31 +34.19% +30.91%
Q4 135.29 +42.05% +112.17%
Flexible
Flexible 17.26 +8.52% -82.27%
Regular 126.93 +37.62% +31.69%
Cashback
No cashback 121.73 +36.72% +29.33%
Cashback 48.35 +16.61% -70.04%
Note: Second column of the table reports the estimated average value of infor-
mation as defined in equation (3.13) in GBP per month. The third and fourth
columns report the average percentage change in prices and search expenditures,
respectively. Calculations made by simulating new prices and search behaviour
from the new equilibrium, assuming that lenders drew had the same cost draws
as in the baseline scenario.
them on average by over £100 per month would still make borrowers better off than in a hypo-
thetical world without intermediation, doing that would drastically reduce the demand for broker
services and force a lot of brokers to exit the market. Secondly, we did not allow for switching
to a different mortgage type in the counterfactual. For example, knowing that brokers almost ex-
clusively provide value to mortgagors shopping for 2-year fixed rate deals, it would be reasonable
to assume that consumers would switch to 3- and 5-year fixed products. Finally, our model does
not provide an estimate for total broker payoffs39, so we do not attempt a full welfare analysis.
With all that in mind, the result still can be interpreted in terms of value of information provided
by brokers to the borrowers under the current market structure.
39Woodward and Hall (2012) argue that brokers are indifferent between the main source of compensation (i.e. the contributions
of the lender and the borrower) and only care about the sum of the two components. In our model, procuration fees, provided they are
passed onto the borrowers, can be seen as a part of the estimated lenders’ cost. In section C.1.4 we provide a robustness check where
we adjust the estimated cost distributions by potential savings faced by the lenders assuming full pass-through of procuration fees.
Overall, the average VOI drops from £112 to £97 and all the results are quantitatively similar to the ones presented here.
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3.6.2 Market centralisation
In the second experiment we consider a hypothetical market centralisation. In the last two years,
startups such as Habito40 began to facilitate mortgage search by creating a free online platform
propelled by machine learning algorithms which helps borrowers find the best offer given their
needs and characteristics (so called robo-advice). Differently from traditional price comparison
services, such as Moneyfacts, Habito does not just list prices but acts as an online broker who
helps borrowers through the application process.
The counterfactual exercise in this section simulates the effects of extending such a technology
to the entire market. This includes not allowing lenders to offer their products directly, only
through the platform. In a centralised market, lenders price according to the standard first-price
procurement bid formula:
β(c|xG,xH) = β(c|xH) = c+
∫ c
s=c(1−H(s|xH))J−1ds
(1−H(c|xH))J−1 [3.14]
Canonical results from auction theory Milgrom and Weber (1985) assure that the symmetric
equilibrium of the bidding game is unique. Therefore, solving for the counterfactual is relatively
straightforward as it only involves finding the best responses defined by 3.14 without having to
determine optimal consumer search behaviour.
We look at projected benefits from such a market regulation assuming that the platform would
be costless to access, completely frictionless environment. The results are summarised in table
3.9.
In a market without search, consumers would be paying on average £21.19 less per month
(6.41% less than currently). The benefits would be further compounded by search expenditure
savings of roughly £6.44. The sum of these two numbers corresponds to the average total increase
in consumer surplus and the estimate is quantitatively very close to the result of a similar exercise
conducted by Allen et al. (2017) who found that eliminating search frictions and limiting banks’
market power in the Canadian market would increase consumer surplus by $27.92.
As in the first counterfactual, the magnitude of the change varies across borrower and product
types. Centralisation would be more beneficial for high income and older borrowers than for
younger consumers with income below the median. In terms of product characteristics, 3- and 5-
year fixed rate deals would become substantially cheaper (15 and 11%, respectively). Borrowers
with higher LTV would on average benefit less from lower prices and lack of frictions.
40For the of description of Habito’s business model see e.g. The Financial Times: https://www.ftadviser.com/
mortgages/2017/01/24/habito-secures-5-5m-to-create-mortgage-platform/
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Table 3.9: Price changes in a centralised market.
∆p %∆p ∆SE ∆p %∆p ∆SE
Overall -21.19 -6.41% -6.44 LTV
Age ≤70 -31.48 -10.07% -7.37
<30 -8.44 -1.99% -6.11 71-75 -6.35 -1.73% -4.57
30+ -23.95 -7.36% -6.50 76-80 -20.17 -5.97% -5.11
Income 81-85 -9.42 -2.34% -5.30
Low -8.19 -1.83% -6.27 86-90 -12.26 -2.61% -6.61
High -25.94 -8.08% -6.49 91-95 -5.99 -1.06% -5.96
FTB Deal
FTB -23.60 -6.74% -8.06 2 years -12.43 -4.12% -7.29
Non-FTB -18.85 -6.08% -4.84 3 years -50.26 -15.03% -7.34
Location 5 years -39.59 -11.11% -4.33
Urban -20.17 -6.07% -6.70 Value
Rural -24.95 -7.67% -5.47 Q1 -36.67 -10.69% -11.07
Term Q2 -21.14 -6.22% -6.26
≤10 years -24.95 -16.71% -10.59 Q3 -14.31 -4.46% -4.71
(10;15] -53.62 -15.13% -8.70 Q4 -12.18 -4.12% -3.56
(15;20] -47.88 -11.71% -6.95 Flexible
(20;25] -37.52 -7.26% -6.02 Flexible -11.28 -3.75% -7.91
(25;30] -14.18 -3.98% -5.47 Regular -22.74 -6.82% -6.21
(30;35] -17.09 -5.25% -5.02 Cashback
No cashback -19.99 -6.01% -6.36
Cashback -29.22 -9.08% -6.92
Note: The second column of each panel shows the average absolute difference between prices charged by lenders in a cen-
tralised market and prices observed in the data. The third column is the same difference but in relative terms. The fourth and
final column shows the average search expenditure savings a fully frictionless market would generate.
Establishing a market-wide platform would stimulate competition between lenders and make
borrowers better off. However, in our framework, mortgagors would be the only side of the mar-
ket that would benefit from such a regulation. In the following section we look at the effects
centralisation would have for banks’ markups. However, to comprehensively assess the cost of the
regulation, we would need to take a stance on the profits of brokers and the potential sunk costs
they would be facing if they had to exit the market.
3.6.3 Summary of findings
To summarise the findings from the two counterfactual exercises we conducted, we take another
look at some aggregate statistics. Clearly, the current market structure lies between the two ex-
treme cases considered in the counterfactuals. Since over 70% of mortgages are currently bro-
kered, it is more similar to a centralised market. Figure 3.5 displays the distributions of markups
and prices in the data and the two counterfactual scenarios.
Without brokers, lenders would enjoy substantially more market power. The average Lerner
index would increase to 27.94% and the dispersion would also be much more substantial with
25% of borrowers being facing 40% or higher margins. In a centralised market, the median PCM
is only 3.68% and the average price would decrease by 6.4%.
We conclude that the market is currently much more competitive than it would be if brokers
were not present. While complete centralisation would reduce mortgage prices and lenders’ mar-
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Figure 3.5: Distributions of prices and price-cost margins in the counterfactual scenarios.
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gins, the overall change is would be modest and might not be sufficient to compensate for the
(potentially high) costs of establishing such a platform. Therefore, we believe that the regula-
tor should instead facilitate broker competition, allowing for new entry, but without necessarily
banning lenders from direct sales.
3.7 Conclusion
Motivated by the observation that over 70% of mortgages in the UK are originated through in-
termediaries, this work attempts to estimate the value of information provided by brokers using a
structural model of borrower search. Using the data on the universe of all originated mortgages in
2016 and 2017, we documented the existence of price dispersion and modest pecuniary benefits
from using a broker. Furthermore, a large part of the decision whether to use a broker cannot be
explained by observable borrower characteristics, which led us to a conclusion that the decision
is driven by heterogeneity in unobserved costs of shopping around and filling out mortgage ap-
plications. Our main identifying assumption was that borrowers with high search cost, instead of
contacting lenders directly, decide to use brokers select the best available deal on their behalf.
Our structural model nonparametrically identifies the distribution of search costs and lenders’
costs of providing the loan. We estimate those primitives using techniques recently developed in
the consumer search literature which leverage methods used for nonparametric auction estimation.
We find that search costs can be substantial and are heterogeneous across different consumer types.
On the supply side, the market appears to be relatively competitive, with average markups around
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10%.
We use the estimates to simulate the effects of removing intermediaries from the market. The
difference in consumer surplus is what we label as value of information. On average, we find that
brokers advice is worth around £112 pounds per month, though not every borrower benefits from
their presence. In the absence of brokers, firms would be enjoying significantly higher monopoly
power and consumers would have to spend more on search. In the second counterfactual, we
simulate the effects a hypothetical market centralisation, finding that it would lead only to a modest
reduction of prices and lenders’ market power.
This research makes two main contributions: first, the empirical results contribute to the policy
discussion on the regulation of banks, brokers, and the mortgage market itself; secondly, the struc-
tural model presented here is relatively straightforward to estimate and simulate and the results are
robust to distributional assumptions, and can be used to study a wider array of industries, where
some consumers can access a platform while others purchase the good directly. Therefore we see
it as an attractive framework for empirical studies of welfare effects of multisided platforms.
In the future, we wish to attempt to use recent results on the estimation of auctions with unob-
served heterogeneity (Haile and Kitamura, 2018) to introduce broker heterogeneity into the model.
This would allow us to relax the assumption that all intermediaries act as unbiased auctioneers and
introduce potentially distorted advice. On the lender side, we could model the decision of offering
the product via an intermediary using the results on estimating auctions with endogenous entry.
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Concluding remarks
The papers comprising this thesis add to the empirical IO literature on oligopoly pricing and com-
petition in markets with supply and demand frictions. The methodological contributions include
the introduction of two new structural models of demand and price competition. In the future, I
aim to extend the dynamic pricing model from chapter 1 to allow for persistent consumer hetero-
geneity and also adapt it to situations where the good is storable and consumers forward-looking.
The search model introduced in chapter 2 can be further extended to allow for asymmetric firms.
In an ongoing work we are also working on establishing methods of statistical testing between our
model with heterogeneous firms and the standard model of Burdett and Judd (1983) with idential
firms and complete information.
The main empirical contributions in chapter 1 included providing an estimate of hidden promo-
tional costs in the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers and assessing their
impact on consumer welfare. We also highlighted the interplay between consumer loyalty and
adjustment costs which has not been properly studied in the literature so far. Future research can
try to further investigate the issue of costly price adjustment in different industries, especially if
the source of the cost is different than here, that is unrelated to promotional activity. The model
proposed here, under a different set of identifying restrictions, can also be used in such settings.
Chapter 3 suggested that the existence of intermediaries has a positive effect on competition and
increases consumer surplus. However, the question whether middlemen are always welfare im-
proving remains open in many other industries where they play a prominent role, including insur-
ance, advertising and financial services. The structural approach proposed in this chapter can be
used in the future to gain new insights about the role of intermediaries in those industries. Finally,
the same approach can be used to analyse market where consumers have a choice to search di-
rectly amongst different sellers for the lowest price or use a platform aggregating different offers,
for example when analysing demand for hotel services or airline tickets.
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Appendix A
Supplementary material for chapter 1
A.1 Alternative demand specification
In this section of the appendix we present an alternative way of defining consumer loyalty in
the demand model, in the vein of Dube´ et al. (2008, 2009) and Pavlidis and Ellickson (2017).
As opposed to the specification presented in section 1.5.3, aggregation here does not deliver a
first-order Markov process on market shares. Instead, current period’s demand realisation can
be predicted using information on the fraction of consumers loyal to each of the products in the
preceding period.
Rewriting (1.6):
uhjt = δj − η · pjt + γ · 1(qht = j) + ξhjt [A.1.1]
To emphasise the difference between (1.6) and (A.1.1), we replace yht−1 with qht . This variable in-
dicates which good was purchased on a previous purchase occasion. In other words, if a consumer
purchased good j in period 1 and chose the outside option in period 2, at the beginning of period 3
he will still be considered loyal to good j. Let qt = [q1t, . . . , q|J |t]′ be an aggregate state variable,
collecting the fractions of consumers loyal to each of the goods at the beginning of period t. Note
that
∑|J |
g=1 qgt = 1, so the dimension of this state variable is |J | − 1, which is 1 dimension less
than st−1. Aggregate market share of good j is now:
sjt(ait,a−it,qt) =
|J |∑
g=1
qg,t · Prt(j|pt(at), qt = g), [A.1.2]
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and the law of motion for the loyalty state is qt+1 = Ψtqt, where Ψt = {ψg→j}|J |g,j is a |J |×|J |
transition matrix, which entry in row g, column j is:
ψg→j =
 Prt(j|pt(at), qt = g) + Prt(0|pt(at), qt = g) if g = jPrt(j|pt(at), qt = g) if g 6= j [A.1.3]
This reformulation of the demand model implies a slight amendment to the firms’ problem. Fol-
lowing the notation we introduced in section 1.5.2, the publicly observed vector of state variables
is now: zt = {qt,at−1}.
With multiple consumer types, one has to keep track of qht , that is the vector of loyalty states of
type-h consumers. Assuming that the types are exogenous and fixed over time, one arrives at the
model of Dube´ et al. (2009). In general it is also possible to allow consumers to migrate between
types, but these transitions have to be identified off the data without imposing further structure.
A.2 Main identification result
In this appendix we present our main identification result. To make it self-contained, we will repeat
some of the notational assumptions we have been making throughout the main body of chapter 1.
Also, to make the exposition clearer, we will be referring to a specific number of players, actions
and cardinality of the set of possible market shares which will be the same as in our empirical
application. This is without loss of generality and can be easily adapted to applications with
different number of actions, players or alternative ways of discretising the state space.
Preliminaries
There are three players, producing two products each (four actions per player). There is also a
generic good that can be chosen by consumers, but its price is exogenously given (hence there
are 7 lagged market shares to keep track of). The vector of publicly observed state variables is
zt = (st−1,at−1). We discretise last period’s market shares into 3 bins, therefore the dimension
of the state space Z is: |Z| = 43 · 37 = 64 · 2187 = 139, 968. For simplicity we will refer to the
action (pHi1 , p
H
i2
) as HH . The payoff function of player i is:
Π(at, zt, εit)) = pii(ait,a−it, st−1) +
∑
`∈Ai
εit(`) · 1(ait = `) [A.2.1]
+
∑
`∈Ai
∑
`′ 6=`
SC`
′→`
i · 1(ait = `, ai,t−1 = `′),
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Derivation
The non-stochastic dynamic payoff from choosing ait = ` is:
v¯i(`, zt) =
∑
a−it∈ ×
j 6=i
Aj
σi(a−it|zt)
[
pii(`,a−it, st−1) + β
∑
zt+1
G(zt+1|st−1, `,a−it)
·
∫
Vi(zt+1, εt+1)dQ(εi,t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
V˜ (zt+1)
]
+
∑
`′ 6=`
SC`
′→`
i · 1(ai,t−1 = `′) [A.2.2]
Defining the differences with respect to the reference action HH we have:
∆v¯i(`, zt) = v¯i(`, zt)− v¯i(HH, zt)
=
∑
a−it∈ ×
j 6=i
Aj
σi(a−it|zt)
{
pii(`,a−it, st−1)− pii(HH,a−it, st−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆pi`i (a−it,st−1)
}
+
∑
a−it∈ ×
j 6=i
Aj
σi(a−it|zt)
{
β
∑
zt+1
[
G(zt+1|st−1, `,a−it)−G(zt+1|st−1, HH,a−it)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆G`(zt+1|a−it,st−1)
]
V˜ (zt+1)
}
+
∑
`′ 6=`
[
SC`
′→`
i · 1(ai,t−1 = `′)− SC`
′→HH
i · 1(ai,t−1 = `′)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆SC`i (ai,t−1)
Using the newly introduced notation, we have:
∆v¯i(`, zt) =
∑
a−it∈ ×
j 6=i
Aj
σi(a−it|zt)
{
∆pi`i (a−it, st−1) + β
∑
zt+1
∆G`(zt+1|a−it, st−1)V˜ (zt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
λi(`,a−it,st−1)
}
+ ∆SC`i (ai,t−1) [A.2.3]
Thinking back about the dimension of the problem, for each of the three remaining (that is, ex-
cluding HH) actions of player i, there are 42 · 37 = 16 · 2187 = 34992 λi(`, ∗) terms. Rewriting
(A.2.3) in vector form:
∆v¯i(`, zt) = σi(zt)
′λi(`, st−1) + ∆SC`i (ai,t−1), [A.2.4]
where σi(zt) = [σi(a−it|zt)]a−it and λi(`, st−1) = [λi(`,a−it, st−1)]a−it are 16 × 1 column
vectors. (A.2.4) holds for all of the 139,968 points in the state space. To make things more
explicit, use the fact that zt can be partitioned into (at−1, st−1). Furthermore:
at−1 = {a1t−1,a2t−1, . . . ,a64t−1}
st−1 = {s1t−1, s2t−1, . . . , s2187t−1 }
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For s1t−1 the system can be written as:

∆v¯i(`,a
1
t−1, s1t−1) = σi(a1t−1, s1t−1)′λi(`, s1t−1) + ∆SC`i (a
1
t−1)
∆v¯i(`,a
2
t−1, s1t−1) = σi(a2t−1, s1t−1)′λi(`, s1t−1) + ∆SC`i (a
2
t−1)
...
∆v¯i(`,a
64
t−1, s1t−1) = σi(a64t−1, s1t−1)′λi(`, s1t−1) + ∆SC`i (a
64
t−1)
Vectorizing again:
∆v¯i(`, s
1
t−1) = σi(s
1
t−1)λi(`, s
1
t−1) + ∆SC
`
i , [A.2.5]
where v¯i(`, s1t−1) = [∆v¯i(`,at−1, s1t−1)]at−1 is a 64× 1 vector, σi(s1t−1) = [σi(at−1, s1t−1)′]at−1
is a 64× 16 matrix and ∆SC`i = [∆SC`i (at−1)]at−1 is a 64× 1 vector. In matrix notation, for all
st−1, this becomes:
∆v¯i(`) =

σi(s
1
t−1) 0
. . .
0 σi(s
2187
t−1 )

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2187·64)×(2187·16)

λi(`, s
1
t−1)
...
λi(`, s
2187
t−1 )

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2187·16)×1
+∆S˜C
`
i [A.2.6]
We will be referring to the block-diagonal matrix containing player i’s beliefs as σ. It can be
written more compactly as a Kronecker product of an identity matrix I and matrix containing
beliefs:
∆v¯i(`) =
I2187 ⊗

σi(s
1
t−1)
...
σi(s
2187
t−1 )



λi(`, s
1
t−1)
...
λi(`, s
2187
t−1 )
+ ∆S˜C`i
= σiλi(`) + ∆S˜C
`
i
Everything we showed so far was for a selected action ` ∈ Ai\{HH}. We can now define
∆v¯i = [v¯i(HL); v¯i(LH); v¯i(LL)]
′, so that:
∆v¯i = [I3 ⊗ σi]

λi(HL)
λi(LH)
λi(LL)
+

∆S˜C
HL
i
∆S˜C
LH
i
∆S˜C
LL
i
 [A.2.7]
= Ziλi + ∆S˜Ci
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The dimension of the object on the LHS of (A.2.7) is (139968 · 3× 1) = 419904× 1. Define the
following 419904× 419904 projection matrix:
MZi = I419904 − Zi(Z′iZi)−1Z′i [A.2.8]
So far we have not discussed ∆S˜Ci in detail, but it can be written as: ∆S˜Ci = D˜i∆SCi where
D˜i is a 419904 × κi matrix of zeros and ones which are a natural consequence of the indicator
functions used while defining the profit function. κi is the number of dynamic parameters to
estimate for player i and ∆SCi is a κi×1 vector of parameters to identify. Multiplying both sides
of (A.2.7) by the projection matrix defined in (A.2.8), we have:
MZi ∆v¯i = M
Z
i D˜i∆SCi
D˜′iM
Z
i ∆v¯i = D˜
′
iM
λ
i D˜i∆SCi
∆SCi = (D˜
′
iM
Z
i D˜i)
−1(D˜′iM
Z
i ∆v¯i) [A.2.9]
(A.2.9) defines the identifying correspondence for player i. We can proceed in an identical fash-
ion to recover the parameters for the remaining players. There is also a straightforward way to
incorporate equality restrictions across players an estimate {∆SCi}Ni=1 for all players in one step.
Computation
The main computational challenge here lies in the construction of the projection matrix MZi which
involves inverting the matrix Z′iZi of size 3 · 34992× 3 · 34992. However, a closer inspection re-
veals that this matrix is block-diagonal. To see this, rewrite Zi:
Zi =


σi(s
1
t−1) 0
. . .
0 σi(s
2187
t−1 )
 0
σi(s
1
t−1) 0
. . .
0 σi(s
2187
t−1 )

0

σi(s
1
t−1) 0
. . .
0 σi(s
2187
t−1 )


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Recall that each of the σi(·)’s is a 64× 16 matrix. Multiplying Zi by its transpose we have:
Z′iZi =


σi(s
1
t−1)′σi(s1t−1) 0
. . .
0 σi(s
2187
t−1 )′σi(s2187t−1 )
 0
[ ]
0 [ ]

Now each of the σi(·)′σi(·) entries is a 16× 16 matrix, so in the end to obtain the inverse of Z′iZi
we have to invert 2187 16 × 16 matrices, which in principle should be much faster and accurate
than inverting one big matrix. In practice we can proceed as follows:
1. Construct 2187 projection matrices:
MZi (·) = I64 − σi(·)[σi(·)′σi(·)]−1σi(·)′
2. Build the matrix Mλi
3. Recover ∆SCi
A.3 Identification of promotional costs
This appendix shows how assuming that adjustment costs are only paid by firms if they change
prices from high to low allows to point-identify the vector of costs consisting of a separate param-
eters for each product. We start with assumptions R1-3:
Assumption (R1). Adjustment costs are incurred only when switching from high to low price.
Assumption (R2). Adjustment cost associated with one product is independent of the current and
lagged promotional status of other products.
R2 is a natural assumption, and allows us to impose equality restriction across a−i,t−1 in the
switching cost part of (1.2). Finally, consider the situation in which prices of more than one
product of a firm move in the same direction. R3 says that we can express the cost of taking this
action as a sum of individual price adjustments of the products involved:
Assumption (R3). There are no economies of scope associated with price promotions on multiple
products of the same firm.
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R1-2 will be sufficient to identify one cost of adjusting prices per product, and R3 can be just
used to reduce the dimension of the parameter vector. The identifying power of our assumptions
is summarised by the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Under assumptions R1-2, the matrix D˜i satisfies the requirements of theorem 2 in
Komarova et al. (forthcoming) and for each player one can identify |Ai| − 1 parameters in SCi.
Adding assumption R3 reduces the number of parameters to |Ji|.
For clarity of exposition we prove proposition 1 for a two-product duopoly case. Generalising
it to more players and products is straightforward.
Setup
Consider a simplified version of the model described in section 3.3: suppose there are two players
which we denote as i = {a, b} producing two differentiated goods each, whose sets we denote as
Ji = {i1, i2}.
Conditional on (st−1,at−1, εit), player i chooses an action ait from the set Ai to maximise the
discounted sum of profits given her beliefs about the actions of the competitor. The decision vari-
able in this game is the vector of prices of all goods manufactured by a player. Since prices are
constrained to take only two values, regular (H) and sale (L), the cardinalities of both Aa and Ab
are 2|Ja| = 2|Jb| = 4.
Specifically Aa = {(pHa1 , pHa2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
HH
; (pHa1 , p
L
a2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
HL
; (pLa1 , p
H
a2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LH
; (pLa1 , p
L
a2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LL
}, where H/L denotes regular/sale
price, Ab is defined analogously.
This implies that without further restrictions there are 12 parameters per player:
SCi=
[
SCHL→HHi , SC
LH→HH
i , SC
LL→HH
i , SC
HH→HL
i , SC
LH→HL
i , SC
LL→HL
i , SC
HH→LH
i ,
SCHL→LHi ,SC
LL→LH
i , SC
HH→LL
i , SC
HL→LL
i ,SC
LH→LL
i
]′.
Under R1-2 there are three dynamic parameters to identify for each player, that is SCHH→LLi ,
SCHH→HLi , SC
HH→LH
i , whereas R3 reduces this number to just two. With an arbitrary number
of actions, |Ai| initially there are |Ai| · (|Ai|−1) possible adjustment costs, (|Ai|−1) under R1-2
and |Ji| under R1-3.
Identification
As previously, we takeHH to be the reference action, so that: ∆v¯i(`,a−it, st−1) ≡ v¯i(`,a−it, st−1)−
v¯i(HH,a−it, st−1). The reason why we use HH is that thanks to R1, no cost is ever incurred in
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period t if ait = HH . Therefore, for player a we have:
∆v¯a(`,a−it, st−1) =
∑
abt∈Ab
Prb(abt|at−1, st−1)λa(`,abt, st−1) + SC`′→`a · 1(ai,t−1 = `′)
[A.3.1]
where λa(·) is defined as in (A.2.3). What remains to be verified is that the matrix of zeros and
ones resulting from stacking the expressions (A.3.1) for all actions of player a and all possible
values of the state variables is indeed of full rank and does not contain a column of ones.
To show this, we invoke lemma 5 in Komarova et al. (forthcoming) and write the expression for
one possible realisation of lagged market shares, st−1:
∆v¯a(st−1) = (I|Aa|−1 ⊗ Za(st−1))λa(st−1) + D˜a(st−1)SCa [A.3.2]
where:
• ∆v¯a(st−1) =
{
∆v¯a(aat,at−1, st−1)
}at−1∈Aa×Ab
aat∈Aa\{HH} is a (|Aa| − 1) · |Aa| · |Ab| × 1 vector,
• Za(st−1) = {Prb(abt|at−1, st−1)}(abt,at−1)∈Ab×(Aa×Ab) is a |Aa| · |Ab| × |Ab| matrix,
• λa(st−1) = {λa(aat, abt, st−1)}(aat,abt)∈(Aa\{HH},Ab) is a (|Aa| − 1) · |Ab| × 1 vector,
• D˜a(st−1) is a (|Aa| − 1) · |Aa| · |A−b| × κ matrix,
• SCa is a κ× 1 vector of parameters to identify.
To show the content of the objects in (A.3.2) we rewrite it as (A.3.4). For the sake of brevity, st−1
was dropped from the notation. We can immediately see from there that D˜a(st−1) satisfies the
rank condition. Imposing R3 only changes the last component of the sum on the RHS of (A.3.4),
so that it becomes:
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 SCHH→HLa
SCHH→LHa

To arrive at (A.2.7) we vertically stack the vectors and matrices in (A.3.2) for all possible combi-
nations of st−1. But since D˜a(st−1) does not vary across st−1, then D˜a = j⊗ D˜a(st−1), where j
is a column vector of ones whose dimension is equal to the cardinality of st−1.
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We can now directly use the identifying correspondence below to recover the costs:

SCHH→HLa
SCHH→LHa
SCHH→LLa
 = (D˜′a(st−1)MI|Aa|−1⊗Za(st−1)D˜a(st−1))−1D˜′a(st−1)MI|Aa|−1⊗Za(st−1)∆v¯a(st−1),
[A.3.3]
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A.4 Estimation of the discount factor
To estimate the discount factor and subsequently to solve the model we have to compute the value
functions associated with each element of the state space. Because our state space is quite large
and some state variables are continuous it is impossible to compute the value function for each
state. Likewise we compute the value function for each of the T = 200 observed states (for each
firm in each supermarket) assuming that value functions can be approximated by a linear function
of functions of state variables. The same approach has been used in Sweeting (2013), Barwick
and Pathak (2015) and Fowlie et al. (2016). Next we discuss the procedures used to estimate the
discount factor.
Using the fact the state transitions in our model are deterministic – see equation (1.10) – we can
write the ex ante value function in problem (1.4) as:
Vi (at−1, st−1) =
∑
at∈Ai
σi (at|at−1, st−1)
{
Π˜i (at,at−1, st−1) + βVi (at, s (at, st−1))
}
,
[A.4.1]
where Vi(zt+1) =
∫
Vi(zt+1, εt+1)dQ(εi,t+1) and Π˜i (at,at−1, st−1) is the (conditional) ex-
pectation of the payoff function Πi (at,at−1, st−1, εit (ait)) with respect to εit when states are
(at−1, st−1) and current actions are at, and s (at, st−1) is the vector of current shares – implied
by equation (1.10) – when past shares are st−1 and current actions are at. As in Sweeting (2013)
we approximate Vi(zt) using the following parametric function:
Vi(zt) '
K∑
k=1
λkiφki (zt) ≡ Φi (zt)λi, [A.4.2]
where λki is a coefficient and φki (·) is a well-defined function mapping the state vector into the
set of real numbers. In our case, φki (·) are flexible functions of shares and prices of the firms. In
practice, the variables we use to approximate the value functions include (i) (past) actions of all
firms, (ii) second order polynomials of (past) shares of all products, (iii) interactions between (past)
actions and shares of the different products and (iv) second order polynomials of the interactions
between (past) actions and shares. We experimented with third and fourth order polynomials of
shares and interactions between shares and actions but the results did not change significantly.
Notice that under this formulation solving for the value function requires that one computes only
K parameters (λki’s) for each manufacturer. By substituting this equation into the ex ante value
function we can solve for λi = [λ1i λ2i ... λKi]′ in closed-form as a function of the primitives of
the model, states and beliefs. Substituting (A.4.2) into (A.4.1) we get:
Φi (at−1, st−1)λi =
∑
at∈A
σi (at|at−1, st−1)
{
Π˜i (at,at−1, st−1) + βΦi (at, s (at, st−1))λi
}
.
To simplify the notation let Π˜∗i (at−1, st−1) and Φ
∗
i (st−1) be the conditional expectations of
Π˜i (at,at−1, st−1) and of Φi (at, s (at, st−1)) with respect to current actions, respectively. There-
fore, we can rewrite equation above as:
(Φi (at−1,st−1)− βΦ∗i (st−1))λi = Π˜∗i (at−1,st−1) .
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Stacking this equation for every possible state in S we have that:
(Φi − βΦ∗i )λi = Π˜∗i ,
where Φi and Φ∗i are Ns×K matrices that depend on states and beliefs and Π˜∗i is a Ns× 1 vector
of expected profits that depends on state, beliefs and parameters, Ns being the number of states
observed in the data. Assuming K < Ns, this expression can be rewritten as:
λi =
[
(Φi − βΦ∗i )
′
(Φi − βΦ∗i )
]−1 [
(Φi − βΦ∗i )
′
Π˜∗i
]
. [A.4.3]
Inserting (A.4.3) into (A.4.2) we obtain the unconditional value functions associated to problem
(1.4); given the logit assumption on εit we can calculate the probability of each action solving
problem (1.4). Having estimated adjustment costs outside of the dynamic model and having cal-
ibrated H and marginal costs, the only parameter to be estimated inside the dynamic model is
the discount factor. We do this by choosing the discount factor that minimises the difference be-
tween estimated action probabilities and the probabilities implied by the structural model, which
are defined based on the approximation explained above (see Komarova et al. (forthcoming)).
A.5 Model solution
To solve the model we use an algorithm similar to that described in Sweeting (2013). The algo-
rithm works as follows:
1. In step s we calculate λ (σs) as a function of the vector of beliefs, σs, substituting equation
(A.4.2) into the ex ante value function and solving for λ = [λ1 λ2 ... λk] in closed-form as a
function of the primitives of the model, states and beliefs;
2. We use λ (σs) to calculate choice specific value functions for each of the selected states and
the multinomial logit formula implied by the model to update the vector of beliefs, σ˜;
3. If the value of the Euclidian norm ‖σs − σ˜‖ is sufficiently small we stop the procedure and
save σ˜ as the equilibrium vector of probabilities implied by the model, σ˜ = σ∗; if ‖σs − σ˜‖
is larger than the tolerance we update σs+1 = ψσ˜ + (1− ψ)σs, where ψ is a number
between 0 and 1, and restart the procedure.
The tolerance used on ‖σs − σ˜‖ was 10−3 and the value of ψ used to update σs to σs+1 was
0.5. We have made several attempts using lower values for the tolerance on ‖σs − σ˜‖ and for
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ψ. All these attempts generated very similar equilibrium probabilities, but the time to achieve
convergence was larger. The initial guess used to start the algorithm, σ0, is equal to the estimated
CCPs evaluated at the corresponding state. To check the robustness of our results to changes in
the initial guess we arbitrarily changed the original initial guess multiplying it by several factors
between 0 and 1. For all our attempts the resulting equilibrium vector of probabilities was the
same.
For the counterfactuals we have to simulate the model for states that are not observed in the data
– i.e. we need estimates of σ∗ for states that are not in the data. To do this we assumed that the
solution of the model, σ∗, for the relevant counterfactual scenario is a logistic function of a linear
index of states – i.e. the same function that we used to compute the CCPs. Mathematically, let
σ∗i (ai = k|z) be the probability that firm i plays ai = k when the state vector is z. We assume
that:
σ∗i (ai = k|z) =
exp (z′γk)∑
k′ exp (z
′γk′)
. [A.5.1]
Dividing it by the probability of an anchor choice, say ai = HH , normalising γ1 = 0 and taking
logs we have ln {σ∗i (ai = k|z)} − ln {σ∗i (ai = 1|z)} = z′γk. Then the vector of parameters γk
can be estimated by OLS – one OLS equation is estimated for each ai = k, k 6= HH .
The probability function (A.5.1) and the Markovian transitions for actions and shares are used to
simulate moments implied by the model. Starting from the initial state vector for each firm in each
supermarket we forward simulate 1000 paths of 200 periods of actions and shares and computed
profits for each period by averaging period profits for each path.
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A.6 Additional tables
Table A.6.1: Annual expenditure shares in the 500g spreadable segment.
Year
PRODUCTS BY MANUFACTURER 2009 2010 2011 2012 2009-2012
ASDA
Asda Store Brand 10.0% 9.3% 6.4% 5.8% 7.7%
Arla 35.6% 42.3% 39.5% 50.6% 42.1%
ANCHOR SPRDBL 500GM 10.7% 11.0% 10.8% 13.9% 11.6%
LURPAK SPRDBL DANISH 500GM 24.9% 31.3% 28.7% 36.7% 30.5%
Dairy Crest 21.0% 14.9% 16.6% 21.3% 18.3%
CLOVER DAIRY SPREAD 500GM 6.4% 6.6% 7.2% 11.3% 7.9%
COUNTRY LIFE SPRDBL 500GM 14.6% 8.3% 9.4% 10.0% 10.4%
Unilever 33.4% 33.5% 37.5% 22.3% 31.8%
FLORA 500GM 16.4% 14.1% 15.2% 21.6% 16.8%
I.C.B.I.N.B SPRD 500GM 17.1% 19.5% 22.2% 0.7% 15.0%
MORRISONS
Morrisons Store Brand 9.9% 11.3% 9.0% 5.9% 9.0%
Arla 35.2% 36.2% 35.8% 37.0% 36.0%
ANCHOR SPRDBL 500GM 9.2% 8.8% 8.4% 10.1% 9.1%
LURPAK SPRDBL DANISH 500GM 26.0% 27.4% 27.3% 26.9% 26.9%
Dairy Crest 20.2% 18.3% 21.8% 23.3% 21.0%
CLOVER DAIRY SPREAD 500GM 12.0% 13.5% 14.2% 14.8% 13.7%
COUNTRY LIFE SPRDBL 500GM 8.2% 4.8% 7.5% 8.6% 7.3%
Unilever 34.7% 34.2% 33.4% 33.7% 34.0%
FLORA 500GM 26.9% 22.4% 21.6% 24.6% 23.8%
I.C.B.I.N.B SPRD 500GM 7.8% 11.8% 11.8% 9.1% 10.2%
SAINSBURY’S
Sainsbury’s Store Brand 15.2% 16.4% 17.4% 14.9% 16.1%
Arla 35.3% 38.3% 37.3% 40.3% 37.9%
ANCHOR SPRDBL 500GM 13.5% 14.3% 12.8% 14.1% 13.6%
LURPAK SPRDBL DANISH 500GM 21.9% 24.0% 24.5% 26.3% 24.3%
Dairy Crest 17.5% 15.6% 19.5% 19.2% 18.0%
CLOVER DAIRY SPREAD 500GM 8.1% 9.3% 11.2% 11.4% 10.1%
COUNTRY LIFE SPRDBL 500GM 9.3% 6.3% 8.3% 7.8% 7.9%
Unilever 32.0% 29.6% 25.8% 25.6% 28.0%
FLORA 500GM 21.5% 19.5% 15.9% 17.7% 18.5%
I.C.B.I.N.B SPRD 500GM 10.5% 10.1% 9.9% 7.8% 9.5%
TESCO
Tesco Store Brand 17.7% 12.9% 15.5% 13.5% 14.9%
Arla 33.8% 40.2% 40.0% 39.0% 38.4%
ANCHOR SPRDBL 500GM 10.3% 13.7% 12.7% 11.2% 12.0%
LURPAK SPRDBL DANISH 500GM 23.6% 26.5% 27.3% 27.8% 26.4%
Dairy Crest 16.1% 16.7% 16.6% 17.2% 16.6%
CLOVER DAIRY SPREAD 500GM 9.1% 10.0% 9.3% 10.6% 9.7%
COUNTRY LIFE SPRDBL 500GM 7.0% 6.7% 7.3% 6.6% 6.9%
Unilever 32.4% 30.2% 28.0% 30.4% 30.1%
FLORA 500GM 24.3% 19.8% 16.1% 22.2% 20.4%
I.C.B.I.N.B SPRD 500GM 8.0% 10.4% 11.9% 8.1% 9.7%
Note: Calculations based on a subsample of products used to estimate the dynamic game. Source: own calculation using
Kantar Worldpanel data.
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Table A.6.2: Price levels.
MEANS MEDIANS MIN/MAX
PRODUCTS BY MANUFACTURER pH pL pH pL pH pL
ASDA
Asda Store Brand 1.02 1.00
Arla
ANCHOR 2.51 1.82 2.60 2.00 2.90 1.00
LURPAK 2.63 2.10 2.58 2.00 2.98 1.50
Dairy Crest
CLOVER 1.73 1.30 1.75 1.38 2.00 1.00
COUNTRY LIFE 2.42 1.85 2.39 2.00 2.68 1.00
Unilever
FLORA 1.40 1.00 1.38 1.00 1.70 0.83
ICBINB 1.22 1.09 1.24 1.00 1.45 0.50
MORRISONS
Morrisons Store Brand 1.09 1.08
Arla
ANCHOR 2.55 1.92 2.60 2.00 2.90 1.50
LURPAK 2.71 2.11 2.80 2.00 3.00 1.50
Dairy Crest
CLOVER 1.75 1.15 1.75 1.00 2.00 0.70
COUNTRY LIFE 2.45 1.83 2.39 2.00 2.85 1.10
Unilever
FLORA 1.47 0.94 1.40 1.00 1.70 0.70
ICBINB 1.21 0.82 1.25 1.00 1.45 0.50
SAINSBURY’S
Sainsbury’s Store Brand 1.13 1.10
Arla
ANCHOR 2.58 2.03 2.60 2.00 3.00 1.50
LURPAK 2.71 2.17 2.80 2.00 3.00 1.50
Dairy Crest
CLOVER 1.75 1.22 1.75 1.00 2.00 0.85
COUNTRY LIFE 2.47 1.89 2.48 2.00 2.85 1.00
Unilever
FLORA 1.48 0.96 1.49 1.00 1.70 0.75
ICBINB 1.27 0.79 1.25 1.00 1.80 0.54
TESCO
Tesco Store Brand 1.02 1.00
Arla
ANCHOR 2.59 1.84 2.60 2.00 2.90 1.00
LURPAK 2.73 1.95 2.80 2.00 2.98 1.40
Dairy Crest
CLOVER 1.74 1.18 1.75 1.00 2.00 0.75
COUNTRY LIFE 2.42 1.76 2.40 2.00 2.85 1.10
Unilever
FLORA 1.49 1.01 1.46 1.00 1.70 0.75
ICBINB 1.24 0.88 1.24 1.00 1.80 0.54
Note: All prices given in GBP. First four columns show prices calculated as 200-
week averages/medians conditional on promotional status. For store brand there
are no price promotions, so it is an unconditional mean/median. Prices in the
last two columns are calculated as highest/lowest price observed in the sample
period conditional on sale/no sale.
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Figure A.6.1: Histograms with the number of products on sale by firm.
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Note: Figure constructed using the universe of all 500g spreadable products by recording the promotional flags for each of the
products. E.g. for Arla there were 19 weeks with no product on sale, 84 weeks with 1 brand on sale, 68 weeks with 2 brands on sale
etc. If the numbers do not sum to 200 for certain manufacturers it is an indication that we did not observe any purchases their brands
in the data in all weeks.
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A.7 Additional results
Table A.7.1: Demand estimates (alternative definition of loyalty).
ASDA MORRISONS SAINSBURY’S TESCO
δAnchor
−2.628
[−2.753;−2.503]
−2.387
[−2.541;−2.233]
−3.143
[−3.290;−2.995]
−3.600
[−3.676;−3.523]
δLurpak
−2.097
[−2.220;−1.975]
−1.744
[−1.893;−1.595]
−2.903
[−3.054;−2.752]
−3.260
[−2.49;−2.35]
δClover
−3.223
[−3.323;−3.123]
−2.730
[−2.834;−2.626]
−3.785
[−3.892;−3.677]
−3.879
[−3.936;−3.822]
δCountry Life
−2.865
[−2.984;−2.745]
−2.794
[−2.938;−2.650]
−3.590
[−3.736;−3.443]
−4.156
[−4.234;−4.077]
δFlora
−3.055
[−3.138;−2.973]
−2.631
[−2.720;−2.542]
−3.455
[−3.550;−3.360]
−3.620
[−3.669;−3.570]
δICBINB
−3.138
[−3.211;−3.065]
−3.036
[−3.117;−2.955]
−3.960
[−4.050;−3.870]
−3.921
[−3.969;−3.874]
δSB
−2.301
[−2.366;−2.237]
−2.280
[−2.350;−2.210]
−2.021
[−2.092;−1.950]
−3.260
[−3.333;−3.186]
η
−0.966
[−1.019;−0.912]
−0.905
[−0.964;−0.846]
−0.587
[−0.646;−0.528]
−0.409
[−0.440;−0.377]
γ
2.564
[2.527; 2.601]
2.086
[2.042; 2.129]
2.779
[2.741; 2.818]
2.569
[2.546; 2.592]
N 104,946 71,294 102,939 280,828
pseudo-R2 0.285 0.329 0.152 0.133
Note: Estimates obtained using the alternative definition of loyalty (see appendix A). All parameters are signifi-
cantly different from 0 at the 1% level. 95% confidence intervals reported below estimated coefficients, constructed
using robust standard errors. SB denotes store brand.
121
Table A.7.2: Demand estimates (heterogenous γ).
ASDA MORRISONS SAINSBURY’S TESCO
δAnchor
−2.975
[−3.109;−2.841]
−3.042
[−3.210;−2.875]
−3.575
[−3.727;−3.424]
−4.100
[−4.179;−4.020]
δLurpak
−2.202
[−2.327;−2.078]
−2.176
[−2.332;−2.020]
−3.177
[−3.329;−3.026]
−3.545
[−3.618;−3.471]
δClover
−3.148
[−3.253;−3.043]
−2.852
[−2.962;−2.741]
−3.821
[−3.931;−3.711]
−4.085
[−4.145;−4.025]
δCountry Life
−3.898
[−4.027;−3.770]
−3.348
[−3.505;−3.190]
−4.322
[−4.484;−4.160]
−4.932
[−5.020;−4.844]
δFlora
−2.299
[−2.376;−2.222]
−2.117
[−2.197;−2.036]
−2.763
[−2.848;−2.679]
−2.925
[−2.969;−2.882]
δICBINB
−2.501
[−2.568;−2.434]
−2.840
[−2.920;−2.759]
−3.447
[−3.532;−3.362]
−3.701
[−3.746;−3.656]
δSB
−2.815
[−2.885;−2.746]
−2.997
[−3.075;−2.918]
−2.576
[−2.650;−2.503]
−3.051
[−3.086;−3.016]
η
−0.744
[−0.800;−0.688]
−0.656
[−0.718;−0.594]
−0.295
[−0.355;−0.235]
−0.130
[−0.162;−0.098]
γAnchor
4.006
[3.870; 4.143]
3.886
[3.712; 4.061]
4.012
[3.904; 4.121]
4.095
[4.024; 4.165]
γLurpak
3.547
[3.459; 3.635]
3.382
[3.275; 3.489]
3.598
[3.506; 3.690]
3.658
[3.606; 3.711]
γClover
3.384
[3.258; 3.511]
3.402
[3.289; 3.515]
3.917
[3.805; 4.030]
4.146
[4.081; 4.211]
γCountryLife
3.988
[3.850; 4.126]
3.846
[3.645; 4.047]
4.768
[4.614; 4.921]
4.948
[4.844; 5.053]
γFlora
2.445
[2.373; 2.518]
2.273
[2.202; 2.345]
2.673
[2.607; 2.739]
2.666
[2.628; 2.705]
γICBINB
2.981
[2.917; 3.046]
3.087
[2.995; 3.179]
2.977
[2.881; 3.073]
3.458
[3.402; 3.513]
γSB
2.857
[2.818; 2.897]
3.302
[3.201; 3.404]
1.851
[1.782; 1.921]
2.857
[2.818; 2.897]
N 104,946 71,294 102,939 280,828
pseudo-R2 0.289 0.367 0.150 0.187
Note: All parameters are significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. 95% confidence intervals reported below
estimated coefficients, constructed using robust standard errors. SB denotes store brand.
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Table A.7.3: Multinomial logit CCP estimates.
Arla Dairy Crest Unilever
HL LH LL HL LH LL HL LH LL
at−1
Arla: HL 2.064*** 0.592* 2.091*** -0.679 0.116 0.228 -0.001 0.333 -0.051
(0.08) (0.32) (0.35) (0.61) (0.24) (0.46) (0.14) (0.71) (0.73)
Arla: LH -0.032 2.385*** 2.450*** -0.398 -0.452 -0.466 -0.232 0.495 -0.070
(0.32) (0.29) (0.46) (0.54) (0.37) (0.45) (0.37) (0.78) (0.95)
Arla: LL 2.869*** 3.018*** 5.031*** 0.124 -0.728 -0.219 -0.148 0.635 -0.059
(0.83) (0.65) (0.79) (0.46) (0.56) (0.70) (0.32) (0.64) (0.58)
DC: HL 0.633 -0.107 -0.308 3.283*** 0.805 2.668*** 0.120 -0.005 -0.620
(0.49) (0.25) (0.35) (0.34) (0.56) (0.32) (0.13) (0.46) (0.40)
DC: LH 0.133 -0.403 -0.087 0.846 2.732*** 2.074*** 0.146 -0.339 -0.720*
(0.28) (0.31) (0.30) (0.55) (0.45) (0.30) (0.21) (0.54) (0.40)
DC: LL -0.205 -0.569 -1.062** 2.312*** 2.780*** 4.387*** 0.035 -0.221 -0.999
(0.20) (0.41) (0.52) (0.53) (0.57) (0.61) (0.20) (0.45) (0.69)
Unilever: HL -0.082 0.129 0.323* -0.072 0.340 -0.948*** 2.512*** -0.059 1.752***
(0.27) (0.15) (0.19) (0.35) (0.38) (0.35) (0.28) (0.87) (0.28)
Unilever: LH -0.313 -0.068 0.474* 0.087 -0.379 -0.404 0.583 3.023*** 3.037***
(0.58) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.15) (0.23)
Unilever: LL -0.812* -0.122 -0.055 -0.548* -0.077 -0.613 2.034* 1.487** 4.261***
(0.48) (0.11) (0.59) (0.32) (0.42) (0.51) (1.14) (0.59) (0.83)
st−1
ANCHOR
46.893** 40.588 58.726 14.085 -14.866 -20.447** -5.319 0.058 44.926*
(18.32) (32.63) (37.59) (25.40) (17.11) (9.74) (19.72) (24.10) (26.81)
LURPAK
39.537*** 19.496 19.526** 2.885 33.039*** 19.656* 12.349 14.877* 33.932***
(14.93) (13.72) (8.34) (11.76) (6.75) (10.25) (19.99) (8.21) (10.48)
CLOVER
-15.452* 5.741 10.781 8.741** -12.049*** 12.354* -5.322 4.464 -4.045
(8.95) (5.75) (6.90) (4.28) (4.59) (6.58) (6.03) (3.40) (6.78)
COUNTRY LIFE
-25.289*** 6.071 -2.554 28.405* 28.989 42.215* -57.456*** 5.898 42.557**
(7.41) (11.71) (17.65) (16.15) (21.78) (22.18) (6.57) (15.09) (20.47)
FLORA
3.161 3.139 2.408 -3.202 -13.367*** 2.528 6.453 3.976 9.420*
(4.54) (5.75) (3.84) (6.58) (4.69) (8.63) (5.80) (9.42) (5.67)
ICBINB
0.305 -4.137* -1.185 -3.324 3.058 3.853 4.523 12.564*** 13.773***
(5.44) (2.42) (2.91) (3.75) (6.31) (2.96) (5.63) (1.65) (2.73)
STORE BRAND
-1.132 -2.270 -18.353 -6.775 -4.959 1.167 -2.047 -22.016*** -25.182***
(6.05) (8.26) (14.07) (15.52) (4.18) (10.09) (5.64) (7.62) (8.39)
MORRISONS
-0.181 -0.519*** -0.457** 0.589*** -0.094 0.122 0.723*** -0.579*** -0.001
(0.13) (0.17) (0.22) (0.20) (0.17) (0.22) (0.11) (0.09) (0.13)
SAINSBURY’S
-0.289* -0.905** -1.754*** 0.223 -0.607** -1.109*** 0.707** -0.574 -1.828***
(0.17) (0.38) (0.61) (0.45) (0.29) (0.33) (0.29) (0.48) (0.52)
TESCO
1.135*** 0.532 0.921** 0.509 -0.249* 0.184 1.086* 0.109 0.687***
(0.18) (0.37) (0.42) (0.42) (0.13) (0.34) (0.20) (0.34) (0.20)
Constant
-2.042*** -1.223** -3.031*** -2.114*** -1.155*** -3.488*** -2.303*** -1.712*** -4.349***
(0.56) (0.62) (0.56) (0.80) (0.41) (0.41) (0.37) (0.43) (1.09)
Note: For all 3 players (Arla, Dairy Crest, Unilever) HH is the reference action. H stands for high and L low price, for the two products each firm is
selling. Arla: Anchor and Lurpak, Dairy Crest: Clover and Country Life, Unilever: Flora and I Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter (ICBINB). Last panel of the
table shows supermarket fixed effects to reflect the fact that different equilibrium strategies can be played in different markets. Asda is the reference market
there. N = 703. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Figure A.7.1: Actions played by firms: model vs. data.
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Figure A.7.2: Market shares by brand: model vs. data.
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Appendix B
Supplementary material for chapter 2
B.1 Proofs
The equivalent of Proposition 1 of GPV (2000)
The goal of this proposition is to study the smoothness of the density of prices f(·), implied by
some assumptions on the latent density of marginal costs, h(·). This is needed to study the uniform
convergence rate of the nonparametric estimator. For simplicity, we assume that the number of
firms is fixed at K. Paraphrasing assumptions A1-A2 of GPV, we have:
Assumptions:
A1 (IPV): ri’s are independently and identically distributed asH(·) with density h(·),
A2 (Finite support): For all K, supp(H) = [R,R] is a compact subset of R+.
A3 (Non-zero density): For all r ∈ supp(H), h(r) ≥ ch > 0
A4 (Smoothness): H(·) admits up to R+ 1 continuous bounded partial derivatives on
supp(H), with R ≥ 1.
Assumptions A1-A4 allow us to formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 1:
The distribution of prices F(·) satisfies:
(i) supp(F) = {p : p ∈ [P , P ]} with P > P and P = R.
(ii) for all p ∈ supp(F), f(p) ≥ cf > 0
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(iii) F(·) admits up to R+ 1 continuous bounded partial derivatives on supp(F)
(iv) f(·) admits up to R + 1 continuous bounded partial derivatives on every closed
subset of the interior of supp(F)
Proof. Monotonicity of the optimal pricing strategy and the boundary condition β(R) = R make
(i) trivially satisfied. To prove (ii), note that f(p) = h(ξ(p))β′(ξ(p)) . h by A3 is bounded away from 0 and
by A4 so the derivative of the optimal pricing strategy β′(·), as long as q1 6= 1. Since we focus on
equilibria with price dispersion, β′(·) > 0 holds almost everywhere. Hence f(p) is also bounded
away from 0. To prove (iii) it is enough to observe that F(p) = H(ξ(p)), where both H and ξ
have R + 1 continuous bounded derivatives. Finally, since for any p in the interior of supp(F),
(p− ξ(p)) > 0, the expression for the inverse of the optimal pricing strategy can be rearranged to
yield the density:
f(p) =
∑K
k=1 qkk(1−F(p))k−1
(p− ξ(p))∑Kk=2 qkk(k − 1)(1−F(p))k−2 [B.1.1]
Since ξ(·) = β−1(·) and β(·) has the same smoothness asH, then ξ(·) isR+1-times continuously
differentiable. But since according to (iii), F(·) is also R + 1-times differentiable, then so is f(·)
and (iv) follows.
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Appendix C
Supplementary material for chapter 3
C.1 Data and reduced form results
C.1.1 Data and summary statistics
Table C.1.1 summarises our main variables of interest by broker usage for different types of mort-
gage products– the two-, three-, and five-year FRMs. There is variation in loan size, fees, and
offered interest rate across product type, but between borrowers who go direct or use brokers. The
last row in the table shows monthly interest payments normalised by the size of the loan, which
is our preferred measure of calculating mortgage cost. Section 3.2.3 outlines the calculation in
detail.
Table C.1.1: Summary statistics
2 yr FRM 3 yr FRM 5 yr FRM
Direct Broker Direct Broker Direct Broker
Interest (bps) 232 213 245 235 259 247
Loan (£) 161,070 185,578 166,804 176,525 145,680 167,747
Loan Fees (£) 373.97 575.18 434.58 578.43 495.12 620.56
Monthly payment (£) 788.47 781.00 831.52 796.33 782.82 791.66
Monthly interest (£) 317.85 358.93 345.73 363.63 316.03 355.56
Normalised payment (£) 305.84 298.95 314.16 312.54 331.70 320.59
Note: Interest is the interest rate in basis points. Loan is the size of the mortgage issued by the bank. Monthly payment is
the payment of capital and interest during the initial contract period of the loan, excluding lender fees. Monthly interest is the
component of the monthly payment that goes towards payment of the interest, and includes the fees. Normalised interest payment
is the monthly interest payment normalised to take into account the size of the loan.
Mortgage contracts in the UK are short-term, with an initial duration of 2-, 3-, or 5-years.
Following the expiration of the initial period, and if the household does not refinance, the mortgage
contract reverts to the bank’s posted rate, or Standard Variable Rate (SVR). There are two types
of contracts in the UK: fixed and variable. Fixed rate mortgages (FRM) have a fixed interest
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rate during the initial period, while adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) have a fluctuating rate that
is a discount off of the SVR. Mortgage rates are arranged according to the length of the initial
period and by LTV band. The longer the period and the higher the LTV, the more expensive the
product. Table C.1.2 shows that, on average in our sample, households pay 230 basis points on
their mortgage product, but that there is a spread of 280 basis points between the 2-year FRM at
70% LTV (cheapest) and the 5-year FRM at 95% LTV. Given that yield curves were roughly flat
during this period, spreads across products have remained more or less constant.
Table C.1.2: Interest Rates by LTV and Rate Duration
2 yr FRM 3 yr FRM 5 yr FRM Total
≤ 70 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.0
71 - 75 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.0
76 - 80 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.1
81 - 85 2.1 2.5 2.8 2.2
86 - 90 2.8 3.0 3.3 2.9
91 - 95 3.0 4.0 4.6 4.0
Total 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.3
Just over one-third of our sample are FTB, with the remainder either moving home or remort-
gaging their current home. But there is variation in the distribution of mortgagors at different LTV
bands. Table C.1.3 shows that 80% of mortgagors on 95% LTV products are FTB, whereas 80%
of mortgagors who took out an LTV of 70% or less are non-FTB.
Different banks also specialise in different products, with the share of longer term products
more likely to be offered by some banks over others. This can be seen in table C.1.4
Table C.1.3: Share by Household type and LTV
Non-FTB FTB Total
≤ 70 82 18 100
71 - 75 60 40 100
76 - 80 68 32 100
81 - 85 56 44 100
86 - 90 36 64 100
91 - 95 19 81 100
Total 64 36 100
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Table C.1.4: Share by Bank and Product Type
2 yr FRM 3 yr FRM 5 yr FRM Total
Bank 1 76.61 0.89 22.50 100
Bank 2 67.48 2.26 30.26 100
Bank 3 58.80 9.75 31.45 100
Bank 4 66.22 4.71 29.07 100
Bank 5 44.19 10.74 45.07 100
Bank 6 72.30 1.42 26.28 100
Total 66.27 4.33 29.40 100
C.1.2 Estimation sample
We restrict our sample to standard1 fixed rate mortgage products with two-, three-, and five-year
durations; and to loan sizes less than £1M. This leaves us with about 82% of the sample (1.7M
loans) for analysis. We further restrict our sample to the six largest mortgage providers which
made up about 75% (or 1.3M loans) in 2016 and 2017. The differences between the raw and final
sample are tabulated in table C.1.5.
Table C.1.5: Raw and Final Sample
Big Six % Raw Sample %
Total 1,539,009 100.00 2,138,754 100.00
Interest-only mortgages 43,276 2.81 81,482 3.81
Non-FRM 114,099 7.41 152,856 7.15
Not 2, 3, 5yrs 61,765 4.01 141,054 6.60
£1M+ loan 4,186 0.27 5,886 0.28
Outliers 6,606 0.43 13,892 0.65
Final Sample 1,309,077 85.06 1,743,584 81.52
C.1.3 Probability of using a broker
Table C.1.6 reports the estimates from a linear probability model where we regressed the indica-
tor whether the contract was brokered on a number of personal and product characteristics. The
first observation is that the signs are in line with intuition. For example, lower income, first time
buyers, the employed, and older mortgagors are more likely to use a broker. Moving to column
2, adding product characteristics shows that mortgagors who took longer term contracts were less
likely to visit brokers (the causality may also be in the other direction, so we interpret the results in
terms of conditional correlations, rather than causal relationships). In fact, a recent FCA investiga-
1These are products that include repayment of the capital.
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tion (Iscenko and Nieboer, 2018) hypothesises that brokers might be more likely to suggest 2-year
contracts knowing that this makes borrowers use their services more frequently in the future. A
longer mortgage term is also associated with increased probability of using brokers. However,
column 2 also shows that when product characteristics are added, the sign on LTV indicators is
reversed from positive (column 1) to negative. In fact, the higher the LTV the less likely a house-
hold uses a broker. This may be for a number of reasons, for example, households on low LTV
products typically have smaller absolute loans, therefore the costs of visiting a broker and paying
a lump-sum is relatively higher. Finally, column 3 shows that even after controlling for regional
fixed effects, the coefficients remain unchanged and the R2 remains low, so the observables are
rather poor predictors for broker use.
Table C.1.6: Probability of using a broker
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent var: Personal Product Regional
Used a broker Characteristics Characteristics Characteristics
Income -0.002*** -0.016*** -0.037***
First Time Buyer 0.048*** 0.016*** 0.009***
Aged 25 - 29 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.024***
Aged 30-34 0.042*** 0.068*** 0.063***
Aged 35- 39 0.049*** 0.121*** 0.115***
Aged 40 - 45 0.036*** 0.179*** 0.172***
Aged 45+ -0.022*** 0.251*** 0.241***
71 - 75 LTV 0.131*** 0.063*** 0.078***
76 - 80 LTV 0.042*** -0.029*** -0.012***
81 - 85 LTV 0.075*** -0.019*** -0.000
86 - 90 LTV 0.035*** -0.066*** -0.041***
91 - 95 LTV 0.028*** -0.111*** -0.084***
Employed -0.054*** -0.046*** -0.045***
Mortgage Term 0.021*** 0.020***
3 Year FRM -0.229*** -0.228***
5 Year FRM -0.187*** -0.184***
Flexible Mortgage 0.086*** 0.083***
Urban area -0.011***
Regional FE No No Yes
Observations 1,309,067 1,309,067 1,307,538
R2 0.020 0.124 0.130
Note: *** denotes 1% significance level. Robust standard errors used.
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Figure C.1.1: Distributions of predicted probabilities of using a broker.
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Note: Density estimates of the distributions of P̂r(di = broker|X) based on the LPM in the third column of table C.1.6 for the
brokered and direct subsamples.
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C.1.4 Robustness checks
This section presents robustness checks, which examine potential effects of procuration fees paid
by the lenders to the brokers. The first two tables display the results of the regression of prices on
brokered dummy (table 3.2 in the main text) for two subsamples of the data – C.1.7 only uses data
on brokers who are not paid by the borrowers directly and are only compensated by the lenders,
while C.1.8 only uses data on brokers who are not paid by the lenders and are only paid directly
by the borrowers. The signs on the variables of interest are negative for all specifications and
subsamples. This suggests that there is no evidence that different sources of compensation can
alter brokers incentives to provide advice about cheaper products.
Table C.1.7: Price benefits of using a broker: brokers who do not charge the borrowers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Interest Interest Interest Monthly Monthly
Payment Payment
Used a broker -6.509*** -6.370*** -7.720*** -2.091*** -2.210***
(0.0902) (0.0917) (0.0927) (0.143) (0.153)
Lender Fees Linear Linear Non-linear - -
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 940,921 940,921 940,921 940,921 940,921
R2 0.741 0.747 0.754 0.600 0.605
Note: *** denotes significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Interest is measured in basis points.
Monthly interest is the component of the initial monthly payment that goes towards payment of the interest, including
lender fees, and normalised by the size of the loan. Controls are income, house price, loan size, LTV, first time buyer and
mortgage term. Time fixed effects are at the monthly level. Regional fixed effects are at the Government Office Region
level and include a flag for an urban region. Non-linearities in lender fees are controlled for using a fifth-order spline.
Table C.1.8: Price benefits of using a broker: brokers who are not paid by lenders.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Interest Interest Interest Monthly Monthly
Payment Payment
Used a broker -6.181*** -2.443*** -4.390*** -6.151*** -1.046***
(0.180) (0.177) (0.182) (0.244) (0.245)
Lender Fees Linear Linear Non-linear - -
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional FE No Yes Yes No Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 464,012 464,012 464,012 464,012 464,012
R2 0.689 0.698 0.704 0.628 0.636
Note: *** denotes significant at 1% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Interest is measured in basis points.
Monthly interest is the component of the initial monthly payment that goes towards payment of the interest, including
lender fees, and normalised by the size of the loan. Controls are income, house price, loan size, LTV, first time buyer and
mortgage term. Time fixed effects are at the monthly level. Regional fixed effects are at the Government Office Region
level and include a flag for an urban region. Non-linearities in lender fees are controlled for using a fifth-order spline.
Tables C.1.9 and C.1.10 display alternative calculations of the value of information under
the assumption that removing brokers would reduce lenders’ costs by the expected amount of
procuration fees. To implement this, we adjust each estimatedH(·|xH) by ∆B ·φ(xH), where the
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first term is the average proportion of brokered loans with characteristics xH and the second term
is the average observed procuration fee for a mortgage characterised by xH taken from the data.
Since the result is a leftward shift of the entire distribution, equilibrium search behaviour does
not change because proportions of borrowers searching different number of lenders depend on the
differences in the expected prices and not the level of prices itself. The results of this exercise are
valid under the assumption that the mortgage sold through a broker and directly is indeed the same
product so any additional cost, such as the procuration fee if it is sold through a broker, is also
indirectly passed onto consumers who obtain it directly from the lender.
The numbers in the tables below should be compared to tables 3.7 and 3.8 in the main text. Overall,
adjusting for procuration fees reduces the value of information by about £15 through a smaller
increase in prices (29% vs. 33%).
Table C.1.9: Value of information with adjusted costs: breakdown by borrower types.
VOI %∆p %∆SE
Overall 97.38 +29.15% +16.33%
Age
<30 183.46 +51.18% +65.49%
30+ 78.76 +24.39% +5.70%
Income
Low 135.64 +36.53% -18.62%
High 83.44 +26.46% +50.43%
FTB
FTB 111.57 +32.88% +62.98%
Non-FTB 83.42 +25.51% -0.67%
Location
Urban 99.57 +29.42% +26.05%
Rural 89.33 +28.18% -19.46%
Note: Second column of the table reports the estimated average value of infor-
mation as defined in equation (3.13) in GBP per month. The third and fourth
columns report the average percentage change in prices and search expenditures,
respectively. Calculations made by simulating new prices and search behaviour
from the new equilibrium, assuming that lenders drew had the same cost draws
as in the baseline scenario. Marginal cost distributions are adjusted to account
for the fact that in a world without brokers, lenders do not pay procuration fees.
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Table C.1.10: Value of information with adjusted costs: breakdown by loan characteristics.
VOI %∆p %∆SE
Overall 97.37 +29.15% +16.33%
LTV
≤70 69.65 +23.09% -26.37%
71-75 132.21 +42.63% +90.52%
76-80 51.31 +16.38% +26.06%
81-85 163.04 +49.09% +98.04%
86-90 151.47 +34.97% +48.36%
91-95 45.49 +9.13% -50.29%
Deal
2 years 146.15 +43.38% +48.25%
3 years -9.45 -0.96% -67.62%
5 years -9.27 -2.05% -52.44%
Term
≤10 years -2.69 +2.26% -86.19%
(10;15] -24.38 -5.34% -77.46%
(15;20] -9.36 -1.33% -69.37%
(20;25] 60.89 +19.53% -43.84%
(25;30] 108.85 +31.75% +7.88%
(30;35] 342.77 +98.11% +284.55%
Value
Q1 101.83 +30.98% -50.97%
Q2 66.17 +19.43% -28.31%
Q3 103.31 +29.87% +30.91%
Q4 116.71 +35.83% +112.17%
Flexible
Flexible 4.47 +4.13% -82.27%
Regular 111.71 +33.01% +31.69%
Cashback
No cashback 106.57 +31.59% -70.04%
Cashback 35.87 +12.84% +29.33%
Note: Second column of the table reports the estimated average value of infor-
mation as defined in equation (3.13) in GBP per month. The third and fourth
columns report the average percentage change in prices and search expenditures,
respectively. Calculations made by simulating new prices and search behaviour
from the new equilibrium, assuming that lenders drew had the same cost draws
as in the baseline scenario. Marginal cost distributions are adjusted to account
for the fact that in a world without brokers, lenders do not pay procuration fees.
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C.2 Additional figures
Figure C.2.1: Distributions of price-cost margins.
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Figure C.2.2: Pairwise comparisons of estimated search cost CDFs.
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Note: Graphs present estimated search cost distributions in a way that allows to compare them across one characteristic (see top of
each column), keeping all the other ones fixed at all their possible values (see graph headings).
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